{
  "id": 6139412,
  "name": "James HUEY v. Sandra HUEY (SHEIRON)",
  "name_abbreviation": "Huey v. Huey",
  "decision_date": "2006-09-20",
  "docket_number": "CA 05-1254",
  "first_page": "188",
  "last_page": "193",
  "citations": [
    {
      "type": "official",
      "cite": "96 Ark. App. 188"
    },
    {
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      "cite": "239 S.W.3d 547"
    }
  ],
  "court": {
    "name_abbreviation": "Ark. Ct. App.",
    "id": 13370,
    "name": "Arkansas Court of Appeals"
  },
  "jurisdiction": {
    "id": 34,
    "name_long": "Arkansas",
    "name": "Ark."
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    {
      "cite": "89 Ark. App. 134",
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      "reporter": "Ark. App.",
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      "cite": "90 Ark. App. 98",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Ark. App.",
      "case_ids": [
        6137291
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      "year": 2005,
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  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T22:00:30.615780+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
    "batch": "2018"
  },
  "casebody": {
    "judges": [
      "Robbins and Crabtree, JJ., agree."
    ],
    "parties": [
      "James HUEY v. Sandra HUEY (SHEIRON)"
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "Wendell L. Griffen, Judge.\nThis is the second appeal in this child-support modification case. Appellant James Huey is the custodial parent of the parties\u2019 daughter, Lauren (d.o.b. 3/2/87). Appellee Sandra Huey (Sheiron) is the noncustodial parent. The procedural history of this case was briefly recited in the previous appeal as follows:\nThe parties were divorced in December 2001. Appellant is retired and receives social security income for himself and Lauren. He also owns stocks valued at approximately two million dollars. Appellee is a physician with her own family practice. In addition, she owns a chicken farm and numerous stocks. Appellant was initially awarded custody of Lauren, and appellee was ordered to pay child support of $132 per week and to pay an additional $85 per month for one-half of Lauren\u2019s health-and dental-insurance premiums.\nSee Huey v. Huey, 90 Ark. App. 98, 204 S.W.3d 92 (2005).\nAfter appellee\u2019s request for reconsideration was denied on December 12, 2001, she filed a motion to reduce her child-support obligation and to abate her obligation to pay insurance premiums. Appellant thereafter filed a motion for contempt for appellee\u2019s failure to pay any child support after the entry of the divorce decree and for failure to pay her share of Lauren\u2019s health costs. Appellee was determined to be in contempt for failure to pay these costs as ordered.\nIn the first appeal, we affirmed the trial court\u2019s findings that a change of circumstances occurred warranting modification of child support, but reversed the trial court\u2019s reduction of child support from $132 per week to $24 per week. We reversed because the trial court failed to consider appellee\u2019s income for the first quarter of2003, as mandated by Administrative Order Number 10 of the Child Support Guidelines. In reversing, we cited to authorities that made it clear the trial court was to consider all sources of appellee\u2019s income.\nOn remand, the trial court considered appellee\u2019s income and expenses for the first quarter of 2003, concluded that appellee\u2019s medical practice and horse farm operated at a loss during that period, and thus, determined that child support should remain at $24 per week, the minimum allowed pursuant to the Child Support Chart. Appellant again appeals based on the amount of child support awarded.\nWe affirm that portion of the trial court\u2019s order awarding child support of $24 per week for part of 2002. However, we reverse the trial court\u2019s order of child support and remand for the trial court to enter an award of $135 per week beginning January-2003. We hold that the trial court erroneously concluded that appellee experienced a negative income during the first quarter of 2003 and improperly assessed additional expenditures that had already been accounted for in appellee\u2019s income report.