{ "id": 6138916, "name": "OFFICE of CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT v. Michael D. PYRON", "name_abbreviation": "Office of Child Support Enforcement v. Pyron", "decision_date": "2005-01-12", "docket_number": "CA 04-360", "first_page": "161", "last_page": "166", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "89 Ark. App. 161" }, { "type": "parallel", "cite": "201 S.W.3d 28" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ark. Ct. App.", "id": 13370, "name": "Arkansas Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 34, "name_long": "Arkansas", "name": "Ark." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "894 S.W.2d 937", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.W.2d", "case_ids": [ 1451202, 1451267 ], "year": 1995, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/320/0151-01", "/ark/320/0093-01" ] }, { "cite": "320 Ark. 151", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1451202 ], "year": 1995, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/320/0151-01" ] }, { "cite": "292 S.W.3d 76", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.W.3d", "year": 1999, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "339 Ark. 25", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 130698 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1999, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/339/0025-01" ] }, { "cite": "80 Ark. App. 416", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark. App.", "case_ids": [ 6142166 ], "weight": 4, "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "421" }, { "page": "442" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark-app/80/0416-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 528, "char_count": 10937, "ocr_confidence": 0.741, "pagerank": { "raw": 5.9127943806329716e-08, "percentile": 0.369606490571458 }, "sha256": "284567641006f8b7bdc6a60350020a1c96288d59cc7589b6d9ca4a1608caa6fc", "simhash": "1:d86eb7ef344e06fe", "word_count": 1867 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T22:09:44.662329+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Robbins and Roaf, JJ., agree." ], "parties": [ "OFFICE of CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT v. Michael D. PYRON" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "Sam Bird, Judge.\nThis appeal arises from the Washington County Circuit Court\u2019s December 11, 2003, dismissal of an action by the Arkansas Office of Child Support Enforcement (OCSE) to enforce a child-support order under the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act (UIFSA). OCSE appeals the part of the order granting Michael Pyron\u2019s motion to dismiss on the basis of the Arkansas statute of limitations. Additionally, OCSE appeals the December 11, 2003, denial of its motion to vacate the order of dismissal. OCSE contends that the trial court erred in failing to exercise its broad authority under Ark. R. Civ. P. 60(a) to correct non-clerical errors or mistakes so as to prevent the miscarriage of justice resulting from the application of the wrong statute of limitations, which erroneously barred collection of the child-support arrearage. We agree with the trial court that Rule 60 did not authorize granting the motion to set aside the order; thus, we affirm the trial court\u2019s decision.\nMichael Pyron was granted a divorce from Elisabeth Mansson-Pyron by decree of the 237th District Court of Lubbock County, Texas, on August 3, 1987. Ms. Mansson-Pyron was awarded custody of the parties\u2019 two children, and Mr. Pyron was ordered to pay monthly support of $300 for each child, for a total of $600 a month. On August 7, 2002, pursuant to the UIFSA and at the request of the nation of Sweden, OCSE registered the support order in the Circuit Court of Washington County, Arkansas, for enforcement against Mr. Pyron. On September 9, 2002, Mr. Pyron petitioned the court to vacate the registration. Denying the allegations of child-support arrearage, Mr. Pyron affirmatively stated that he had satisfied all obligations imposed by the order sought to be registered and that the children for whom he had been ordered to pay support had achieved the age of majority.\nAt a hearing in the Circuit Court of Washington County on April 23, 2003, Mr. Pyron questioned the authority of the Swedish F\u00f3rs\u00e1kringskassan to enforce the Texas divorce decree and support order. By order ofjune 16, 2003, the Circuit Court of Washington County allowed registration of the Texas order, but enforcement of the registered order was denied, the issue of back support was reserved, and the petition for enforcement was dismissed without prejudice. The circuit court permitted OCSE to file subsequent pleadings for enforcement upon obtaining further proof as to the identity of the party requesting registration, as to the party\u2019s status as a government agency, and as to the party\u2019s legal authority to request registration.