{ "id": 6142252, "name": "Jamie MANN v. ARKANSAS PROFESSIONAL BAIL BONDSMAN LICENSING BOARD", "name_abbreviation": "Mann v. Arkansas Professional Bail Bondsman Licensing Board", "decision_date": "2004-12-01", "docket_number": "CA 04-236", "first_page": "393", "last_page": "403", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "88 Ark. App. 393" }, { "type": "parallel", "cite": "199 S.W.3d 84" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ark. Ct. App.", "id": 13370, "name": "Arkansas Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 34, "name_long": "Arkansas", "name": "Ark." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "720 S.W.2d 313", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.W.2d", "case_ids": [ 1873731, 6650366 ], "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/290/0537-01", "/ark-app/19/0259-01" ] }, { "cite": "19 Ark. App. 259", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark. App.", "case_ids": [ 6650366 ], "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark-app/19/0259-01" ] }, { "cite": "76 Ark. App. 235", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark. App.", "case_ids": [ 6139937 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2001, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark-app/76/0235-01" ] }, { "cite": "83 Ark. App. 111", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark. App.", "case_ids": [ 6137938 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2003, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark-app/83/0111-01" ] }, { "cite": "304 Ark. 562", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1880857 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1991, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/304/0562-01" ] }, { "cite": "336 Ark. 211", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 51248 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1999, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/336/0211-01" ] }, { "cite": "341 Ark. 381", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1257809 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2000, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/341/0381-01" ] }, { "cite": "305 Ark. 556", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1916697 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1991, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/305/0556-01" ] }, { "cite": "13 Ark. App. 111", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark. App.", "case_ids": [ 6137952 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "declining to address the two findings of the Board that the circuit court found to be supported by substantial evidence because neither party had appealed on those issues" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark-app/13/0111-01" ] }, { "cite": "269 Ark. 67", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1712534 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1980, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/269/0067-01" ] }, { "cite": "Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 25-15-212", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "Ark. Code Ann.", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(h)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 17-19-211", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "Ark. Code Ann.", "year": 2001, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "320 Ark. 333", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1451271 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1995, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/320/0333-01" ] }, { "cite": "348 Ark. 48", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 74071 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2002, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/348/0048-01" ] }, { "cite": "350 Ark. 444", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1404467 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2002, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/350/0444-01" ] }, { "cite": "Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 17-19-106", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "Ark. Code Ann.", "year": 2001, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 17-19-101", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "Ark. Code Ann.