{ "id": 6142142, "name": "Ronny DEAVER, Administrator of the Estate of Faye Deaver v. FAUCON PROPERTIES, INC. d/b/a St. Andrews Place; St. Andrews Place, Inc. d/b/a St. Andrews Place; and William Mainord", "name_abbreviation": "Deaver v. Faucon Properties, Inc.", "decision_date": "2006-03-08", "docket_number": "CA 05-1019", "first_page": "370", "last_page": "373", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "94 Ark. App. 370" }, { "type": "parallel", "cite": "231 S.W.3d 100" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ark. Ct. App.", "id": 13370, "name": "Arkansas Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 34, "name_long": "Arkansas", "name": "Ark." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "10 Ark. 504", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 8727869 ], "year": 1850, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/10/0504-01" ] }, { "cite": "162 S.W. 47", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.W.", "year": 1913, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "110 Ark. 311", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1337066 ], "year": 1913, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/110/0311-01" ] }, { "cite": "127 Ark. 498", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1550197 ], "year": 1917, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/127/0498-01" ] }, { "cite": "89 S.W. 88", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.W.", "weight": 2, "year": 1905, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "76 Ark. 485", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1501083 ], "year": 1905, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/76/0485-01" ] }, { "cite": "340 Ark. 692", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1365286 ], "weight": 4, "year": 2000, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/340/0692-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 429, "char_count": 6458, "ocr_confidence": 0.765, "pagerank": { "raw": 5.4033266686372354e-08, "percentile": 0.33954045197229643 }, "sha256": "5897558dde5b6729125e07785f85cd70853bb8af1d550a7a8b8c7105b35ce616", "simhash": "1:9f36cfa614a3d58d", "word_count": 1071 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T18:52:04.997483+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Roaf and Vaught, JJ., agree." ], "parties": [ "Ronny DEAVER, Administrator of the Estate of Faye Deaver v. FAUCON PROPERTIES, INC. d/b/a St. Andrews Place; St. Andrews Place, Inc. d/b/a St. Andrews Place; and William Mainord" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "Josephine Linker Hart, Judge.\nRonny Deaver, as administrator for the Estate of Faye Deaver, appeals from an order of the Faulkner County Circuit Court striking and dismissing with prejudice a complaint for failure to properly revive the action after the death of Faye Deaver. On appeal, Deaver argues that the circuit court erred in dismissing his case because: 1) the lawsuit was properly revived by the entry of an order substituting him as a party for his mother, who died during the pendency of the action; 2) his filing of an amended complaint that raised a new cause of action either revived his lawsuit or created a new claim; and 3) the appellees waived the right to challenge the revivor because twenty-two months elapsed since he filed the \u201csuggestion of death\u201d and motion for substitution of parties in accordance with Rule 25 of the Arkansas Rules of Civil Procedure. We agree with Deaver\u2019s first point and reverse and remand without reaching his second and third points.\nOn November 1, 2002, Faye Deaver and her son, Ronny Deaver, filed a lawsuit against the appellees, the administrator and various business entities that owned the nursing home where Faye had resided since March 24, 2000. The complaint alleged breach of contract, negligence, and \u201cres ipsa loquitur\u201d as theories for recovering damages. On May 3, 2003, Faye died. On October 28, 2003, Ronny filed a pleading styled: \u201cPLAINTIFFS\u2019 SUGGESTION OF DEATH UPON THE RECORD, MOTION FOR APPOINTMENT OF SPECIAL ADMINISTRATOR, AND REQUEST FOR ORDER OF SUBSTITUTING PARTIES.\u201d The pleading cited and apparently relied on the requirements of Rule 25 of the Arkansas Rules of Civil Procedure, but made no mention of Arkansas\u2019s revivor statutes, \u00a7 16-62-101 etseq. (Repl. 2005). On November 5, 2003, the circuit court entered an order that stated:\nPursuant to Ark. R. Civ. P. 25, the Court should, and hereby does, appoint Ronny Deaver as the Special Administrator for his mother, Faye Deaver, with the power to prosecute this case on behalf of the Estate of Faye Deaver and its beneficiaries, and orders a substitution of the Special Administrator as the proper party to pursue this case on behalf of the Estate of Faye Deaver and its beneficiaries.