{ "id": 6142810, "name": "MUSSON CUSTOM BUILDING, INC. v. Gilmar VALLADARES and Juan Guerrero d/b/a/ J&M Roofing", "name_abbreviation": "Musson Custom Building, Inc. v. Valladares", "decision_date": "2006-01-04", "docket_number": "CA 05-474", "first_page": "490", "last_page": "495", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "93 Ark. App. 490" }, { "type": "parallel", "cite": "222 S.W.3d 214" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ark. Ct. App.", "id": 13370, "name": "Arkansas Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 34, "name_long": "Arkansas", "name": "Ark." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "356 Ark. 324", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 5370289 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2004, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/356/0324-01" ] }, { "cite": "6 Ark. App. 193", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark. App.", "case_ids": [ 6139711 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1982, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark-app/6/0193-01" ] }, { "cite": "326 Ark. 217", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 12021646 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1996, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/326/0217-01" ] }, { "cite": "92 Ark. App. 406", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark. App.", "case_ids": [ 6142161 ], "weight": 3, "year": 2005, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark-app/92/0406-01" ] }, { "cite": "341 Ark. 474", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1257744 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2000, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/341/0474-01" ] }, { "cite": "Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 11-9-402", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "Ark. Code Ann.", "weight": 4, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(a)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "90 Ark. App. 388", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark. App.", "case_ids": [ 6141363 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "Griffen, J., dissenting" }, { "parenthetical": "Griffen, J., dissenting" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ark-app/90/0388-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 480, "char_count": 9876, "ocr_confidence": 0.744, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.03580807328026e-08, "percentile": 0.17497274937650806 }, "sha256": "b94862bf0c3e09118cbed616e02c685358c69e065a0f8642bed791fc5077d71a", "simhash": "1:bc1a509293cfae9b", "word_count": 1539 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T22:52:25.043286+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Robbins, J., agrees.", "Griffen, J., concurs." ], "parties": [ "MUSSON CUSTOM BUILDING, INC. v. Gilmar VALLADARES and Juan Guerrero d/b/a/ J&M Roofing" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "Sam Bird, Judge.\nThis workers\u2019 compensation case involves dge. \u00a7 11-9-402 (Repl. 2002), which assigns liability to a prime contractor for the compensation of a subcontractor\u2019s injured employee when the subcontractor has not secured compensation as required by statute. Appellant Musson Custom Building, Inc., raises one point on appeal, challenging the finding of the Workers\u2019 Compensation Commission that Musson was the prime contractor liable for compensation to appellee Gilmar Valladares. We affirm the decision of the Commission.\nThis claim was controverted in its entirety at proceedings before the administrative law judge. Valladares contended that he was employed by J&M Roofing, which was a subcontractor \u201ccontracted by Musson Custom Building, Inc. ... as a general contractor on the residential real estate,\u201d and that Musson was therefore his statutory employer pursuant to Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 11-9-402(a). Appellant Musson and appellee Juan Guerrero d/b/a J&M Roofing appeared as uninsured respondents.\nThe parties stipulated that Valladares sustained injuries to his face, left leg, and left knee when he fell from the roof of a house being constructed at 1517 Northeast Dysart Wood Lane in Ben-tonville on January 25, 2003. They also stipulated that Musson \u201cwas the general contractor for the house and had subcontracted the roofing to Juan Guerrero dba J&M Roofing.\u201d The law judge accepted these and other stipulations in regard to the parties who offered them.