\nOn remand after the first appeal, the trial court entered \u201cadditional findings\u201d in letter form on July 14, 2005, as follows:\nI. Findings of Fact\nA cartful review of [appellee\u2019s] income and expenses for the first quarter of2003 indicate she continued to suffer a net loss. The \u201cDeposit Detail\u201d exhibit indicates income during that period of $64,500.00. The \u201cExpenses by Vendor Summary\u201d exhibit indicates those expenses to be $39,238.61, after deduction of chemotherapy incurred by the husband of [appellee]. However, the \u201cPayroll Summary\u201d exhibit indicates expenses of $18,160.17, after deduction of chemo-related payments. This amount is not included in the \u201cExpenses by Vendor Summary.\u201d Further, a comparison of those income and expenses with the 2002 income tax return convinces the Court that many other expenses were not included in the \u201cExpenses by Vendor Summary\u201d exhibit. Those include insurance other than health, telephone, utilities, postage and legal and professional services. These items above amounted to $28,000.00 in 2002, one-fourth of which would be $7,000.00. In fact, if the first quarter of [appellee\u2019s] 2003 income and expenses are multiplied by four, there is very little difference from the totals indicated in the 2002 tax return. [Appellee\u2019s] medical practice suffered a loss that year, even after subtracting depreciation.\nIt is not disputed that [appellee\u2019s] medical practice suffered losses in 2001 and 2002. The Court finds that losses continued through the first quarter of2003.\nII.\nThe 2002 tax return indicates [appellee\u2019s] farm suffered a loss in 2002, even after excluding depreciation. She testified that the farm continued to lose money in 2003, and no evidence to the contrary was submitted.\nIII.\nThe evidence submitted does not indicate there is equity in either the medical practice or the farm. [Appellee] is operating on borrowed money and owed approximately eight hundred thousand dollars at the time of the trial.\nIV.\nThe only other asset of [appellee\u2019s] is the Edward Jones account in the amount of ninety thousand dollars. She received several hundred thousand dollars of her portion of marital property. Only $90,000.00 is left and she hopes to use that for retirement. There is no evidence that such account is producing any income.\nConclusions of Law\nI.\nThe Supreme Court\u2019s Administrative Order No. 10 requires this Court to consider every resource available to appellee. It has done so, wA finds no resources with positive values.\n(Emphasis added.) These findings were later adopted in a written order dated October 18, 2005, from which appellant now appeals.\nChild-support cases are reviewed de novo on the record. Cole v. Cole, 89 Ark. App. 134, 201 S.W.3d 21 (2005). It is the ultimate task of the trial judge to determine the expendable income of a child-support payor. Id. When the amount of child support is at issue, the appellate court will not reverse the trial judge absent an abuse of discretion. Id.\nWe recognized in the first appeal, and appellant does not dispute, that appellee experienced a negative income during 2001 and 2002. Accordingly, we affirm that portion of the trial court\u2019s order awarding child support of $24 per week from December 6, 2002, through the end of December 2002. However, we reverse that portion of the trial court\u2019s order relating to the child support award for 2003, and remand for the court to order an award of $135 per week beginning the first week of January 2003.\nThe trial court first erred in determining that appellee continued to suffer a negative income during the first quarter of 2003. In the prior appeal, we expressly recognized appellee\u2019s testimony that her medical practice would experience a loss in 2003 was speculative and contrary to the information regarding her expenses and receipts during the first quarter of 2003. Nonetheless, on remand, the trial court failed to recognized that appellee\u2019s own evidence demonstrates that she had a positive income for the first quarter of 2003.\nIn determining appellee\u2019s income on remand, the trial court examined appellee\u2019s 2002 tax return and improperly determined that certain expenses that were present on the tax return were not present on appellee\u2019s expense summary for the first quarter of 2003, entitled \u201cExpenses by Vendor Summary.\u201d The Vendor Summary was prepared by appellee for the purpose of obtaining a $600,000 loan from the Portland Bank, and on' its face, included expenses that the trial court stated it did not contain \u2014 namely, payroll expenses and nonpayroll expenses, such as telephone services, utilities, postage, and professional services.