{ "id": 6137680, "name": "PUBLIC EMPLOYEE CLAIMS DIVISION, et al. v. John H. KEYS", "name_abbreviation": "Public Employee Claims Division v. Keys", "decision_date": "2007-05-23", "docket_number": "CA 06-382", "first_page": "77", "last_page": "82", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "99 Ark. App. 77" }, { "type": "parallel", "cite": "257 S.W.3d 570" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ark. Ct. App.", "id": 13370, "name": "Arkansas Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 34, "name_long": "Arkansas", "name": "Ark." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "309 Ark. 537", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1906058 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1992, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/309/0537-01" ] }, { "cite": "76 Ark. App. 286", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark. App.", "case_ids": [ 6141131 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "288" }, { "page": "776-77" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark-app/76/0286-01" ] }, { "cite": "6 Ark. App. 154", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark. App.", "case_ids": [ 6138963 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1982, "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ark-app/6/0154-01" ] }, { "cite": "71 Ark. App. 126", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark. App.", "case_ids": [ 6138358 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2000, "opinion_index": 2, "case_paths": [ "/ark-app/71/0126-01" ] }, { "cite": "84 Ark. App. 215", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark. App.", "case_ids": [ 6139425 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2003, "opinion_index": 2, "case_paths": [ "/ark-app/84/0215-01" ] }, { "cite": "214 Ark. 741", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 8725190 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1949, "opinion_index": 2, "case_paths": [ "/ark/214/0741-01" ] }, { "cite": "207 Ark. 257", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1481737 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1944, "opinion_index": 2, "case_paths": [ "/ark/207/0257-01" ] }, { "cite": "76 Ark. App. 286", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark. App.", "case_ids": [ 6141131 ], "weight": 4, "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "288" }, { "page": "777" }, { "page": "288" }, { "page": "777" } ], "opinion_index": 2, "case_paths": [ "/ark-app/76/0286-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 585, "char_count": 10280, "ocr_confidence": 0.771, "pagerank": { "raw": 8.138363859351185e-08, "percentile": 0.4724285083802183 }, "sha256": "18610e9f92a81efbd1e13ce007bfeb4f832ca58ac5031463e2cff92d20ed9e6b", "simhash": "1:e0cbb990d19afc9b", "word_count": 1647 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T20:09:21.655097+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Hart, Gladwin, Bird, and Marshall, JJ., agree.", "Robbins, J., concurs.", "Griffen, Vaught, and Miller, JJ., dissent." ], "parties": [ "PUBLIC EMPLOYEE CLAIMS DIVISION, et al. v. John H. KEYS" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "John Mauzy Pittman, Chief Judge.\nThe in this workers\u2019 compensation case became permanently and totally disabled in 1979 when he sustained an injury in the course of his employment with appellant that left him a paraplegic. Subsequently appellee filed a claim for additional benefits in the form of a hand-controlled, wheelchair-accessible vehicle. After a hearing, the Commission found that this benefit was reasonable and necessary and ordered that it be awarded to appellee. On appeal, appellants argue that the Commission erred because the applicable statute does not provide for the provision of such benefits.\nAppellee was rendered a paraplegic in a 1979 injury suffered in the service of appellant. He has subsequently suffered the amputation of both legs in 2003 and a heart attack from a blood clot three days later. His medical condition is poor, his need for care is great, and his quality of life is drastically diminished. Nevertheless, we are duty-bound to reverse the Commission\u2019s award.\nAppellee\u2019s benefits are governed by the law in effect at the time of his injury. In 1979, the applicable statute provided as follows:\nThe employer shall promptly provide for an injured employee such medical, surgical, hospital, and nursing services, and medicine, crutches, artificial limbs and other apparatus as may be reasonably necessary for the treatment of the injury received by the employee.