{ "id": 6136242, "name": "Tony HORTON v. Roy Gene HORTON", "name_abbreviation": "Horton v. Horton", "decision_date": "2005-06-22", "docket_number": "CA 04-1365", "first_page": "22", "last_page": "28", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "92 Ark. App. 22" }, { "type": "parallel", "cite": "211 S.W.3d 35" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ark. Ct. App.", "id": 13370, "name": "Arkansas Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 34, "name_long": "Arkansas", "name": "Ark." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "249 Ark. 1001", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 8725127 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1971, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1004" }, { "page": "92" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/249/1001-01" ] }, { "cite": "9 Ark. App. 170", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark. App.", "case_ids": [ 6139136 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1983, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark-app/9/0170-01" ] }, { "cite": "251 Ark. 350", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1633252 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1971, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/251/0350-01" ] }, { "cite": "Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 9-12-315", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "Ark. Code Ann.", "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "b" }, { "page": "66" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "13 Ark. App. 63", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark. App.", "case_ids": [ 6137185 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "813-14", "parenthetical": "case citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark-app/13/0063-01" ] }, { "cite": "53 Ark. App. 140", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark. App.", "case_ids": [ 6139147 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1996, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark-app/53/0140-01" ] }, { "cite": "6 Ark. App. 252", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark. App.", "case_ids": [ 6140924 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1982, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark-app/6/0252-01" ] }, { "cite": "Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 9-12-318", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "Ark. Code Ann.", "year": 2002, "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "761 S.W.2d 933", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.W.2d", "case_ids": [ 1891457, 1891349 ], "year": 1988, "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ark/297/0370-01", "/ark/297/0368-01" ] }, { "cite": "297 Ark. 370", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1891457 ], "year": 1988, "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ark/297/0370-01" ] }, { "cite": "Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7\u00a7 9-2-101", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "Ark. Code Ann.", "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "70 Ark. App. 240", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark. App.", "case_ids": [ 6140943 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2000, "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ark-app/70/0240-01" ] }, { "cite": "82 Ark. App. 17", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark. App.", "case_ids": [ 6136318 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2003, "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ark-app/82/0017-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 690, "char_count": 13440, "ocr_confidence": 0.766, "pagerank": { "raw": 6.184765865984079e-08, "percentile": 0.3837320245311599 }, "sha256": "f7bbd43c5198fe3d1833ccefe802b9b1c04e1ebef6ccd44dde0259db8244b66a", "simhash": "1:9fae6427f342886c", "word_count": 2305 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T16:18:39.939690+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Crabtree, J., agrees.", "Baker, J., concurs." ], "parties": [ "Tony HORTON v. Roy Gene HORTON" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "John Mauzy Pittman, Chief Judge.\nAppellant and appellee were divorced on August 31, 2004, after thirty-one years of marriage. The only issues at the divorce hearing were alimony and property division. The trial court awarded appellant $300 per month alimony and, in the course of the property division, declared that the couple\u2019s home was marital property, despite it having been deeded to appellant in 1982. Appellant now argues that: 1) the amount of alimony was too low; 2) the trial court failed to divide the parties\u2019 property equally or state reasons for making an unequal division; 3) the trial court erred in declaring the parties\u2019 home to be marital property. We reverse and remand on the basis of appellant\u2019s third argument.\nThe evidence surrounding the ownership of the parties\u2019 home was as follows. Appellee deeded the home to appellant in 1982. According to appellant, she filed for divorce around that time when she discovered that appellee had a child with another woman. She said that her attorney advised her to have the home deeded to her, and she further said that appellee told her that the house was a gift to make sure that she would not be \u201cout on the street\u201d with two children. The deed was filed on October 15, 1982, the same day that it was signed by appellee. The record as abstracted contains no evidence regarding the circumstances of the parties\u2019 reconciliation after the deed was executed or any evidence as to the manner in which the house was maintained or paid for thereafter. Appellee testified only that he had agreed to deed the house to appellant and that he would not dispute that the house had remained in appellant\u2019s name since the deed was executed. He agreed with his attorney\u2019s statement that \u201cthere may be some problems with regard to the house because you\u2019ve deeded that house to her.