\nThe trial court erroneously extrapolated and added approximately $7,000 in additional expenses that were already accounted for in the Vendor Summary report. The effect was to artificially inflate appellee\u2019s expenditures and, as a result, to artificially reduce her income. Once the duplicated expenses are removed from the calculation, appellee\u2019s records clearly demonstrate that her medical practice produced positive income for the first quarter of 2003. Further, common sense dictates that a person does not secure a $600,000 loan based on negative income.\nMoreover, we are not inclined to agree with the trial court that the fact that appellee\u2019s horse farm operated at a loss warrants a decrease in child support where she otherwise has positive income from her medical practice. We cannot overlook the fact that appellee\u2019s farm is a voluntary operation on which she expended a substantial amount of money, while at the same time she failed to pay child support, failed to pay her share of the cost of her daughter\u2019s health insurance, and failed to even offer her daughter free medical care in her own clinic. For example, according to appellee\u2019s tax return, in 2002, she spent $43,075 on supplies for her horses and $1,106 on veterinary fees during the same time period in which she asserted that she could not pay child support. We cannot affirm an order that allows discretionary expenditures to circumvent the noncustodial parent\u2019s child-support obligation.\nBased on our de novo review of appellee\u2019s proof of her actual income and expenses, and taking into consideration appellant\u2019s concession during oral arguments regarding a calculation error, we determine appellee\u2019s income for the first quarter of 2003 to be $791.32 per week. According to the Child Support Chart, the presumptive amount of weekly child support for that income is $135. Thus, we remand for the trial court to enter an order awarding child support beginning January 2003 in the amount of $135 per week.\nFinally, both parties in this case request attorney\u2019s fees and costs. As appellee did not prevail, she is not entitled to attorney\u2019s fees or costs. We agree that appellant should be awarded $1,000 in attorney\u2019s fees for prevailing on this appeal.\nAffirmed in part; reversed and remanded in part.\nRobbins and Crabtree, JJ., agree.\nIn his brief, aPPellant asserted that aPPellee\u2019s income was $2,282.07 Per month, as follows:\nFirst Quarter 2003 receipts $64,500.00\nLess nonpayroll expenses -39,238.61\nLess payroll expenses -18,160.17\nLess one-half of Lauren\u2019s health insurance ($85/month) -255.00\nFirst Quarter 2003 net income $ 6,846.22\nDivided by three for monthly income $ 2,282.07\nAs appellant correcdy notes, child support at this level would be set at $99 per week because the weekly income would be $526.55 ($2,282.07/4.334 = $525.65). However, during oral arguments, appellant noted that a mistake was made in these calculations because the full expense for ten months of the State Volunteer Mutual Insurance Company was listed as $4,918, instead of the quarterly amount of $1,475.40 ($491.80 x 3=11,475.40).\nAccordingly, assuming this insurance costs is a nonpayroll expense, the figures should be adjusted as follows:\nFirst Quarter 2003 receipts $64,500.00\nLess nonpayroll expenses -35,796.01\nLess payroll expenses -18,160.17\nLess one-half of Lauren\u2019s health insurance ($85/month) -255.00\nFirst Quarter 2003 net income $10,288.82\nDivided by three for monthly income $ 3,429.60\nThe monthly income of$3,429.61,in turn, equals $791.32 weekly. The presumptive weekly child support at this income level is $135.00. See Admin. Order No. 10, Child Support Chart.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "Wendell L. Griffen, Judge."
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Gibson &Hashem, P.L.C., by: C.C. Gibson, III, for appellant.",
      "Sara Hartness, for appellee."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "James HUEY v. Sandra HUEY (SHEIRON)\nCA 05-1254\n239 S.W.3d 547\nCourt of Appeals of Arkansas\nOpinion delivered September 20, 2006\n[Rehearing denied October 25, 2006.]\nGibson &Hashem, P.L.C., by: C.C. Gibson, III, for appellant.\nSara Hartness, for appellee.\nCRABTREE, J., would grant fees."
  },
  "file_name": "0188-01",
  "first_page_order": 216,
  "last_page_order": 221
}