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "79 Ark. App. 43", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark. App.", "case_ids": [ 6136843 ], "weight": 8, "year": 2002, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark-app/79/0043-01" ] }, { "cite": "342 Ark. 325", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1342430 ], "weight": 10, "year": 2000, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/342/0325-01" ] }, { "cite": "88 Ark. App. 222", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark. App.", "case_ids": [ 6139976 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2004, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark-app/88/0222-01" ] }, { "cite": "Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 17-19-210", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "Ark. Code Ann.", "weight": 3, "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(a)(3)" }, { "page": "(a)(3)" }, { "page": "(a)(3)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 775, "char_count": 16570, "ocr_confidence": 0.732, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.03580807328026e-08, "percentile": 0.17496290324262148 }, "sha256": "d26c3cf5ba006dbfa49d147eee9e3b8042f82d99e6cebf3806fefcf579c4caf0", "simhash": "1:586d74c42288355d", "word_count": 2757 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T22:49:43.833679+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Robbins and Bird, JJ., agree." ], "parties": [ "Jamie MANN v. ARKANSAS PROFESSIONAL BAIL BONDSMAN LICENSING BOARD" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "Andree Layton Roaf, Judge.\nJamie Mann, a bail bondsman, appeals from the Pulaski County Circuit Court\u2019s decision following an appeal to that court from the Arkansas Professional Bail Bondsman Licensing Board. On September 18, 2000, the Board revoked Mann\u2019s license after finding that he had violated Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 17-19-210(a)(3) (Repl. 1995), which states that the Board may suspend or revoke a license if the licensee has committed a fraudulent or dishonest act or practice, or has demonstrated incompetence or untrustworthiness. The circuit court affirmed the Board\u2019s finding that Mann had violated the statute but modified the penalty to a suspension of his license for one year. We affirm the Board\u2019s finding that he violated the statute. Because the Board has not appealed the modification of its decision, we do not disturb the circuit court\u2019s reduction of the penalty.\nSharon Patton was arrested in Fulton County on drug charges in June 2000 and was released on her own recognizance. On June 28, 2000, Mrs. Patton called Daniel Brown of First Arkansas Bail Bonds, Inc. (First Arkansas), and told him that she would need a bond because she was required to turn herself in to the sheriffs office the next day. On June 29, 2000, on behalf of First Arkansas, Mr. Brown wrote a $30,000 bond for Mrs. Patton. She and her friend, James Foster, signed a promissory note, security agreement, and indemnity agreement. Mrs. Patton and her husband, Richard Patton, also gave First Arkansas a mortgage on their real property in Fulton County to secure the bond.\nMrs. Patton agreed to meet Mr. Brown at his office at 6:00 p.m. on June 30, 2000, to pay the bond\u2019s $3,000 premium. Mrs. Patton, however, did not appear at Mr. Brown\u2019s office as they had agreed. Later that night, Mr. Foster called Mr. Brown and told him that another bonding company had written a second bond for Mrs. Patton and had canceled the First Arkansas bond.\nMann is an employee of Affordable Bail Bonds, Inc. (Affordable). Mann, on behalf of Affordable, wrote the second $30,000 bond for Mrs. Patton, on a long-term payment plan, on June 30, 2000. On July 1, 2000, Mrs. Patton wrote a letter to Mr. Brown, in which she stated: \u201cOn the date of conversation, I exercised my lawful right to change bail bond agents within the 3 day civil rights limitations. Since no money was exchanged on the above mentioned bond, I did have this right.\u201d\nMr. Brown filed a complaint against Mann with the Board on July 10, 2000, which stated in part:\nOn July 1, 2000, Brad Parnell who is an agent with First Arkansas Bail Bond called Sharon Patton to question her about what had happened. She told him that Affordable Bail Bonds had agreed to write the bond on a long term payment plan and all she had was $800.00 and she gave that to them. She also stated that according to Jamie Mann, she had civil rights and she could void our contract within three days....\nOn July 6, 2000 I contacted Sharon Patton again to get the matter resolved. I asked her to explain to me what had happened. She stated \u201cJamie Mann called me and asked if I had paid any money to First Arkansas and I replied no, I am on my way to pay them $800.00.\u201d He advised her not to pay us any money because our contract was no good if no money has changed hands. He the [sic] advised her to go to the jail and surrender herself and he would write the bond on a long term payment plan on the premium.