\nArk. Stat. Ann. \u00a7 81-1311 (Repl. 1976) (emphasis added). In the general revision of the Workers\u2019 Compensation Act that took place in 1993, the legislature revised this section so as to provide a broader range of ancillary medical services and supplies to injured workers:\nThe employer shall promptly provide for an injured employee such medical, surgical, hospital, chiropractic, optometric, podiatric, and nursing services and medicine, crutches, ambulatory devices, artificial limbs, eyeglasses, contact lenses, hearing aids, and other apparatus as may be reasonably necessary in connection with the injury received by the employee.\nArk. Code Ann. \u00a7 ll-9-508(a) (Supp. 2005) (emphasis added).\nIn Liberty Mutual Insurance Co. v. Chambers, 76 Ark. App. 286, 288, 64 S.W.3d 775, 776-77 (2002), we held that a hand-controlled van was an allowable benefit under the 1993 amendment because:\nSection ll-9-508(a) was amended by the 1993 act and no longer ties \u201capparatus\u201d to medical services, but rather \u201cother apparatus as may be reasonably necessary in connection with the injury received by the employee.\u201d\nUnder the reasoning of Chambers, the van was allowable only because of the 1993 amendment. However, the 1993 amendment, which provides benefits for ambulatory devices, is inapplicable in the present case. Here, we are limited to the language of the prior act, which allows provision only of apparatus that is reasonably necessary for treatment of the compensable injury. Although it is true that the prior act was to be construed liberally, liberal construction is only one of the tools of statutory construction. It is seldom conclusive in itself and will not be used to defeat the legislative purpose implicit in an act. Arkansas Fire & Police Pension Review Board v. Stephens, 309 Ark. 537, 832 S.W.2d 239 (1992). In fight of the restriction ofbenefits for mechanical apparatus in the applicable statute to those necessary for treatment of injury, we hold that the provision of a private vehicle without restrictions on the use thereof cannot reasonably be deemed necessary for the treatment of appellee\u2019s injury.\nReversed and dismissed.\nHart, Gladwin, Bird, and Marshall, JJ., agree.\nRobbins, J., concurs.\nGriffen, Vaught, and Miller, JJ., dissent.", "type": "majority", "author": "John Mauzy Pittman, Chief Judge." }, { "text": "John B. Robbins, Judge,\nconcurring. I concur with the majority in reversing the Commission\u2019s decision that requires appellant to provide appellee a hand-controlled, wheelchair accessible van; however, I would remand this claim for further proceedings rather than dismissing the claim altogether.\nThe prompt provision of medical services reasonably necessary for the treatment of a compensable injury was required of an employer under the law in effect in 1979. Ark. Stat. Ann. \u00a7 81-1311. it could not reasonably be contended that transportation for an injured employee to and from his medical services providers is not reasonably necessary for the treatment of his injury.\nThe evidence in the instant appeal does not suggest that appellee limited the use of his van solely for traveling to and from his medical services providers. Under these circumstances I am of the opinion that appellant should not be responsible for appellee\u2019s non-medical use of his van. We have precedent for directing the Commission to apportion the gross cost of a benefit between that portion attributable to those services and apparatus required to be furnished by \u00a7 81-1311 and that portion attributable to services for which the employer is not liable. Pine Bluff Parks & Recreation v. Porter, 6 Ark. App. 154, 639 S.W.2d 363 (1982). I submit this is what we should do in this case with respect to the wheelchair accessible van, rather than dismiss appellee\u2019s claim outright.\nFor these reasons I would reverse and remand this appeal to the Commission for further proceedings.", "type": "concurrence", "author": "John B. Robbins, Judge," }, { "text": "Brian S. Miller, Judge,\ndissenting. I disagree with the majority\u2019s interpretation of Liberty Mutual Insurance Co. v. Chambers, 76 Ark. App. 286, 288, 64 S.W.3d 775, 777 (2002), because that case simply provides that an employee injured after the 1993 amendment to the Workers\u2019 Compensation Act may be awarded a wheelchair-accessible van. In Chambers, we did not determine the rights of claimants injured before the 1993 amendment, and we certainly did not address whether an employer is required to \u201creplace\u201d a wheelchair accessible van that it had agreed to provide a permanently disabled employee.\nAppellee was injured in 1979 and appellant provided him with a wheelchair-accessible van in 1991, because \u201che needed a van.