{ "id": 6136463, "name": "Lori A. STUTZMAN v. BAXTER HEALTHCARE CORPORATION and Old Republic Insurance Company", "name_abbreviation": "Stutzman v. Baxter Healthcare Corp.", "decision_date": "2007-05-09", "docket_number": "CA 06-1159", "first_page": "19", "last_page": "25", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "99 Ark. App. 19" }, { "type": "parallel", "cite": "256 S.W.3d 524" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ark. Ct. App.", "id": 13370, "name": "Arkansas Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 34, "name_long": "Arkansas", "name": "Ark." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "72 Ark. App. 250", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark. App.", "case_ids": [ 6139996 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2000, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark-app/72/0250-01" ] }, { "cite": "90 Ark. App. 402", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark. App.", "case_ids": [ 6141459 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2005, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark-app/90/0402-01" ] }, { "cite": "366 Ark. 297", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 3655810 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2006, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/366/0297-01" ] }, { "cite": "81 Ark. App. 57", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark. App.", "case_ids": [ 6136763 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2003, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark-app/81/0057-01" ] }, { "cite": "73 Ark. App. 146", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark. App.", "case_ids": [ 6138609 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2001, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark-app/73/0146-01" ] }, { "cite": "80 Ark. App. 45", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark. App.", "case_ids": [ 6136539 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2002, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark-app/80/0045-01" ] }, { "cite": "87 Ark. App. 145", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark. App.", "case_ids": [ 6138389 ], "weight": 3, "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "151" }, { "page": "452-53" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark-app/87/0145-01" ] }, { "cite": "575 S.W.2d 155", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.W.2d", "case_ids": [ 1668944, 1668834 ], "year": 1979, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/264/0791-01", "/ark/264/0789-01" ] }, { "cite": "264 Ark. 791", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1668944 ], "year": 1979, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/264/0791-01" ] }, { "cite": "82 Ark. App. 69", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark. App.", "case_ids": [ 6137140 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2003, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark-app/82/0069-01" ] }, { "cite": "77 Ark. App. 167", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark. App.", "case_ids": [ 6138169 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "171" }, { "page": "892" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark-app/77/0167-01" ] }, { "cite": "Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 11-9-102", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "Ark. Code Ann.", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(4)(A)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 11", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "Ark. Code Ann.", "opinion_index": 0 } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 659, "char_count": 11159, "ocr_confidence": 0.764, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.837045019159666e-07, "percentile": 0.7215511406263454 }, "sha256": "69ca63c9745207295ba8ce97d8e5f6e9f19558d83b66e7f4c77cdb660d20fce2", "simhash": "1:b493ee8a6c824285", "word_count": 1749 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T20:09:21.655097+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Pittman, C.J., and Griffen, J., agree." ], "parties": [ "Lori A. STUTZMAN v. BAXTER HEALTHCARE CORPORATION and Old Republic Insurance Company" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "Sam Bird, Judge.\nLori Stutzman appeals a July 11, 2006 decision of the Workers\u2019 Compensation Commission that reversed the administrative law judge\u2019s award of benefits and denied her claim for bilateral carpal-tunnel injuries. Stutzman contends that substantial evidence does not support the Commission\u2019s finding that she failed to prove the elements necessary to establish her claim, and that the Commission\u2019s reversal of the law judge\u2019s decision violated her due-process rights under our state and federal constitutions. We affirm.\nAs the claimant, appellee had the burden of proving a compensable injury by a preponderance of the evidence. Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 11 \u2014 9\u2014102(4)(E) (Supp. 2005). A \u201ccompensable injury\u201d is one \u201carising out of and in the course of employment.\u201d Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 11-9-102(4)(A). In order to prove a compensable injury the claimant must prove, among other things, a causal relationship between his employment and the injury. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Westbrook, 77 Ark. App. 167, 171, 72 S.W.3d 889, 892 (2002). It is the Commission\u2019s function to determine the weight to be afforded to the testimony and medical evidence. Searcy Indus. Laundry, Inc. v. Ferren, 82 Ark. App. 69, 110 S.W.3d 306 (2003).\nAt a hearing conducted before the administrative law judge in November 2005, the parties stipulated that Stutzman had been employed by Baxter Healthcare since April 2004. The evidence that was presented included testimony by Jeff Rowbothen, who was one of Stutzman\u2019s supervisors; testimony by Stutzman; and medical records. Rowbothen testified that Stutzman\u2019s work involved rapid repetitive motions and that she worked under quotas.\nStutzman testified about her ten years of assembly work at Baxter, the trouble that developed with her hands, and her activities of crocheting and playing computer games. She testified that she also worked \u201coff and on\u201d as a certified nursing assistant, but she denied that her work at a nursing home involved rapid, repetitive, or continuous motion. She admitted, \u201cOn paper work that I filled out, I did lie. I said that I was not gainfully employed anywhere else.\u201d Under cross-examination Stutzman testified that, for part of the time while she worked at the nursing home, she was drawing short-term disability benefits from Baxter. She stated that she smoked a pack of cigarettes a day and in 1985 had complained to a doctor about her right hand going numb.\nMedical evidence introduced at the hearing included a nurse\u2019s memo and medical reports from Drs. Richard Burnett, Rick Walker, and J. K. Smelz. The nurse\u2019s note stated that Stutzman had an appointment with Dr. Sward on May 11, 1995, that he \u201csplinted her right hand/arm\u201d because she preferred a conservative approach instead of the surgery that he wanted to do, and that she was scheduled for a return visit. A report by Dr. Burnett in January 2002 stated that Stutzman, a patient since 1985, suffered from an ongoing anxiety condition for which medication had been prescribed. In August 2002 Dr. Burnett assessed her with severe depression and chronic obstructive pulmonary disease and tobacco abuse.\nIn a report of October 2004, Dr. Walker stated with a reasonable degree of medical certainty that \u201cassembly line work at Baxter Healthcare\u201d did not contribute more than fifty percent to the causation or any aggravation of Stutzman\u2019s carpal-tunnel-syndrome symptoms. Dr. Walker wrote:\nEpidemiology studies indicate that age-related factors, female gender, smoking and body mass index as well as cross-sectional area of the carpal tunnel all contribute primarily to carpal tunnel syndrome symptoms. Many studies are now viewing work as being only peripherally related to the causative factor of carpal tunnel syndrome.\nDr. Smelz evaluated Stutzman on August 19, 2005 for her hand and arm complaints, including a \u201cchief complaint\u201d of swelling and numbness in her hands especially when using the computer or telephone. His report stated that the problem was first noted several years after Stutzman began her job at Baxter, where she no longer was working; it related a medical history of chronic obstructive pulmonary disease, smoking, and severe depression; and it noted that she had smoked one-and-one-half packs a day for more than thirty years. Dr. Smelz wrote that electrodiagnostic testing had revealed minimal evidence of distal median neuropathy and that Stutzman\u2019s \u201csignificant subjective symptoms,\u201d which she ascribed to carpal tunnel syndrome, were not usually associated with clinical carpal tunnel syndrome. He reported her statement that her symptoms abated only minimally after she left Baxter and discontinued the repetitive activity she described there. Noting that etiology was a difficult question in carpal-tunnel cases, Dr. Smelz concluded:\nMs. Stutzman has multiple factors which are known to increase her risk, including increased body mass index, increased wrist ratio bilaterally, right more than left, female gender, post menopausal status, age over 41 years, hand arthritis, and smoking.\nShe described her work at Baxter as involving repetitive activity, however, this activity as she demonstrated today, involved fine motor coordination and grasping, and not significant and/or prolonged torquing with extreme flexion and extension of the wrist.\nGiven her multiple inherent risk factors, and reviewing her work history, I do not feel with a greater than 50% certainty, that the previous type of work she described performing would have caused or exacerbated a carpal tunnel syndrome.\nThe administrative law judge found that Stutzman\u2019s carpal tunnel syndrome arose out of and in the course of her employment with appellee Baxter Healthcare Corporation. The Commission, reversing the decision, determined that Stutzman was not a credible witness and found that her history of numbness and tingling in her hands was \u201ccompletely inconsistent.