\nOn August 25, 2003, OCSE filed a motion for modification and judgment, and it submitted documents regarding the Fors\u00e1kringskassan. OCSE requested that it be allowed to proceed with enforcement, and it requested judgment in the amount of $22,871 for back support against Mr. Pyron due to Stokholm County Social Insurance Office, Sweden.\nAt a hearing on November 12, 2003, Mr. Pyron\u2019s counsel contended that collection of child support for both children was barred by the statute of limitations. Stating that Sweden\u2019s statute of limitations was five years, he asserted that the statute of limitations had ended in June 2000 for Charles, who had turned eighteen in June 1995, and had ended in September 2002 for Juliana, who had turned eighteen in September 1997.\nThe court asked, \u201cIsn\u2019t there a statute that \u2014 do you know what the statute of limitations is under \u2014 wasn\u2019t this original order issued out of Texas?\u201d Pyron\u2019s counsel agreed that the initial order was issued by Texas but asserted that because Sweden was seeking to enforce the order, Sweden rather than Texas was the initiating state under UIFSA. Counsel further answered the court, \u201cSo we can go with the statute of limitations of Sweden or Arkansas, which both are five years.\u201d Counsel for OCSE argued that because the issue of back support had been reserved previously, OCSE should be able to proceed for the arrearage although Juliana had turned eighteen in the time between the original filing and the subsequent motion.\nThe following colloquy took place between the court and counsel for OCSE:\nThe Court: Mr. Ziser, do you agree that the statute that says that the person seeking to enforce the arrearages can use the longer of any two applicable statutes of limitations but, in this case, they\u2019re both five years?\nMr. Ziser: I think URESA specifically provides the longer of the two statutes are applicable.\nThe Court: Do you agree that it\u2019s either Arkansas or Sweden?\nMr. Ziser: Yes. I agree Sweden is the initiating State.\nNoting the parties\u2019 agreement that the applicable statute of limitations was five years from the date that each child had turned eighteen, the court found that the statute had run as to the older child, Charles, in June of 2000, which was prior to the filing of the first action on August 7, 2002. The court further found that the statute of limitations on Juliana had run in September of 2002, subsequent to the filing of the registration of the judgment, but that the enforcement action had been dismissed and the statute had run prior to the filing of the new action for enforcement on August 25, 2003. The trial court granted Mr. Pyron\u2019s motion to dismiss; the resulting order of dismissal was entered on December 11, 2003.\nRule 60(a) Motion\nOn January 6, 2004, OCSE filed a notice of appeal from the trial court\u2019s final order ofDecember 11, 2003. Onjanuary 8, 2004, OCSE filed a motion and supporting brief pursuant to Rule 60 of the Arkansas Rules of Civil Procedure, asserting that the order of dismissal should be vacated \u201cto prevent the miscarriage of justice, and correct a mistake\u201d because the case should have been decided under the Texas statute of limitations, which has no limitation of when child support can be collected. Mr. Pyron answered that the motion to vacate should be dismissed, and he requested reimbursement for costs and attorney\u2019s fees.\nAt a hearing on February 10, 2004, Mr. Ziser told the court that he took full responsibility for mistakenly arguing at the prior hearing that the applicable statute of limitations was that of Sweden. He asked that the order of dismissal be set aside in order to correct an injustice, and, regarding the younger child, on the grounds that OCSE\u2019s second motion was filed before she turned eighteen. The court noted that OCSE previously had agreed that five years was the applicable statute of limitations. The court also noted that at the previous hearing OCSE had not made its argument about the second motion relating back to the first. Mr. Ziser responded that he thought he had made a reference \u201csomewhere along the way about one of the children not having been emancipated,\u201d and he pointed out that the issue of back support had been reserved.