{ "id": 6137522, "name": "Natasha Nicole STEWART v. STATE of Arkansas", "name_abbreviation": "Stewart v. State", "decision_date": "2004-12-15", "docket_number": "CA CR 03-1394", "first_page": "86", "last_page": "91", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "89 Ark. App. 86" }, { "type": "parallel", "cite": "200 S.W.3d 465" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ark. Ct. App.", "id": 13370, "name": "Arkansas Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 34, "name_long": "Arkansas", "name": "Ark." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "75 Ark. App. 15", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark. App.", "case_ids": [ 6136228 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2001, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark-app/75/0015-01" ] }, { "cite": "6 Ark. App. 89", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark. App.", "case_ids": [ 6137928 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "due process requirement was met when defendant had actual notice in that he was present during plea and arraignment when trial court set trial date" }, { "parenthetical": "due process requirement was met when defendant had actual notice in that he was present during plea and arraignment when trial court set trial date" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark-app/6/0089-01" ] }, { "cite": "266 Ark 919", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 8723790 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "due process required that an appellant be afforded proper notice and an opportunity to be heard in a proceeding involving the deprivation of life, liberty, or property" }, { "parenthetical": "due process required that an appellant be afforded proper notice and an opportunity to be heard in a proceeding involving the deprivation of life, liberty, or property" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/266/0919-01" ] }, { "cite": "Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 5-54-120", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "Ark. Code Ann.", "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(b)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "337 Ark. 196", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1241003 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "202" }, { "page": "698" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/337/0196-01" ] }, { "cite": "79 Ark. App. 447", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark. App.", "case_ids": [ 6142908 ], "weight": 5, "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "456" }, { "page": "363" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark-app/79/0447-01" ] }, { "cite": "30 Ark. App. 196", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark. App.", "case_ids": [ 6140657 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1990, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark-app/30/0196-01" ] }, { "cite": "72 S.W.3d 517", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.W.3d", "case_ids": [ 6137639 ], "year": 2002, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark-app/77/0122-01" ] }, { "cite": "11 Ark. App. 122", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark. App.", "year": 2002, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "79 Ark. App. 297", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark. App.", "case_ids": [ 6140897 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "citing Walker v. State, 11 Ark. App. 122, 72 S.W.3d 517 (2002)" }, { "parenthetical": "citing Walker v. State, 11 Ark. App. 122, 72 S.W.3d 517 (2002)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark-app/79/0297-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 532, "char_count": 10536, "ocr_confidence": 0.771, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.6564382281512242e-07, "percentile": 0.6935908232487685 }, "sha256": "2d9bb8ebbd7ab8e1bb441e5905081272691331f0274ef7e53ef19d6d826b6d56", "simhash": "1:4743d40644eebbc2", "word_count": 1777 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T22:09:44.662329+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Griffen and Crabtree, JJ., agree." ], "parties": [ "Natasha Nicole STEWART v. STATE of Arkansas" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "Karen R. Baker, Judge.\nFollowing a bench trial in Pulaski County Circuit Court, appellant, Natasha Nicole Stewart, was convicted of failure to appear and was sentenced to three years\u2019 probation and a $300 fine. On appeal, she argues that the trial judge erred in denying her motion to dismiss the charge of failure to appear because the State failed to prove that she had actual notice of a summons directing her to appear on March 31, 2003, for plea and arraignment. We reverse and dismiss.