\nThe Board notified Mann of the complaint, and he filed a responsive affidavit in which he denied any wrongdoing. After sending Mann notice of probable cause to conduct a hearing, the Board conducted a hearing on September 8, 2000. Its decision included the following findings of fact:\n7. Later that night [June 30, 2000], Mr. Brown received a call from co-signer James Foster stating that another bonding company had written a second bond for Mrs. Patton and the other bail bondsman had \u201ccanceled the bond\u201d written by Dan Brown and First Arkansas.\n8. On July 1,2000, Mr. Brown and Brad Parnell, another agent for First Arkansas, learned that Jamie Mann and Affordable had written the second bond for Mrs. Patton on a long-term payment plan. Mr. Brown and Mr. Parnell also learned that Respondent Jamie Mann had advised Mrs. Patton that she had \u201ccivil rights\u201d and could void her contract with First Arkansas within three days of the day the bond was written.\n9. On July l,2000,Mrs.PattonforwardedalettertoMr.Brown stating she was exercising \u201cher lawful right to change bail bond agents within the three day civil rights limitations\u201d and stating she had this right since no money had exchanged hands on the bond written by Mr. Brown.\n10. Respondent Jamie Mann encouraged Mrs. Patton to surrender herself so her bond with First Arkansas would be canceled and he could bond her out a second time. Respondent Jamie Mann provided legal advice to Mrs. Patton regarding the consequences of attempting to cancel her bond with Mr. Brown and First Arkansas.\n11. Mr. Brown and First Arkansas never agreed to have Mrs. Patton\u2019s bond written by Mr. Brown on June 29,2000 canceled.\nThe Board concluded that Mann had violated Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 17-19-210(a)(3) and revoked his license. It did not hold Affordable responsible for Mann\u2019s acts. Mann appealed the Board\u2019s decision to the circuit court, which found that substantial evidence supported the Board\u2019s findings of fact and its conclusion that Mann had violated Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 17-19-210(a)(3). It found the revocation of Mann\u2019s license, however, to be \u201cunduly harsh\u201d and modified the penalty to a one-year suspension. Mann appealed from the circuit court\u2019s decision; however, the Board has not filed a cross-appeal of the decision modifying its penalty.\nArkansas Code Annotated section 25-15-212(h) (Repl. 2002) provides that we may reverse or modify an administrative agency\u2019s decision if the substantial rights of the petitioner have been prejudiced because the administrative findings, inferences, conclusions, or decisions are: (1) in violation of constitutional or statutory provisions; (2) in excess of the agency\u2019s statutory authority; (3) made upon unlawful procedure; (4) affected by other error or law; (5) not supported by substantial evidence of record; or (6) arbitrary, capricious, or characterized by abuse of discretion. See Dep\u2019t of Human Servs. v. Parker, 88 Ark. App. 222, 197 S.W.3d 33 (2004).\nOur review is limited in scope and is directed not to the circuit court but to the decision of the administrative agency. Tomerlin v. Nickolich, 342 Ark. 325, 27 S.W.3d 746 (2000). It is not the role of the circuit courts or the appellate courts to conduct a de novo review of the record; rather, review is limited to ascertaining whether there is substantial evidence to support the agency\u2019s decision. Id. Substantial evidence has been defined as valid, legal, and persuasive evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion and force the mind to pass beyond conjecture. Id. The challenging party has the burden of proving an absence of substantial evidence. Id. To establish an absence of substantial evidence to support the decision, the chai-lenging party must demonstrate that the proof before the administrative tribunal was so nearly undisputed that fair-minded persons could not reach its conclusion. Id. The question is not whether the testimony would have supported a contrary finding but whether it supports the finding that was made. Id. It is the prerogative of the agency to believe or disbelieve any witness and to decide what weight to accord the evidence. Id. We review the entire record in making this determination. Id. In reviewing the record, we give the evidence its strongest probative force in favor of the agency\u2019s ruling. Van Curen v. Arkansas Prof'l Bail Bondsman Licensing Bd., 79 Ark. App. 43, 84 S.W.3d 47 (2002). Between two fairly conflicting views, even if the reviewing court might have made a different choice, the Board\u2019s choice must not be displaced. Id.