{
  "id": 6136813,
  "name": "Cynthia HARDY v. UNITED SERVICES AUTOMOBILE ASSOCIATION; Chloe J. Miers, and James Miers",
  "name_abbreviation": "Hardy v. United Services Automobile Ass'n",
  "decision_date": "2006-03-22",
  "docket_number": "CA 05-918",
  "first_page": "48",
  "last_page": "51",
  "citations": [
    {
      "type": "official",
      "cite": "95 Ark. App. 48"
    },
    {
      "type": "parallel",
      "cite": "233 S.W.3d 165"
    }
  ],
  "court": {
    "name_abbreviation": "Ark. Ct. App.",
    "id": 13370,
    "name": "Arkansas Court of Appeals"
  },
  "jurisdiction": {
    "id": 34,
    "name_long": "Arkansas",
    "name": "Ark."
  },
  "cites_to": [
    {
      "cite": "296 Ark. 285",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Ark.",
      "case_ids": [
        1892707
      ],
      "weight": 2,
      "year": 1988,
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/ark/296/0285-01"
      ]
    },
    {
      "cite": "9 Ark. App. 86",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Ark. App.",
      "case_ids": [
        6137381
      ],
      "weight": 2,
      "year": 1983,
      "pin_cites": [
        {
          "parenthetical": "stating that the Declaratory Judgment Act was not designed to force the parties to have a \"dress rehearsal\" of important issues to be tried in the subsequent tort suit"
        },
        {
          "parenthetical": "stating that the Declaratory Judgment Act was not designed to force the parties to have a \"dress rehearsal\" of important issues to be tried in the subsequent tort suit"
        }
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/ark-app/9/0086-01"
      ]
    },
    {
      "cite": "15 Ark. App. 302",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Ark. App.",
      "case_ids": [
        6142360
      ],
      "weight": 3,
      "year": 1985,
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/ark-app/15/0302-01"
      ]
    },
    {
      "cite": "297 Ark. 516",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Ark.",
      "case_ids": [
        1891351
      ],
      "weight": 3,
      "year": 1989,
      "pin_cites": [
        {
          "parenthetical": "Citations omitted."
        }
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/ark/297/0516-01"
      ]
    },
    {
      "cite": "Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7\u00a7 16-111-102",
      "category": "laws:leg_statute",
      "reporter": "Ark. Code Ann.",
      "opinion_index": 0
    },
    {
      "cite": "Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 16",
      "category": "laws:leg_statute",
      "reporter": "Ark. Code Ann.",
      "weight": 2,
      "opinion_index": 0
    },
    {
      "cite": "344 Ark. 177",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Ark.",
      "case_ids": [
        210189
      ],
      "weight": 5,
      "year": 2001,
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/ark/344/0177-01"
      ]
    },
    {
      "cite": "66 Ark. App. 122",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Ark. App.",
      "case_ids": [
        6138053
      ],
      "weight": 2,
      "year": 1999,
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/ark-app/66/0122-01"
      ]
    }
  ],
  "analysis": {
    "cardinality": 477,
    "char_count": 7065,
    "ocr_confidence": 0.756,
    "pagerank": {
      "raw": 6.380125665320789e-08,
      "percentile": 0.39388107183082877
    },
    "sha256": "105bcf29bc3830b277a45b48726f6db521e0379286591365ffa39b3b05aa23d9",
    "simhash": "1:2b4684a140a6df10",
    "word_count": 1139
  },
  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T15:50:54.342319+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
    "batch": "2018"
  },
  "casebody": {
    "judges": [
      "Hart and Vaught, JJ., agree."
    ],
    "parties": [
      "Cynthia HARDY v. UNITED SERVICES AUTOMOBILE ASSOCIATION; Chloe J. Miers, and James Miers"
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "Andree Layton Roaf, Judge.\nAppellant Cynthia Hardy appeals the decision of the Union County Circuit Court dismissing her declaratory action against appellees Miears and United Services Automobile Association (USAA). Hardy raises two points on appeal: (1) that the trial court erred in dismissing her action because a justiciable controversy does exist and (2) that Arkansas case law allows third-party standing in a declaratory judgment suit in the context of an insurance dispute. We find no error and affirm.\nOn November 23, 2003, while negligently operating an automobile, appellee Chloe Miears struck and killed Catrice Johnson, Hardy\u2019s disabled minor daughter. Hardy\u2019s minor son witnessed the death of his sister and as a consequence suffered substantial mental and emotional difficulties.\nMiears had an insurance policy with appellee USAA; the policy limits were $500,000 per claim and $1,000,000 per accident. Hardy, as special administratrix, settled a wrongful-death claim against Miears and USAA on behalf of her daughter\u2019s estate and the statutory beneficiaries for $500,000. This claim did not resolve the issue of any separate claim that Hardy\u2019s minor son could possibly bring.\nHardy subsequently brought a Petition for Declaratory Judgment on the issue of whether her son had a separate and independent tort claim so as to trigger the additional $500,000 of coverage. USAA filed a Motion to Dismiss, asserting that this issue was not proper for a declaratory judgment suit and that Hardy did not have standing to bring such an action. The trial court granted the motion to dismiss, finding that there was no justiciable controversy between Hardy and USAA because Hardy has no legal interest in the relationship between Miears and USAA.\nWhen reviewing questions of law, the appellate courts employ a de novo standard of review. Arkansas Dep\u2019t of Human Servs. v. Welhorn, 66 Ark. App. 122, 987 S.W.2d 768 (1999). In reviewing the trial court\u2019s decision on a motion to dismiss pursuant to Ark. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), this court treats the facts alleged in the complaint as true and views those facts in a light most favorable to the complaining party. Martin v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc\u2019y of the U.S., 344 Ark. 177, 40 S.W.3d 733 (2001).\nThe Declaratory Judgment Act, Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 16 \u2014 111\u2014 101 et. seq. (1997) is remedial, and its purpose is to afford relief from uncertainty and insecurity by declaring \u201crights, status, and other legal relationships whether or not further relief is or could be claimed.\u201d Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7\u00a7 16-111-102 and 103. The act is to be liberally construed and administered. Ark Code Ann. \u00a7 16-111-102(c). In addition, when declaratory reliefis sought, \u201call persons shall be made parties who have or claim any interest that would be affected by the declaration.\u201d Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 16-lll-106(a).\nA declaratory judgment proceeding is intended to supplement rather than supersede ordinary causes of action, and is not a proper means of trying a case. Martin, supra. A declaratory judgment action does not substitute for an ordinary cause of action, but rather is dependent on and unavailable in the absence of a justi-ciable controversy. Id. Declaratory judgment suits are typically used to determine the obligations of the insurer under the insurance policy. Id.\nHardy\u2019s first point on appeal is simply that her request for declaratory relief was proper in this case. USAA argues that seeking a declaration of whether Hardy\u2019s son has an independent tort claim against Miears is not an appropriate use of declaratory judgment relief because the relationship between USAA and Miears has no bearing on the existence or nonexistence of a tort claim. We agree.\nDeclaratory relief may be maintained when its purpose of liquidating uncertainties and interpretations that might result in future litigation is served. Traveler\u2019s Indem. Co. v. Olive\u2019s Sporting Goods, Inc., 297 Ark. 516, 764 S.W.2d 596 (1989). The requisite precedent facts that must be established before declaratory relief can be obtained include the following: (1) there must be a justiciable controversy (a controversy in which a claim or right is asserted against one who has an interest in contesting it); (2) the controversy must be between parties with adverse interests; (3) the party seeking declaratory relief must have a legally protectable interest in the controversy; and (4) the issue must be ripe for judicial determination. Id. (Citations omitted.) In essence, before the trial court can use its discretion in favor of a declaratory judgment, the court must conclude that the judgment will terminate the uncertainty or controversy giving rise to the proceeding and that the judgment will be useful in stabilizing legal relations. Equity Gen. Agents, Inc. v. O\u2019Neal, 15 Ark. App. 302, 692 S.W.2d 789 (1985). Moreover, the court may not deny a declaration merely because another remedy is available or because of the pendency of another suit in which the rights of the parties would not necessarily be determined. Id.\nIn this case, Hardy\u2019s petition for declaratory judgment presents no justiciable controversy. Declaratory judgment relief is not appropriate simply to determine whether a cause of action exists. See, e.g., Bankers & Shippers Ins. Co. of N.Y. v. Kildow, 9 Ark. App. 86, 654 S.W.2d 600 (1983) (stating that the Declaratory Judgment Act was not designed to force the parties to have a \u201cdress rehearsal\u201d of important issues to be tried in the subsequent tort suit).\nIt is true, as USAA states, that Arkansas does not recognize the tort claim of negligent infliction of emotional distress, see Mechanics Lumber Co. v. Smith, 296 Ark. 285, 752 S.W.2d 763 (1988); however, Hardy framed her complaint in terms of a claim for either the tort of outrage or intentional infliction of emotional distress. Still, whether a cause of action exists is an important issue that can only be resolved if Hardy actually files suit. Either Hardy\u2019s son has a recognized cause of action or he does not, and the resolution of this matter does not depend upon whether Miears\u2019s insurance policy with USAA will cover any subsequent judgments in Hardy\u2019s son\u2019s favor.\nHardy\u2019s son has only a potential claim against Miears; he does not have a judgment that might be subject to collection from the insurance proceeds. We find that dismissal of Hardy\u2019s declaratory action is proper because there is no justiciable issue. As such, we decline to address Hardy\u2019s second contention that she had standing.\nAffirmed.\nHart and Vaught, JJ., agree.\nThe filings and briefi indicate that appellee\u2019s last name is spelled \u201cMiers\u201d; however, in his brief, appellees\u2019 counsel asserts that the proper spelling is \u201cMiears.\u201d We will refer to appellee as \u201cMiears.\u201d",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "Andree Layton Roaf, Judge."
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Writ. C. Plouffe,Jr., for appellant.",
      "Kilpatrick, Williams, & Meeks, L.L.P., by: Richard A. Smith, for appellees."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "Cynthia HARDY v. UNITED SERVICES AUTOMOBILE ASSOCIATION; Chloe J. Miers, and James Miers\nCA 05-918\n233 S.W.3d 165\nCourt of Appeals of Arkansas\nOpinion delivered March 22, 2006\n[Rehearing denied April 26, 2006.]\nWrit. C. Plouffe,Jr., for appellant.\nKilpatrick, Williams, & Meeks, L.L.P., by: Richard A. Smith, for appellees."
  },
  "file_name": "0048-01",
  "first_page_order": 72,
  "last_page_order": 75
}