\nThe court denied the Rule 60 motion, explaining as follows:\nThe cases dealing with Rule 60 that speak of miscarriage of justice, speak of fraud that has been practiced on the court.... I see nothing to indicate from the appellate courts that, when a party does not make the arguments they should have, that the court should allow them a second chance, once it\u2019s been decided, to come back in and make the arguments they forgot to make or didn\u2019t make because they didn\u2019t know to make them at the time. There\u2019s absolutely no doubt you would have been successful if you had made those arguments at the time. But I just do not see a provision to get a second bite at the apple in the rules or the cases interpreting them.\nOCSE subsequently filed an amended notice of appeal and designation of record, appealing both the granting of Pyron\u2019s motion to dismiss and the denial of OCSE\u2019s motion to vacate, which afterward was reduced to judgment.\nThe issue before us on appeal is whether Rule 60 authorized the trial court to vacate its order to dismiss as a miscarriage of justice when OCSE\u2019s counsel stipulated to the application of a statute of limitations that effectively barred collection of child support. Rule 60(a) of Ark. R. Civ. P. \u2014 Civ. (2004) reads as follows:\nRelief from judgment, decree or order, (a) Ninety-Day Limitation. To correct errors or mistakes or to prevent the miscarriage of justice, the court may modify or vacate a judgment, order or decree on motion of the court or any party, with prior notice to all parties, within ninety days of its having been filed with the clerk.\nIn Fritzinger v. Beene, 80 Ark. App. 416, 97 S.W.3d 440 (2003), the circuit court granted a Rule 60(a) motion by the City of Conway to modify a judgment against it from $92,500 to $25,000, which was the city\u2019s maximum liability under Arkansas\u2019s tort immunity statutes. On appeal, we examined the phrase \u201cto prevent the miscarriage of justice\u201d:\nRule 60(a), as modified in 2000, allows the trial court not only to correct errors or mistakes but to \u201cprevent the miscarriage of justice.\u201d The term \u201cmiscarriage of justice\u201d is not limited to clerical errors. See Lord v. Mazzanti, 339 Ark. 25, 2 S.W.3d 76 (1999); David Newbern and John Watkins, Arkansas Civil Practice and Procedure \u00a7 2612 at 391, n. 3 (3d ed. 2002). A trial court has broad authority to correct non-clerical errors or mistakes so as to prevent the miscarriage of justice. See Lord v. Mazzanti, supra.\n80 Ark. App. at 421, 97 S.W.3d at 442. We noted that the city, which initially pleaded governmental immunity from suit, could not have known that the jury would render a verdict in excess of $25,000 until after the trial was completed. We held that the circuit court\u2019s use of Rule 60 to conform the verdict to the limits of the law was not an abuse of discretion.\nFritzinger is distinguishable from the case at bar because OCSE not only failed to plead what it now alleges is the appropriate statute of limitations, but it also stipulated at trial to a statute of limitations that effectively time barred its suit. A trial court\u2019s power to correct mistakes or errors is to make the record speak the truth, but not to make it speak what it did not speak but ought to have spoken. Lord v. Mazzanti, 339 Ark. 25, 292 S.W.3d 76 (1999). We agree with Mr. Pyron that here, OCSE is asking that the record be made to speak something that it did not speak, not merely to clarify the previous order.\nIn his brief to this court, Mr. Pyron reasserts the request he made to the circuit court for an award of attorney\u2019s fees and costs under Rule 11 of Ark. R. App. P. \u2014 Civ. The request was not granted by the trial court. Because appellee seeks affirmative relief and did not file a cross appeal, he is precluded from raising this argument on appeal. Wright v. Eddinger, 320 Ark. 151, 894 S.W.2d 937 (1995).\nAffirmed.\nRobbins and Roaf, JJ., agree.", "type": "majority", "author": "Sam Bird, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "G. Keith Griffith, for appellant.", "McCauley Law Firm, PLLC, by: Rhonda McCauley, for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "OFFICE of CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT v. Michael D. PYRON\nCA 04-360\n201 S.W.3d 28\nCourt of Appeals of Arkansas\nOpinion delivered January 12, 2005\nG. Keith Griffith, for appellant.\nMcCauley Law Firm, PLLC, by: Rhonda McCauley, for appellee." }, "file_name": "0161-01", "first_page_order": 187, "last_page_order": 192 }