{ "id": 6140771, "name": "Daniel MORALES v. Hector MARTINEZ, et al.", "name_abbreviation": "Morales v. Martinez", "decision_date": "2004-11-10", "docket_number": "CA 04-92", "first_page": "272-274", "last_page": "276", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "88 Ark. App. 274" }, { "type": "parallel", "cite": "198 S.W.3d 134" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ark. Ct. App.", "id": 13370, "name": "Arkansas Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 34, "name_long": "Arkansas", "name": "Ark." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "237 Ark. 909", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1737966 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1964, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/237/0909-01" ] }, { "cite": "82 Ark. App. 570", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark. App.", "case_ids": [ 6143223 ], "weight": 3, "year": 2003, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark-app/82/0570-01" ] }, { "cite": "80 Ark. App. 51", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark. App.", "case_ids": [ 6136827 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2002, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark-app/80/0051-01" ] }, { "cite": "74 Ark. App. 55", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark. App.", "case_ids": [ 6137202 ], "weight": 3, "year": 2001, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark-app/74/0055-01" ] }, { "cite": "Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 11-9-102", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "Ark. Code Ann.", "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(4)", "parenthetical": "B" }, { "page": "(4)(E)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 370, "char_count": 4895, "ocr_confidence": 0.731, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.4916347051210247e-07, "percentile": 0.6631396270593382 }, "sha256": "38c5f034ac4c539aceab029804785b01ceeb7619065df728555a45c7ac1d48e1", "simhash": "1:89bf33a7449f6ce0", "word_count": 776 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T22:49:43.833679+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Stroud, C.J., and Crabtree, J., agree." ], "parties": [ "Daniel MORALES v. Hector MARTINEZ, et al." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "John Mauzy Pittman, Judge.\nThe appellant in this work-J ers\u2019 compensation case, a Mexican national, was employed by appellee Martinez Packing Company to pick and pack produce on farms in Texas and Arkansas. On September 1, 2001, appellant and other workers were directed to clean a warehouse owned by appellee Holden-Conner Seed and Grain and used by appellee Martinez Packing Company to store produce. Appellant was injured while driving a forklift in the warehouse. He filed a claim for benefits that was denied, the Commission finding that appellant was not performing employment services at the time of the injury; that appellant\u2019s injury was not compensable because it was the result of horseplay; and that the agricultural farm labor exemption was applicable to appellee Martinez Packing Company. This appeal followed.\nFor reversal, appellant contends that the Commission erred in concluding that it was appellant\u2019s burden to show that he was not engaged in horseplay; in finding that appellant\u2019s injury was the result of horseplay; and in failing to impose liability for benefits upon appellee Holden-Conner Seed and Grain. We affirm.\nThe Commission correctly rejected appellant\u2019s contention that horseplay was an affirmative defense which must be proven by the employer. Arkansas Code Annotated section 11 \u2014 9-102(4) defines the meaning of \u201ccompensable injury\u201d in the Arkansas Workers\u2019 Compensation Law, and specifically excepts from that definition injuries caused by participation in horseplay. Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 11-9-102(4) (B)(i) (R.epl. 2002). Insomuch as the employee in a workers\u2019 compensation case has the burden of proving a compensable injury, Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 11-9-102(4)(E) (Repl. 2002); see Carman v. Haworth, Inc., 74 Ark. App. 55, 45 S.W.3d 408 (2001), the Commission correctly held that appellant in the present case had the burden to prove that he sustained an injury while engaged in the performance of employment services rather than while engaged in horseplay.\nNor do we agree with appellant\u2019s contention that the evidence is insufficient to support the Commission\u2019s finding that his injury resulted from his participation in horseplay. In reviewing decisions from the Workers\u2019 Compensation Commission, we view the evidence and all reasonable inferences deducible therefrom in the light most favorable to the Commission\u2019s findings and affirm if they are supported by substantial evidence, i.e., evidence that a reasonable person might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Carman v. Haworth, Inc., supra. We will not reverse the Commission\u2019s decision unless we are convinced that fair-minded persons with the same facts before them could not have reached the conclusions arrived at by the Commission. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Sands, 80 Ark. App. 51, 91 S.W.3d 93 (2002). Questions of weight and credibility are within the sole province of the Workers\u2019 Compensation Commission, which is not required to believe the testimony of the claimant or of any other witness, but may accept and translate into findings of fact only those portions of the testimony it deems worthy of belief. Strickland v. Primex Technologies, 82 Ark. App. 570, 120 S.W.3d 166 (2003). Once the Commission has made its decision on issues of credibility, the appellate court is bound by that decision. Id.\n\u201cHorseplay\u201d has not been defined by statute or case law in Arkansas, except to note that its meaning is synonymous with the term \u201cskylarking,\u201d which is chiefly employed in English case law. Southern Cotton Oil Division v. Childress, 237 Ark. 909, 377 S.W.2d 167 (1964). This is instructive, as the verb \u201cto skylark\u201d describes a practice in which a sailor would run up and down the rigging of a ship in sport, graphically exemplifying the dictionary definition of \u201chorseplay\u201d as \u201crough or boisterous play.\u201d Webster\u2019s Third New International Dictionary (1961). In the present case, there was evidence that appellant was not authorized to operate the forklift but that, while the forklift operators were distracted by a fire, appellant got behind the wheel of the forklift, began driving the forklift very fast in tight circles \u201clike a game,\u201d and that he was \u201cwasting time\u201d and \u201cplaying\u201d while doing so. On this record, we cannot say that the Commission erred in finding that the injury appellant sustained when the forklift overturned was the result of horseplay.\nGiven our resolution of this question, the remaining issue raised by appellant concerning the liability of appellee Holden-Conner Seed and Grain is moot, and we do not address it.\nAffirmed.\nStroud, C.J., and Crabtree, J., agree.", "type": "majority", "author": "John Mauzy Pittman, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Jay N. Tolley, for appellant.", "Huckabay, Munson, Rowlett & Moore, P.A., by: Melissa Ross and Carol Lockard Worley, for appellees." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "Daniel MORALES v. Hector MARTINEZ, et al.\nCA 04-92\n198 S.W.3d 134\nCourt of Appeals of Arkansas\nOpinion delivered November 10, 2004\n[Rehearing denied January 5, 2005.]\nJay N. Tolley, for appellant.\nHuckabay, Munson, Rowlett & Moore, P.A., by: Melissa Ross and Carol Lockard Worley, for appellees." }, "file_name": "272-274-01", "first_page_order": 298, "last_page_order": 300 }