\u201d Appellant never objected to providing the van and never refused anything that was required to equip the van. The van now has 189,000 miles on it and is inoperable. Appellant recently paid to have hand controls installed in a vehicle owned by appellee\u2019s wife and has agreed to pay for any modifications to that vehicle. Appellee, however, has great difficulty transferring between his wheelchair and his wife\u2019s vehicle and now has no transportation during the day while his wife is at work.\nThe Commission ordered appellant to replace appellee\u2019s van because it determined that the van was \u201cother apparatus as may be reasonably necessary for the treatment of the injury received by the employee.\u201d Ark. Stat. Ann. \u00a7 81-1311 (Repl. 1976). It is well settled that we \u201cwill not overturn an administrative agency\u2019s interpretation of a statute unless it is clearly wrong,\u201d Chambers, 76 Ark. App. at 288, 64 S.W.3d at 777, and I believe this interpretation of section 81-1311 is not \u201cclearly wrong.\u201d In fact, the Commission\u2019s reading of the statute is quite reasonable considering that this statute was, at that time, highly remedial and was to be interpreted liberally, with doubtful cases being resolved in favor of allowing benefits. Elm Springs Canning Co. v. Sullins, 207 Ark. 257, 180 S.W.2d 113 (1944). Indeed, the Commission was required to act as a jury and to take a liberal view of the evidence in favor of the statute\u2019s purpose of compensating those who came within its terms or who by reasonable construction were within it. See Stout Constr. Co. v. Wells, 214 Ark. 741, 217 S.W.2d 841 (1949).\nBy reversing the Commission\u2019s decision, we are disregarding our duty to apply a liberal construction to the statute and to resolve this case in favor of allowing benefits. See Elm Springs, supra. The majority is indeed making the mistake of substituting its judgment for that of the Commission and reversing because it would have reached a different result. See Heptinstall v. Asplundh Tree Expert Co., 84 Ark. App. 215, 137 S.W.3d 421 (2003).\nWhile I believe a liberal reading of the statute, as required by legal precedent, favors affirming the Commission\u2019s decision, I also believe appellant should be estopped from denying its obligation to replace the van it purchased for appellee in 1991. See, e.g., Thompson v. Washington Reg\u2019l Med. Ctr., 71 Ark. App. 126, 27 S.W.3d 459 (2000). For fifteen years, appellant has failed to object to providing appellee with a wheelchair-accessible van. To explain its recent actions, appellant\u2019s adjuster testified that she assumed appellee\u2019s file in 2000 and that the previous case manager made the decision to provide the funds to purchase the van. She further testified that\nour position is that we don\u2019t purchase vans and aren\u2019t obligated to purchase vans, in that particular case it was the more cost effective route to go. There was no intent to establish a pattern of buying vans. It was an exception for that particular circumstance.\nThe adjuster\u2019s testimony is unpersuasive. She was not the case manager in 1991, and she could not know what the previous case manager\u2019s intentions were regarding whether the van would be replaced.\nFinally, appellee is severely prejudiced by appellant\u2019s recent objection to replacing the van. Appellant relies on this van for all transportation, which presumably includes transportation to and from medical visits. Because he receives only $106.12 per week in benefits, it will be extremely difficult for him to afford to replace this van. If appellant had informed appellee in 1991 that it would not replace the van, appellee could have planned for this day. Instead, appellant waited fifteen years and, during that time, led appellee to believe that all of his transportation needs would be covered. Now, without warning, appellant has unjustifiably pulled the plug on appellee.\nFor these reasons, I dissent. I am authorized to say that Judges Griffen and Vaught join in this dissent.", "type": "dissent", "author": "Brian S. Miller, Judge," } ], "attorneys": [ "The Zan Davis & McNeely Law Firm, PLLC, by: Steven R. McNeely, for appellant.", "Robert L. Wilson, Chief Counsel, and William L. Wharton, Staff Attorney, for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "PUBLIC EMPLOYEE CLAIMS DIVISION, et al. v. John H. KEYS\nCA 06-382\n257 S.W.3d 570\nCourt of Appeals of Arkansas\nOpinion delivered May 23, 2007\n[Rehearing denied June 6, 2007.]\nThe Zan Davis & McNeely Law Firm, PLLC, by: Steven R. McNeely, for appellant.\nRobert L. Wilson, Chief Counsel, and William L. Wharton, Staff Attorney, for appellee.\nGriffen, J., would grant rehearing." }, "file_name": "0077-01", "first_page_order": 107, "last_page_order": 112 }