\nGilmar Valladares testified that Edgar Villanueva hired him, that Juan Guerrero \u201chad taken us to be contracted,\u201d that Guerrero paid Villanueva, and that Valladares received cash from Villanueva. Regarding his injury ofjanuary 25, 2003, Valladares testified that he was carrying a bundle of shingles when he slipped and fell from the roof, which was wet and a little icy.\nJuan Guerrero testified that his business was J&M Roofing and that he had no employees. Guerrero testified that he used subcontractors to help him with his jobs for Musson, with whom he had a business relationship. Guerrero testified that, because of increased volume, he had hired Villanueva and his \u201ccrew services.\u201d Guerrero denied hiring or knowing Valladares, but he stated, \u201cThe day that Valladares got hurt he was working on the job that I was doing for Mr. Musson.\u201d Guerrero stated that he did not know if the home under construction was custom-built. He said that he \u201ccontracted with Musson to do the job by the squares and ... then contracted with Villanueva to do it by the square at a lesser price,\u201d and that Musson was the contractor on the job.\nIn an opinion of August 9, 2004, the administrative law judge found that appellee Juan Guerrero d/b/a J&M Roofing was the prime contractor of Edgar Villanueva, the employer of Valla-dares; the law judge also found that \u201cVillanueva and Juan Guerreo dba J&M Roofing are jointly and [severally] liable\u201d for Valladares\u2019s temporary total disability benefits and medical expenses. In its opinion of February 10, 2005, the Workers\u2019 Compensation Commission reversed the law judge\u2019s decision. The Commission found that Musson was the prime contractor and that Valladares was an employee of the subcontractor Villanueva, who in turn \u201chad subcontracted for Juan Guerrero.\u201d Therefore, the Commission found that Musson was liable for Valladares\u2019s medical treatment and temporary total disability compensation.\nArguments on Appeal\nMusson presents three arguments to support its contention that it was not the prime contractor in this case. It argues that no evidence shows that it was obligated to a third party for the work performed by Valladares, that the Commission failed to strictly construe Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 11-9-402, and that the Commission used inapplicable case law in determining Musson to be the prime contractor. We first will address the requirement of strict construction.\nMusson correctly notes that the workers\u2019 compensation statutes must be strictly and literally construed, and that a particular provision must be construed with reference to the statute as a whole. See Act 796 of 1993; Flowers v. Norman Oaks Constr. Co., 341 Ark. 474, 17 S.W.3d 472 (2000). Musson complains that nothing in Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 11-9-402 says that general contractors are obligated to the employees of subcontractors of subcontractors. In the recent case of Jones Bros., Inc. v. Journagan Constr. Co., 92 Ark. App. 406, 214 S.W.3d 870 (2005), however, we have ruled otherwise.\nThe claimant in Jones was injured while driving a dump truck for Whitlock Trucking. Whitlock had been hired by Aggregate Transportation Specialist, an immediate subcontractor of Journa-gan Construction Company. The Commission found that Jones Bros., Inc., was liable to the claimant for payment of workers\u2019 compensation benefits because it was the prime contractor within the meaning of section 11-9-402. We affirmed the decision of the Commission, explaining as follows:\nWhidock Trucking \u2014 who lacked workers\u2019 compensation insurance \u2014 was Aggregate\u2019s subcontractor, Aggregate was Journa-gan\u2019s subcontractor, and Journagan was Jones\u2019s subcontractor. All subcontractors were performing services that arose from the contract between Jones and a third party, the Arkansas State Highway Commission. Thus, because Jones is the only contractor with an obligation to a third party, we are convinced that Jones was the sole prime contractor.\nIn the case now before us, under the precedent of Jones, we reject Musson\u2019s argument that strict construction prevents a finding of a general contractor\u2019s obligation to compensate injured employees of subcontractors of subcontractors.