\nAdministrative actions may be considered arbitrary and capricious when they are not supported by any rational basis or hinge on a finding of fact based on an erroneous view of the law. Id. To set aside an agency decision as arbitrary and capricious, the party challenging the action must prove that it was willful and unreasoned action, without consideration, and with a disregard of the facts and circumstances of the case. Id. The requirement that an administrative decision not be arbitrary and capricious is less demanding than the requirement that it be supported by substantial evidence. Id. An action is not arbitrary simply because the reviewing court would have found differently. Id. If the Board\u2019s decision to revoke Mann\u2019s license is supported by substantial evidence, it necessarily follows that it is not arbitrary and capricious. Id.\nBail bondsmen and bail-bond companies are required to conduct their bail-bond businesses in conformity with the statutes governing the profession, Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 17-19-101 through 17-19-402 (Repl. 2001 and Supp. 2003), and the rules and regulations promulgated pursuant to Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 17-19-106 (Repl. 2001), the Arkansas Professional Bail Bond Company and Professional Bail Bondsman Licensing Act. The Act provides that the Board has the authority to administer and enforce the statutes, as well as the rules and regulations promulgated thereunder, in order to carry out its duty of licensing and regulating professional bail bondsmen and professional bail-bond companies. See Arkansas Prof'l Bail Bondsman Licensing Bd. v. Frawley, 350 Ark. 444, 88 S.W.3d 418 (2002).\nAdministrative agencies are better equipped than courts, by specialization, insight through experience, and more flexible procedures to determine and analyze underlying legal issues affecting their agencies, and this recognition accounts for the limited scope of judicial review of administrative action and the refusal of the court to substitute its judgment and discretion for that of the administrative agency. Arkansas Prof'l Bail Bondsman Licensing Bd. v. Oudin, 348 Ark. 48, 69 S.W.3d 855 (2002). Because decisions regarding the licensing of bond companies and their employees turn on executive wisdom, it is appropriate to limit the scope of review on appeal. Tomerlin v. Nickolich, supra.\nWith these principles in mind, we consider Mann\u2019s argument on appeal that the Board\u2019s findings are not supported by substantial evidence. Mann asserts that the simple act of knowingly writing a second bond is not expressly prohibited by statute or regulation. Mann also contends that the Board violated his due-process rights in revoking his license because his actions were not prohibited by law. The abstract and addendum do not demonstrate that the Board ruled on this argument. Failure to obtain a ruling will preclude even a constitutional issue\u2019s being considered on appeal. Technical Servs. of Ark., Inc. v. Pledger, 320 Ark. 333, 896 S.W.2d 433 (1995).\nArkansas Code Annotated section 17-19-210(a)(3) provides that the Board may revoke a bondsman\u2019s license if he has committed any fraudulent or dishonest acts or practices or has demonstrated his incompetence or untrustworthiness to act as a licensed bondsman. Mann denied having done anything improper or untrustworthy but admitted that he had agreed to write Mrs. Patton\u2019s second bond and had completed the paperwork, \u201cshort of writing the bond,\u201d when he met her at the jail on the evening of June 30, 2000. He argued that he had not actually written the second bond before the first bond \u201cwas surrendered\u201d and denied telling Mrs. Patton that she had the legal right to cancel the first bond.\nAt the hearing, Mrs. Patton was less sure of Mann\u2019s advice than she had been when the Board\u2019s investigator interviewed her about her \u201ccivil rights,\u201d and about his encouragement to surrender herself on First Arkansas\u2019s bond so that it would be canceled. She admitted that she had told the investigator on July 31, 2000, that Mann had been aware of the original bond and that he had informed her that, if she had not yet given Mr. Brown any money, she had a \u201cthree-day civil right\u201d to change bondsmen. Mr. Foster also admitted at the hearing that he had previously informed the investigator about a discussion of this alleged right with Mann.