\u201d\nThe trial court ruled that the parties\u2019 home was marital property. Appellant, citing Smith v. Smith, 6 Ark. App. 252, 640 S.W.2d 458 (1982), contends that, based on the foregoing evidence, the house remained her separate property after it was deeded to her in 1982. We agree.\nIn Smith, the parties separated, and the husband filed for divorce. Later, they reconciled on the condition that the husband convey his interest in the marital home to the wife, which he did. The parties separated again about five months later, and the wife filed for divorce. The husband then asked the court to set aside the deed. The trial court refused, and this court affirmed, ruling that there was no evidence of an agreement that the property would belong to the wife only if the reconciliation was successful, and there was no evidence of any agreement that the husband would regain an interest in the property. Likewise, in the present case, there is no evidence that appellant would retain the property only under certain circumstances or that appellee would regain an interest in the property.\nMoreover, we observe that there are other cases even closer factually to the case at bar because they involve a gift of the marital home from one spouse to another. In Cole v. Cole, 53 Ark. App. 140, 920 S.W.2d 32 (1996), the husband, a truck driver, had a drinking problem and had been charged with DWI. The wife, fearing that he would cause an accident and that they would \u201close everything,\u201d asked him to put the house in her name. He did so but later, during their divorce proceeding, said that he merely \u201cwent along\u201d with his wife and did not realize that he was signing away his rights in the house. The supreme court observed that the deed was filed of record in the same month that it was signed; that, although the husband continued to live in the house after the conveyance, the wife paid the mortgage, taxes, and insurance from an account that was determined to be her separate property; and that there was no evidence that the wife ever said that she would deed the property back to the husband. While Cole contains a factor that is missing in the case at bar \u2014 evidence as to who paid the household expenses following the conveyance \u2014 it does point up the significance of the immediate recording of the deed and the lack of an agreement that the property would be deeded back to the donor spouse.\nIn Lyons v. Lyons, 13 Ark. App. 63, 679 S.W.2d 811 (1984), the husband was living in California and the wife was living in Arkansas. Following telephone and letter communications, the husband agreed to deed their marital residence to the wife. Upon the parties\u2019 divorce, he asked that the deed be set aside. He testified that he made the conveyance to \u201cget some peace and quiet\u201d from his wife\u2019s demands. This court ruled that:\nThe chancellor found that [husband] voluntarily executed the deed, and although the court did not specifically find that there was a gift intended, it would have been justified in so doing. There was ample evidence from which the chancellor could have found that there was an actual delivery of the subject matter of the gift with a clear intent to make an immediate, unconditional and final gift accompanied by an intent to release all future dominion and control. A gift acquired by either spouse subsequent to the marriage is excluded from the definition of martial property by the provisions of Ark. Stat. Ann. \u00a7 34-1214(B)(l) (Supp. 1983) [now Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 9-12-315 (b)(1) (Repl. 2002)].\nId. at 66, 679 S.W.2d at 813-14 (case citations omitted).\nFinally, in Dennis v. Younts, 251 Ark. 350, 472 S.W.2d 711 (1971), the husband and wife separated in the spring of 1962, when the husband began living with another woman. On July 19, 1962, the husband deeded the marital home to his wife because he \u201cfelt sorry\u201d for her. The pair resumed cohabitation in 1964 and lived on the property until the wife\u2019s death in 1967. Thereafter, her children by a former marriage claimed the property by virtue of the 1962 deed. The husband asserted that the deed was part of a property settlement prior to divorce and that it should be canceled because a reconciliation occurred and the parties resumed their marital relationship. The chancellor upheld the deed, and the supreme court affirmed. The court noted that the record contained no evidence that the deed was executed as part of a property settlement agreement in contemplation of divorce, and there was no evidence that the wife agreed to do anything as an inducement or consideration for the transfer. Rather, the evidence showed that the husband deeded the house because, in the words of the trial court, he \u201cmoved in with another woman and got to feeling bad about his wife.\u201d In short, the supreme court said, the husband made a gift of the property to his wife.\nIn the case before us, there is no evidence that the parties entered into a property settlement agreement or reconciliation agreement. There is also no evidence that appellant agreed to do anything as an inducement or consideration for the transfer. The only proof regarding the parties\u2019 intentions is that appellee made a gift to appellant so that appellant and her children would have a place to live after appellee became involved with another woman. The law presumes a gift when the donor registers legal title in a family member\u2019s name. See Perrin v. Perrin, 9 Ark. App. 170, 656 S.W.2d 245 (1983). Further, the deed was immediately recorded, and there was no discussion of appellant\u2019s deeding the property back to appellee. Finally, appellee, in his own testimony, seemed resigned to the conclusion that he was not entitled to the property. He testified that he was basically asking the court to award him his business, his business assets, and his pension, and to make a division of debt; he understood that there might be some \u201cproblems\u201d with the house because he had deeded it to appellant. Given these circumstances, we believe that the trial court clearly erred in declaring the home to be marital property rather than appellant\u2019s separate property.