The appellant in this udge. possession of crack cocaine and sentenced to twenty years’ imprisonment. On appeal, he argues that the trial court erred in refusing to suppress the crack cocaine found on appellant’s person because, inter alia, the search exceeded the permissible scope of a protective search. Alternatively, appellant contends that the evidence should have been excluded for failure to establish a sufficient chain of custody. We agree with his first point, and we reverse and remand.
In reviewing the trial court’s denial of a motion to suppress evidence, we conduct a de novo review based on the totality of the circumstances, reviewing findings of historical facts for clear error and determining whether those facts give rise to reasonable suspicion or probable cause, giving due weight to inferences drawn by the trial court. Baird v. State, 83 Ark. App. 392, 128 S.W.3d 459 (2003).
Viewed in light of this standard, the record shows that appellant was a passenger on a motor scooter driven by a twelve or thirteen-year-old juvenile. Officer Phillip Bailey stopped the vehicle and warned the juvenile that he was violating the law by not wearing a helmet and by carrying a passenger. Officer Bailey knew from past experience with appellant that appellant had been known to carry weapons and had been arrested for a terroristic act. He also noticed that appellant’s demeanor was radically different from what it had been in their prior encounters. Whereas appellant had in the past been characteristically aggressive, belligerent, and uncooperative in his dealings with Officer Bailey, appellant on this occasion was nervous and overly friendly. Officer Bailey asked appellant if he would consent to a pat-down for weapons. Appellant consented and, while conducting the pat-down, Officer Bailey felt something in appellant’s left coat pocket. Officer Bailey testified that, based on his training and experience, it was immediately apparent that the object that he felt in appellant’s pocket was crack cocaine. Officer Bailey did not, however, explain what it was about the object’s shape, feel, or contour that made the incriminating nature of the object immediately apparent to him.
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures. The Fourth Amendment requires adherence to judicial processes, and searches conducted outside the judicial *314process, without prior approval by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable - subject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967). One such exception was delineated in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), which authorizes a police officer who has reason to believe that he is dealing with an armed and dangerous individual to conduct a reasonable search for weapons for the protection of the police officer. Id. at 27. This authority, however, is narrowly drawn, and such a warrantless protective search is strictly limited to that which is necessary for the discovery of weapons that might be used to harm the officer or others nearby; if the protective search goes beyond what is necessary to determine if the suspect is armed, it is no longer valid under Terry and its fruits will be suppressed. Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 373 (1993).
Appellant’s argument for suppression is twofold: he argues that Officer Bailey had no right to search appellant after the stop had been concluded, and that the pat-down exceeded the permissible scope of a Terry search. We need not decide whether Officer Bailey was justified in searching appellant because, even assuming that the search was justified by circumstances or consent, the search clearly exceeded the scope of the Terry search to which appellant arguably consented.1
Deciding whether the pat-down exceeded the permissible scope of a Terry stop requires application of the “plain feel” doctrine enunciated in Minnesota v. Dickerson, supra, which holds that, if a police officer lawfully pats down a suspect’s outer clothing and feels an object whose contour or mass makes its identity immediately apparent, there has been no invasion of the suspect’s privacy beyond that already authorized by the officer’s search for weapons; if the object is contraband, its warrantless seizure would be justified by the same practical considerations that inhere in the plain-view context. Id., 508 U.S. at 375-76. Appellant argues that Officer Bailey’s testimony that it was “immediately apparent” that *315the object in appellant’s pocket was crack cocaine is insufficient in the absence of any testimony concerning the factual basis for his knowledge.
There is a split of authority on this issue. Some courts have accepted a police officer’s testimony that he was able to immediately recognize the incriminating character of crack cocaine by feel during a pat-down where it was supported by evidence that the officer had experience detecting the substance in that manner. See, e.g., Huffman v. State, 651 So. 2d 78 (Ala. Crim. App. 1994). Other courts, however, have held that a police officer’s generalized statement that the incriminatory nature of the contraband was readily apparent was insufficient to establish that fact for purposes of the plain-feel exception where the officer did not testify concerning specific facts establishing his ability to recognize crack cocaine by touch. See Jones v. State, 343 Md. 448, 455, 682 A.2d 248, 252 (1996) (“it’s not just a question ofbeing an expert and coming in and saying the magic words”). Although we have not expressly ruled on this issue, our cases have employed the latter rationale. In Howe v. State, 72 Ark. App. 466, 472, 39 S.W.3d 467, 471 (2001), we noted that “[completely absent from [the officer’s] testimony is any statement explaining what it was about the object’s feel, shape, or contour that led him to believe that the object was contraband.” In the absence of any such explanation in the present case, we hold that Officer Bailey’s testimony does not permit a reasonable conclusion that the incriminating nature of the object in appellant’s pocket was immediately apparent, and that the trial court therefore erred in denying appellant’s motion to suppress. In light of our resolution of this issue, we need not address appellant’s remaining arguments.
Reversed and remanded.
Bird, J., agrees.
Neal, J., concurs.