\nOn March 7, 2005, Ronny, this time acting both individually and as administrator of his mother\u2019s estate, filed an amended complaint. The new complaint reasserted the breach of contract and negligence claims, deleted all references to \u201cres ipsa loquitur,\u201d and asserted a claim under the Arkansas Long Term Care Facility Residents\u2019 Rights Statute. The appellees moved to strike on March 16, 2005, asserting that Ronny had never petitioned for nor received an order of revival as required by Arkansas Code Annotated section 16-62-108, and that because more than one year had passed, the complaint must be dismissed with prejudice. The trial court granted the motion and dismissed with prejudice.\nOn appeal, Deaver argues that the circuit court erred in dismissing his lawsuit because it was properly revived through the entry of an order substituting him as a party. He concedes that his petition and the order that he caused to be entered did not use the term \u201crevive,\u201d but he contends that it was \u201cimplicit in the Court\u2019s order\u201d that the litigation \u201ccould and should\u201d continue, and to hold otherwise \u201cwould be to put form over substance.\u201d We agree.\nThis case requires us to construe the requirements of the Arkansas revivor statute. Our review of issues of statutory construction is de novo. Simmons First Bank v. Bob Callahan Servs., Inc., 340 Ark. 692, 13 S.W.3d 570 (2000). In this respect, we are not bound by the trial court\u2019s decision. Id.\nWe agree with Deaver that the lawsuit was properly revived through the entry of an order substituting him as a party despite the fact that his petition and the order that he submitted to the trial court did not strictly comply with the requirements of the revivor statute. It is obvious that Deaver relied entirely upon the requirements of Rule 25 of the Arkansas Rules of Civil Procedure to address the effect of his mother\u2019s death on the lawsuit against the appellees. Commentators have noted that \u201c[tjhere is a close relationship between the subject of revivor of actions and substitution of parties.\u201d David Newbern and John Watkins, Arkansas Civil Practice and Procedure \u00a7 5-12 (3d ed. 2002). However, they have also stated that \u201crevivor is technically a different phenomenon from substitution,\u201d and that \u201cthe statute contemplates an order of revivor of the action in the name of the personal representative or successor to the decedent.\u201d Id. Therefore, the question is whether the November 5, 2003, order fulfilled the requirements of our revivor statute. We believe that it does.\nAt common law, actions abated upon the death of either party. See generally Miller v. Nuckolls, 76 Ark. 485, 89 S.W. 88 (1905). The purpose of our revivor statute is to remediate the harshness of this doctrine. Id. In more than a century and a half of dealing with revivor actions, our supreme court has allowed substantial compliance as the standard in determining whether the requirements of the revivor statutes were met. See Keffer v. Stuart, 127 Ark. 498, 193 S.W.83 (1917); Vandiever v. Conditt, 110 Ark. 311, 162 S.W. 47 (1913); Noland v. Leech, 10 Ark. 504, 5 Eng. 504 (1850). Here, the order that Deaver obtained clearly substituted him as a party and recited that he was the \u201cproper party to pursue this case on behalf of the Estate of Faye Deaver.\u201d In our view, we cannot subscribe to the conclusion that the mere failure to use the word \u201crevivor\u201d in the order meant that the trial court did not contemplate that the cause of action should be allowed to continue. Accordingly, we hold that the trial court erred in dismissing Deaver\u2019s lawsuit.\nReversed and remanded.\nRoaf and Vaught, JJ., agree.", "type": "majority", "author": "Josephine Linker Hart, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "David A. Couch, PLLC, by: David A. Couch, for appellant.", "Mitchell, Williams, Selig, Gates & Woodyard, P.L.L.C., by: Stuart P. Miller and Jeffrey W. Hatfield; and Barber, McCaskill, Jones & Hale, P.A., by: G. Spence Fricke, for appellees." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "Ronny DEAVER, Administrator of the Estate of Faye Deaver v. FAUCON PROPERTIES, INC. d/b/a St. Andrews Place; St. Andrews Place, Inc. d/b/a St. Andrews Place; and William Mainord\nCA 05-1019\n231 S.W.3d 100\nCourt of Appeals of Arkansas\nOpinion delivered March 8, 2006\n[Rehearing denied April 19, 2006.]\nDavid A. Couch, PLLC, by: David A. Couch, for appellant.\nMitchell, Williams, Selig, Gates & Woodyard, P.L.L.C., by: Stuart P. Miller and Jeffrey W. Hatfield; and Barber, McCaskill, Jones & Hale, P.A., by: G. Spence Fricke, for appellees.\nCRABTREE, J., would grant rehearing. Glover J., not participating." }, "file_name": "0370-01", "first_page_order": 396, "last_page_order": 399 }