\u201d\nAssessing the evidence, the Commission stated:\nShe gave a medical history and initially testified that she began having problems with her hands about a year and a half into her employment with the respondent. However, on cross-examination, the claimant admitted that if company records indicate that she began complaining of hand numbness and related symptoms about six months into her employment with the respondent, this is probably correct. Dr. Walker and Dr. Smelz have both opined that the claimant\u2019s job activity with the respondent was not the cause of her hand problems. There is also other evidence to suggest that the claimant\u2019s bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome may have resulted from some other source, such as playing computer games, surfing the net, and long-term crocheting, as she has admitted to experiencing hand numbness and related symptoms with her hands during these activities. In addition to this, Dr. Walker and Dr. Smelz have also cited several intrinsic patient factors, which are known to increase the claimant\u2019s risk for bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome, which include, her tobacco abuse, hand arthritis, body mass index, post menopausal status, and other age-related factors.\nCiting Dena Construction Co. v. Herndon, 264 Ark. 791, 575 S.W.2d 155 (1979), the Commission noted that conjecture and speculation cannot be permitted to supply the place of proof. The Commission concluded that speculation and conjecture would be required to causally link Stutzman\u2019s carpal tunnel syndrome to her work activity.\nCompensability of Stutzman\u2019s Claim\nIn her first point on appeal, Stutzman asserts that \u201cthe only evidence in the record\u201d establishes that her carpal tunnel syndrome was caused by her employment activities with Baxter. She points to the administrative law judge\u2019s determination that the credible evidence preponderated in her favor, and she disputes Baxter\u2019s allegations that her injury was caused by other activities and factors.\nWhen reviewing a decision of the Arkansas Workers\u2019 Compensation Commission, the appellate court views the evidence and all reasonable inferences deducible therefrom in the light most favorable to the Commission\u2019s findings and affirms that decision if it is supported by substantial evidence. Parker v. Atlantic Research Corp., 87 Ark. App. 145, 151, 189 S.W.3d 449, 452-53 (2004). Substantial evidence is relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Id. The issue is not whether this court might have reached a different result from the Commission; the Commission\u2019s decision will not be reversed unless it is clear that fair-minded persons could not have reached the same conclusions if presented with the same facts. Horticare Landscape Mgmt. v. McDonald, 80 Ark. App. 45, 89 S.W.3d 375 (2002); Wheeler Constr. Co. v. Armstrong, 73 Ark. App. 146, 41 S.W.3d 822 (2001). When a claim is denied because a claimant failed to show entitlement to compensation by a preponderance of the evidence, the substantial-evidence standard of review requires that we affirm if the Commission\u2019s opinion displays a substantial basis for the denial. Marshall v. Madison County, 81 Ark. App. 57, 98 S.W.3d 452 (2003).\nHere, the Commission determined that Stutzman was not a credible witness, and it noted the medical opinions of Drs. Walker and Smelz that her work activity at Baxter did not cause or aggravate her carpal tunnel syndrome. Because it is the Commission\u2019s function to determine the credibility of witnesses and the weight of the evidence, we hold that its decision displays a substantial basis to deny this claim.\nConstitutional Arguments of Due Process\nStutzman contends as her second point on appeal that, because the Commission did not have the opportunity to personally observe her testimony or that of her supervisor, her due-process rights were violated by the Commission\u2019s reversal of the administrative law judge\u2019s determinations. This issue is not developed in her brief, nor has she abstracted any arguments raised to the Commission. Her entire argument consists of a footnote quoted from Kimbell v. Association of Rehab Industry, 366 Ark. 297, 235 S.W.3d 499 (2006), in which our supreme court expressed a willingness to address the issue of whether a constitutional violation occurs when the Commission and reviewing court are permitted to ignore the findings of the law judge, the only adjudicator who sees and hears witnesses.\nWhere an appellant fails to make a convincing argument or to cite convincing authority in support of it, we will not address the argument on appeal. Jones Truck Lines v. Pendergrass, 90 Ark. App. 402, 206 S.W.3d 272 (2005). We also note that we thoroughly addressed this argument in Stiger v. State Line Tire Service, 72 Ark. App. 250, 35 S.W.3d 335 (2000), and we concluded that the Commission\u2019s substitution of its own credibility determinations for those made by the administrative law judge does not deny due process.\nAffirmed.\nPittman, C.J., and Griffen, J., agree.", "type": "majority", "author": "Sam Bird, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Frederick S. Spencer, for appellant.", "Jones & Harper, by: Tom Harper, Jr., for appellees." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "Lori A. STUTZMAN v. BAXTER HEALTHCARE CORPORATION and Old Republic Insurance Company\nCA 06-1159\n256 S.W.3d 524\nCourt of Appeals of Arkansas\nOpinion delivered May 9, 2007\nFrederick S. Spencer, for appellant.\nJones & Harper, by: Tom Harper, Jr., for appellees." }, "file_name": "0019-01", "first_page_order": 49, "last_page_order": 55 }