\nObviously, the Board did not believe Mann\u2019s denial of having told Mrs. Patton that she could cancel the first bond within three days. In light of Mrs. Patton\u2019s and Mr. Foster\u2019s reluctant admissions that they had told the Board\u2019s investigator that Mann had done so, and deferring to the Board\u2019s prerogative to assess the credibility of the witnesses and weigh the evidence, we hold that the Board\u2019s findings that Mann encouraged Mrs. Patton to cancel her first bond and that he violated the statute are supported by substantial evidence.\nMann further contends that, even if there is substantial evidence that he violated the statute, the revocation of his license was an abuse of the Board\u2019s discretion. He asserts that a more appropriate penalty would have been a fine as permitted by Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 17-19-211 (Repl. 2001). In response, the Board states that revocation was appropriate because Mann\u2019s license had been suspended within the previous twenty-four months. At the hearing, the assistant attorney general asked the Board to find Mann guilty and \u201crevoke his license, just as [it] did before.\u201d Arkansas Code Annotated section 17-19-210(d) provides: \u201cIf the board finds that one (1) or more grounds exist for the suspension or revocation of a license and that the license has been suspended within the previous twenty-four (24) months, then the board shall revoke the license.\u201d The issue of his earlier suspension, however, was not fully developed before the Board, and therefore, we will not consider it.\nWith regard to the Board\u2019s decision to revoke Mann\u2019s license, we note that the Board has not appealed from the circuit court\u2019s modification of the revocation to a one-year suspension, which was within the circuit court\u2019s powers set forth in Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 25-15-212(h). See Baxter v. Arkansas State Bd. of Dental Exam\u2019rs, 269 Ark. 67, 598 S.W.2d 412 (1980); Arkansas State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Isely, 13 Ark. App. 111, 680 S.W.2d 718 (1984). The Board, of course, had the burden of appealing from the circuit court\u2019s reduction of the penalty but failed to do so. Because it did not file a cross-appeal, we are without jurisdiction to address the argument made in its brief that this court should reinstate its penalty, the revocation of Mann\u2019s license. Brown v. Minor, 305 Ark. 556, 810 S.W.2d 334 (1991). See also Boothe v. Boothe, 341 Ark. 381, 17 S.W.3d 464 (2000); Slaton v. Slaton, 336 Ark. 211, 983 S.W.2d 951 (1999); Egg City of Ark., Inc. v. Rushing, 304 Ark. 562, 803 S.W.2d 920 (1991). See also Wren v. Sanders Plumbing Supply, 83 Ark. App. 111, 117 S.W.3d 657 (2003); McHalffey v. Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 76 Ark. App. 235, 61 S.W.3d 231 (2001); Broadhead v. McEntire, 19 Ark. App. 259, 720 S.W.2d 313 (1986). In Van Curen v. Arkansas Professional Bail Bondsman Licensing Board, supra, we affirmed the circuit court\u2019s affirmance of the Board\u2019s revocation of the bondsman\u2019s license but refused to address that portion of the circuit court\u2019s decision reversing the Board\u2019s directive that the bondsman return a bond premium because the Board had not cross-appealed from that aspect of the court\u2019s decision.\nAccordingly, we hold that the effect of the Board\u2019s failure to cross-appeal from the circuit court\u2019s reduction of the revocation of Mann\u2019s license to a one-year suspension is to leave the court\u2019s modification of the penalty intact. See also Arkansas State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Isely, supra (declining to address the two findings of the Board that the circuit court found to be supported by substantial evidence because neither party had appealed on those issues). We thus need not address Mann\u2019s argument that the revocation of his license was an abuse of the Board\u2019s discretion.\nFor these reasons, we affirm the Board\u2019s decision as modified by the circuit court.\nAffirmed.\nRobbins and Bird, JJ., agree.\nThe security agreement covered several types of personal property, including vehicles, tools, household goods, and bank accounts.", "type": "majority", "author": "Andree Layton Roaf, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Wilber Law Firm, P.A., by: Norman C. Wilber, for appellant.", "Mike Beebe, Att\u2019y Gen., by: Alice Lightle, Ass\u2019t Att\u2019y Gen., for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "Jamie MANN v. ARKANSAS PROFESSIONAL BAIL BONDSMAN LICENSING BOARD\nCA 04-236\n199 S.W.3d 84\nCourt of Appeals of Arkansas\nOpinion delivered December 1, 2004\nWilber Law Firm, P.A., by: Norman C. Wilber, for appellant.\nMike Beebe, Att\u2019y Gen., by: Alice Lightle, Ass\u2019t Att\u2019y Gen., for appellee." }, "file_name": "0393-01", "first_page_order": 417, "last_page_order": 427 }