\nMs. Studdard, the case coordinator for the Seventh Division, testified that she originally scheduled appellant\u2019s plea and arraignment for March 24, 2003, in case number CA03-734, a case in which appellant was charged with domestic battery in the second degree, a felony. On March 24, 2003, upon discovering that appellant had posted bond and was no longer in jail, Ms. Studdard rescheduled appellant\u2019s plea and arraignment for March 31, 2003. Ms. Studdard testified that on March 24, 2003, she mailed notice to appellant of the new plea and arraignment date at her address of record, 2719 Welch. Ms. Studdard testified that the letter was not returned, which would indicate that there was no one at that address, and that she did not receive any notice indicating that the summons had not been served. When appellant did not appear at the March 31 plea and arraignment, a warrant was issued for her failure to appear. It is unclear if this warrant was ever served. However, immediately following the bench trial in case number CA03-734, where appellant was acquitted of domestic battery but convicted of a misdemeanor for obstructing government operations, the court took up the matter of appellant\u2019s failure to appear for the March 31 plea and arraignment.\nAppellant\u2019s father, Mr. Stewart, testified at the hearing that appellant was in jail after being arrested for the battery charge and, after being released, appellant began living with him at 1716 South Pulaski. Mr. Stewart stated that appellant had lived at 2719 Welch, and \u201cshe was in the process of moving back over there, and I was trying to help her.\u201d He testified that appellant \u201ckept the residence [2719 Welch] up.\u201d \u201cWe was keeping it up, but she just \u2014 the utilities and stuff was down, and the babies \u2014 I just kept them over there at my house, that\u2019s all. But she was still technically living at that residence.\u201d He testified that appellant did receive mail at the South Pulaski residence.\nMr. Oliver, appellant\u2019s bail bondsman, testified that appellant\u2019s bail bond receipt listed her address as 2719 Welch, an address that appellant had given him on February 19, 2003, the day he made the bond. Mr. Oliver testified that when he contacted appellant after finding out that she had missed a court appearance on March 31, appellant told him that she did not have notice of the hearing. Mr. Oliver also testified that after contacting-appellant at her father\u2019s house he requested that a new plea and arraignment date be set. He then advised appellant that the new date was May 5. Appellant appeared as instructed on May 5, and appeared for all other scheduled court appearances.\nAppellant testified and confirmed that she gave Mr. Oliver the Welch Street address. She also testified that she and her children stayed with her father because she was without a job and had no electricity at the house on Welch Street. She stated that mail continued to go to the Welch Street address, \u201cbesides the mail that was going to my dad\u2019s.\u201d She did not move back to the home on Welch Street until May or June. She testified that she had no knowledge of the March 31 court date until she was contacted by her bondsman, Will Oliver.\nAppellant argues that the trial court erred in denying her motion for a directed verdict because the prosecution failed to present sufficient evidence that she had actual notice that she was to appear in court on March 31, 2003. Appellant specifically asserts that the State provided circumstantial evidence that was insufficient in that \u201cin order to find that appellant Stewart had the required notice, the circuit judge had to find one inferred fact on the basis of another inferred fact.\u201d\nA motion to dismiss, identical to a motion for a directed verdict in a jury trial, is a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence. Green v. State, 79 Ark. App. 297, 87 S.W.3d 814 (2002) (citing Walker v. State, 11 Ark. App. 122, 72 S.W.3d 517 (2002)). The evidence is reviewed in the light most favorable to the appellee and the conviction is affirmed if there is substantial evidence to support the verdict. Ryan v. State, 30 Ark. App. 196, 786 S.W.2d 835 (1990). Substantial evidence is that which will with reasonable certainty compel a conclusion one way or another without resorting to speculation or conjecture. Id. Circumstantial evidence may constitute substantial evidence to support a conviction. Medlock v. State, 79 Ark. App. 447, 456, 89 S.W.3d 357, 363 (2002). The longstanding rule in the use of circumstantial evidence is that, to be substantial, the evidence must exclude every other reasonable hypothesis than that of the guilt of the accused. Id. The question of whether the circumstantial evidence excludes every hypothesis consistent with innocence is for the jury to decide. Id. On review, this court must determine whether the fact-finder resorted to speculation and conjecture in reaching its verdict. Id. It is in the province of the fact-finder to determine the weight of the evidence and the credibility ofwitnesses. Johnson v. State, 337 Ark. 196, 202, 987 S.W.2d 694, 698 (1999).\nAppellant\u2019s argument that the State failed to prove actual notice of the March 31 court date is well taken. Arkansas Code Annotated section 5-54-120(a)(l) and (2) (Repl. 1997) provides that a person commits the offense of failure to appear if he fails to appear without reasonable excuse subsequent to having been: (1) cited or summoned as an accused; or (2) lawfully set at liberty upon condition that he appear at a specified time, place, and court. Failure to appear is a Class C felony if the required appearance was to answer a felony charge. Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 5-54-120(b) (Repl.1997). Arkansas Rule of Criminal Procedure 6.3 (2004) describes the process by which a summons is served to an accused. It states that, \u201ccriminal summons may be served by (a) any method prescribed for personal service of civil process; or (b) certified mail, for delivery to addressee only with return receipt requested.\u201d There is no evidence in the record that the State complied with the requirements ofsection 5-54-120(a)(l) or (2) or Rule 6.3. Rawls v. State, 266 Ark 919, 587 S.W.2d 602 (Ark. App. 1979) (due process required that an appellant be afforded proper notice and an opportunity to be heard in a proceeding involving the deprivation of life, liberty, or property); cf. Harris v. State, 6 Ark. App. 89, 638 S.W.2d 698 (1982) (due process requirement was met when defendant had actual notice in that he was present during plea and arraignment when trial court set trial date). We note that appellant did not specifically argue noncompliance with Rule 6.3; however, she does argue that the State failed to prove actual notice. Given that the State did not prove either that she was set at liberty upon condition that she appear at a specified time, place, and court nor that the attempted summons was served in compliance with Rule 6.3, the State failed to meet its burden in this case.\nThis court addressed the issue of adequate notice of a required court appearance in the context of a speedy-trial analysis in Ballard v. State, 75 Ark. App. 15, 53 S.W.3d 53 (2001). In Ballard, we held that the State\u2019s evidence demonstrating that it was standard procedure to send a notice of plea and arraignment by regular mail failed to show by a preponderance of the evidence that the notice was actually sent to the defendant. Without proving that the notice was sent to the defendant, the State could not prove that the defendant actually received notice of the scheduled plea and arraignment, and thus the delay following his non-appearance could not be attributed to the defendant on his claim that he was not afforded a speedy trial.\nBallard held that, in order to establish an excludable period for speedy trial purposes, at a minimum, a copy of the notice letter should be maintained in the accused\u2019s file. Here, as in Ballard, a copy of the notice letter was not maintained in the accused\u2019s file; however, this case is unlike Ballard, in that here the case coordinator testified that she actually sent the notice to appellant at the Welch Street address, whereas in Ballard, the case coordinator testified only that it was standard procedure to do so. Although we recognize this distinction, we find the analysis in Ballard instructive.\nIn this case, the State had the higher burden of establishing beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant failed to appear without reasonable excuse after being summoned to court. Although we accept as true the testimony of the case coordinator that she mailed a notice of the March 31 plea and arraignment on March 24, we find that this proof falls short of meeting the State\u2019s burden.\nThe State urges us to apply the mailbox rule and hold that because a letter placed in the mail is presumed to be delivered to the addressee, the evidence was sufficient to support appellant\u2019s conviction. We disagree. We decline to hold that a felony conviction for failure to appear is supported by sufficient evidence where the State has presented less proof than is required to show service of a civil summons. See Ark. R. Crim. P. 6.3.\nThe trial judge could not find that appellant had actual notice of the plea and arraignment set on March 31 without resorting to speculation and conjecture. Therefore, the State failed to meet its burden, and the trial court erred in denying appellant\u2019s motion to dismiss. For the foregoing reason, appellant\u2019s conviction is reversed, and this case is dismissed.\nReversed and dismissed.\nGriffen and Crabtree, JJ., agree.\nNothing in Ms. Stoddard\u2019s testimony or the record establishes that the notice was mailed by certified mail return receipt requested.", "type": "majority", "author": "Karen R. Baker, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "William R.,Simpson, Jr., Public Defender, Sandra S. Cordi, Deputy Public Defender, by: Clint Miller, Deputy Public Defender, for appellant.", "Mike Beebe, Att\u2019y Gen., by: Vada Berger, Ass\u2019t Att\u2019y Gen., for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "Natasha Nicole STEWART v. STATE of Arkansas\nCA CR 03-1394\n200 S.W.3d 465\nCourt of Appeals of Arkansas\nOpinion delivered December 15, 2004\nWilliam R.,Simpson, Jr., Public Defender, Sandra S. Cordi, Deputy Public Defender, by: Clint Miller, Deputy Public Defender, for appellant.\nMike Beebe, Att\u2019y Gen., by: Vada Berger, Ass\u2019t Att\u2019y Gen., for appellee." }, "file_name": "0086-01", "first_page_order": 110, "last_page_order": 115 }