\nAppellee relies on the case of Ward v. Ward, 249 Ark. 1001, 463 S.W.2d 90 (1971), but that case is distinguishable from the case at bar. In Ward, the parties were divorced in 1965 and, by virtue of their property settlement agreement, the wife quitclaimed the home to the husband. Thereafter, the decree was set aside and the parties resumed the marriage. The deed was not recorded by the husband until 1969, after the wife learned that he had a young girlfriend. In the ensuing divorce action, the trial court ruled that the home was marital property. The supreme court affirmed, holding that the \u201conly inference from the parties\u2019 conduct is that they intended to abrogate the property settlement at the time they caused the divorce decree to be set aside.\u201d Id. at 1004, 463 S.W.2d at 92. Unlike the situation here, Ward involved a deed that was part of a property settlement and divorce decree that were later set aside. Further, the grantee in Ward waited four years to record his deed and did so only when it looked as though another divorce proceeding was forthcoming. These factors are strong indicators that the parties in Ward did not intend for the deed to remain viable after the 1965 divorce decree was set aside. No such factors are present in this case.\nBased on the foregoing, we reverse the trial court\u2019s finding that the home was marital property. Because our reversal will very likely affect the overall property division as well as the alimony award \u2014 alimony and property division being complementary devices that a trial judge employs to make the dissolution of a marriage as equitable as possible, see Cole, supra \u2014 we reverse and remand the case in its entirety for reconsideration in light of our holding herein.\nReversed and remanded.\nCrabtree, J., agrees.\nBaker, J., concurs.", "type": "majority", "author": "John Mauzy Pittman, Chief Judge." }, { "text": "Karen R. Baker, Judge,\nconcurring. I concur in the majority\u2019s decision to reverse and remand this case. However, I write to address the trial court\u2019s rather troubling decision to deny appellant\u2019s request to restore her former name because she chose to seek alimony. The court\u2019s response to appellant\u2019s request, as set forth in the divorce decree, was as follows:\nThe Court finds it is somewhat ironic that [appellant] requested that her name be changed to the name she bore before this marriage, while on the other hand requesting that [appellee] be ordered to pay her alimony. Based upon this Court\u2019s grant of alimony to [appellant] and [appellant\u2019s] request for alimony, the [appellant\u2019s] request for name change is denied. That if the respective attorneys can reach an agreement in this matter, then the Court would be inclined to enter an Order approving the name change, however, if the attorneys cannot agree, then that request is denied by the Court.\nAppellant does not appeal this portion of the divorce decree, so I find no fault with the majority for not addressing it. However, I believe that the trial court\u2019s mistaken apprehension that appellant may not have her former name restored because she chose to seek alimony should not pass without comment.\nNowhere in our case law or statutory law do I find any link between the restoration of a party\u2019s name and an award (or lack of an award) of alimony. The purpose of alimony, as our courts have stated many times, is to rectify, insofar as is reasonably possible, the frequent economic imbalance in the earning power and standard of living of the divorced parties in light of the particular facts of each case. See Powell v. Powell, 82 Ark. App. 17, 110 S.W.3d 290 (2003); Holaway v. Holaway, 70 Ark. App. 240, 16 S.W.3d 302 (2000). Pursuant to that purpose, the trial court ruled that appellant, who has been totally disabled since 1992, should receive alimony. Yet, as the result of seeking that to which she was legally entitled, appellant was denied her reasonable request for a name change. These two matters \u2014 alimony and restoration of a former name \u2014 are separate and distinct issues with separate and distinct inquiries; a ruling on one has no bearing on the other.\nFurthermore, our name-change statutes, Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7\u00a7 9-2-101 and 102 (Repl. 2002), place no condition on a name change other than that \u201cgood reasons\u201d be shown. In fact, our name-change statutes are merely supplementary to the common law, see Stamps v. Rawlins, 297 Ark. 370, 761 S.W.2d 933 (1988), which provides that an adult has the right to change his or her name absent fraud, misrepresentation, or interference with the rights of others. See generally 57 Am. Jur. 2d Name \u00a7\u00a7 2, 16 (2d ed. 2001); 65 C.J.S. Names \u00a7 21 (2000).\nAppellant, as an adult acting without a fraudulent purpose, was entitled to have her name changed as she requested, whether or not she sought an award of alimony. I recognize that Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 9-12-318 (Repl. 2002) provides that the trial court \u201cmay\u201d restore the wife\u2019s former name. However, where fraud or other illegal purpose is absent, I cannot conceive of a situation where it would not be an abuse of discretion to deny a name-change request in a divorce action. Certainly, a wife should not be forced to effectively \u201cpurchase\u201d her former name by foregoing the alimony to which she may be legally entitled, nor should her name be used as a bargaining chip in negotiations of monetary matters, as the decree suggests.", "type": "concurrence", "author": "Karen R. Baker, Judge," } ], "attorneys": [ "Batchelor & Batchelor, by: Fines F. Batchelor, Jr., for appellant.", "Eddie N. Christian, for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "Tony HORTON v. Roy Gene HORTON\nCA 04-1365\n211 S.W.3d 35\nCourt of Appeals of Arkansas\nOpinion delivered June 22, 2005\nBatchelor & Batchelor, by: Fines F. Batchelor, Jr., for appellant.\nEddie N. Christian, for appellee." }, "file_name": "0022-01", "first_page_order": 48, "last_page_order": 54 }