\nWe next address Musson\u2019s remaining arguments: that no evidence shows that Musson was obligated to a third party for the work performed by Valladares, and that the Commission used inapplicable case law in determining that Musson was the prime contractor. The following portion of the Commission\u2019s decision is pertinent to these arguments:\nThe parties stipulated that \u201cMusson Building, Inc. was the general contractor [for] the house ... and had subcontracted the roofing of the house to Juan Guerrero d/b/a/J&M Roofing.\u201d ... In addition, Juan Guerrero testified that he had \u201ca business relationship\u201d with Musson Custom Building.\nThe record indicates that the claimant was an employee of an uninsured subcontractor. Musson Custom Building was the prime contractor and was statutorily liable. Musson was contractually liable to a third party to build roofs. Musson hired Juan, who hired Edgar, who hired the claimant. The parties characterized Musson as a \u201cgeneral\u201d contractor. The administrative law judge determined, \u201ca \u2018general\u2019 contractor is not necessarily synonymous with a \u2018prime\u2019 contractor.\u201d The Arkansas Supreme Court implicitly found these terms synonymous in Chevron USA v. Murphy Exploration & Prod. Co., 03-612 (Ark. 3-4-2004).\nMusson acknowledges that under Nucor Holding Corp. v. Rinkines, 326 Ark. 217, 931 S.W.2d 426 (1996), and Bailey v. Simmons, 6 Ark. App. 193, 639 S.W.2d 526 (1982), the status of prime contractor presupposes work to be done for a third party. Musson complains that no evidence in this case showed that it was obligated to a third party \u201cfor the same task which Juan Guerrero dba J&M Roofing had contracted to do\u201d; Musson asserts that, without this contractual obligation, it was not a prime contractor and J&M Roofing was not its subcontractor. Musson further asserts that \u201cJuan Guerrero d/b/a J&M Roofing was responsible to a third party, Musson Custom Building, Inc.; therefore, . . . Juan Guerrero d/b/a J&M Roofing was in fact the prime contractor on the job on the day of the claimant\u2019s injury.\u201d\nMusson recognizes that in Chevron USA v. Murphy Exploration & Production Co., 356 Ark. 324, 151 S.W.3d 306 (2004), the supreme court interchangeably used the terms \u201cprime contractor\u201d and \u201cgeneral contractor.\u201d Noting that Chevron was a personal injury case in which the issue was whether a subcontractor could be liable for a general contractor\u2019s negligent acts, Musson asserts that \u201cprime contractor\u201d and \u201cgeneral contractor\u201d are not synonymous for purposes of workers\u2019 compensation law.\nWe review the Commission\u2019s decision on appeal to determine if it is supported by substantial evidence, viewing the evidence and all reasonable inferences deducible therefrom in the light most favorable to the Commission\u2019s findings. Jones Bros., Inc., supra. The Commission found from the testimony and stipulations that Musson was contractually liable to a third party to build roofs and had hired Guerrero, who hired Villanueva, who hired Valla-dares. We hold that the stipulations and testimony recited by the Commission, particularly that Musson was the general contractor for the house and had subcontracted the roofing of the house to Juan Guerrero d/b/a/ J&M Roofing, along with the Chevron court\u2019s interpretation of the terms \u201cprime contractor\u201d and \u201cgeneral contractor,\u201d constitute substantial evidence to support the Commission\u2019s finding that Musson was the prime contractor in this case and thus was statutorily liable for purposes of Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 11-9-402.\nAffirmed.\nRobbins, J., agrees.\nGriffen, J., concurs.\nThe record in this case includes transcripts of two hearings: a first hearing was continued to allow the joinder ofEdgar Villanueva as an uninsured respondent, but he did not appear at the second hearing.", "type": "majority", "author": "Sam Bird, Judge." }, { "text": "Wendell Griffen, Judge,\nconcurring. I concur with the udge, reasons outlined in my dissenting opinion in Riddell Flying Servs. v. Callahan, 90 Ark. App. 388, 206 S.W.3d 284 (2005) (Griffen, J., dissenting).", "type": "concurrence", "author": "Wendell Griffen, Judge," } ], "attorneys": [ "Taylor Law Firm, by: Jason L. Watson, for appellant.", "Stephen M. Sharum, for appellee Gilmar Valladares." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "MUSSON CUSTOM BUILDING, INC. v. Gilmar VALLADARES and Juan Guerrero d/b/a/ J&M Roofing\nCA 05-474\n222 S.W.3d 214\nCourt of Appeals of Arkansas\nOpinion delivered January 4, 2006\nTaylor Law Firm, by: Jason L. Watson, for appellant.\nStephen M. Sharum, for appellee Gilmar Valladares." }, "file_name": "0490-01", "first_page_order": 516, "last_page_order": 521 }