{
  "id": 6141612,
  "name": "Barbara FOWLER v. STATE of Arkansas",
  "name_abbreviation": "Fowler v. State",
  "decision_date": "2007-06-20",
  "docket_number": "CA CR 06-943",
  "first_page": "283",
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      "cite": "99 Ark. App. 283"
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    "name_abbreviation": "Ark. Ct. App.",
    "id": 13370,
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          "parenthetical": "\"A confession of a defendant, unless made in open court, will not warrant a conviction, unless accompanied with other proof that the offense was committed.\""
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        1459833
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      "year": 1939,
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        {
          "page": "873"
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      "reporter": "Ark.",
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      "year": 2002,
      "pin_cites": [
        {
          "page": "335",
          "parenthetical": "requiring that appellate court view evidence in light most favorable to State and only consider evidence that tends to support the verdict"
        },
        {
          "page": "107",
          "parenthetical": "requiring that appellate court view evidence in light most favorable to State and only consider evidence that tends to support the verdict"
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  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T20:09:21.655097+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
    "batch": "2018"
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  "casebody": {
    "judges": [
      "Bird and Baker, JJ., agree."
    ],
    "parties": [
      "Barbara FOWLER v. STATE of Arkansas"
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "Larry D. Vaught, Judge.\nAfter her home was destroyed by fire, appellant Barbara Fowler was convicted of arson, a class Y felony, and sentenced to 120 months\u2019 imprisonment in the Arkansas Department of Correction. On appeal she argues that the trial court erred in its denial of her directed-verdict motion because the State failed to provide sufficient evidence to rebut the common-law presumption against arson. Specifically, she argues that there was no evidence, other than her confession, that the fire was intentionally set. We agree and reverse and dismiss her conviction.\nThe evidence supporting Fowler\u2019s confession, especially when considered in the light most favorable to the State, is compelling. See Jones v. State, 349 Ark. 331, 335, 78 S.W.3d 104, 107 (2002) (requiring that appellate court view evidence in light most favorable to State and only consider evidence that tends to support the verdict). In a statement to police officers, which Fowler recanted at trial, she confessed to setting the fire. She gave officers a detailed description of how she carried out the act, complete with a diagram of the room where she set the fire. Several witnesses at trial testified that Fowler had stated her intentions to burn down the property or confessed her culpability after the fire.\nThe State also introduced evidence showing that Fowler was in bankruptcy and that her pending divorce would substantially reduce her annual income. The State also established that Fowler had discussed burning the house down for the \u201cinsurance money\u201d and that just prior to the fire Fowler had stored many of her personal possessions \u2014 especially items of sentimental value \u2014 in an off-site storage facility. Further, there was testimony that the night before her home burned she cleaned out her refrigerator and pantry and gave the food to a friend. Finally, there was evidence that, before the fire, Fowler asked her son to remove items that his ex-wife was storing in the Fowler home, so they would no longer be bn the property.\nIn her most compelling argument, Fowler maintains that the State failed to offer corpus delecti proof of arson \u2014 proof that she actually set the fire. In arson, there are two components to corpus delicti \u2014 the fact of the loss (proof that a fire occurred) and the criminal agency of some person (proof that the fire did not ignite by accident). Further, there is a common-law presumption that an unexplained fire was caused by accident. See Johnson v. State, 198 Ark. 871, 131 S.W.2d 934 (1939). Therefore, the State had the added burden of proving that the Fowler home \u201cwas burned by the willful act of some person criminally responsible for his acts, and not by natural or accidental causes.\u201d Id. at 873, 131 S.W.2d at 935.\nAt first blush, the remaining analysis in this case would appear remedial \u2014 it is clear that the home was burned by Fowler\u2019s willful act because she admitted as much. However, Arkansas law requires more than Fowler\u2019s out-of-court confession. See Thomas v. State, 295 Ark. 29, 31, 746 S.W.2d 49, 50 (1988) (\u201cA confession of a defendant, unless made in open court, will not warrant a conviction, unless accompanied with other proof that the offense was committed.\u201d). The State was required to provide \u201cother proof\u2019 that the offense was committed. Id. Thus, we are left to consider whether the State produced sufficient evidence \u2014 without Fowler\u2019s confession \u2014 to overcome the common-law presumption against arson and prove that the fire did not accidentally ignite.\nIn an attempt to show that the requisite \u201cother proof\u2019 was established at trial, the State points us to evidence showing many suspicious acts and circumstances preceding the fire, including Fowler\u2019s financial distress, her off-site storage of sentimental items, and her distribution of personal and food items the evening before the fire. However, the State offers no \u201cother proof\u2019 showing that Fowler actually undertook the act of igniting a fire. The fire investigator was unable to independently identify the fire\u2019s point-of-origin or establish that the fire was intentionally set. The investigator and the electrician who serviced the home were unable to definitively rule out the possibility of electrical malfunction. Further, there was no proof that the fire was fueled by an accelerant or other flammable substance.\nTherefore, although we are satisfied that the State presented ample evidence to support a conclusion that Fowler intended to burn her house down, without Fowler\u2019s supporting confession, the State failed to carry its burden of proving that Fowler actually carried out the act. Writing for the Johnson court, Chiefjustice Griffin Smith questioned the seemingly absurd effect of requiring \u201cother proof\u2019 that a fire was intentionally ignited after a defendant had confessed his culpability in the arson. Smith noted that although it was \u201cpossible \u2014 perhaps probable \u2014 that the defendant\u2019s confession was true ... it is more important that the law\u2019s symmetry be preserved than that a criminal be punished in a particular case.\u201d Johnson, 198 Ark. at 871, 131 S.W.2d at 935. Like the Johnson court, we too must preserve the law\u2019s symmetry. As such, Fowler\u2019s arson conviction is reversed and dismissed.\nReversed and dismissed.\nBird and Baker, JJ., agree.\nFowler also argues that the State failed to prove that the property\u2019s value exceeded $100,000; that the jury was improperly instructed; and that her suppression motion should have been granted. However, because we reverse and dismiss on her first point of appeal, we do not address these additional allegations of error.\nCorpus delecti is a Latin term, meaning \u201cbody of the crime,\u201d and in a legal vernacular it refers to the \u201cact of the transgression.\u201d See Black\u2019s Law Dictionary 369 (8th ed.).",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "Larry D. Vaught, Judge."
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "The Law Offices of J. Brent Standridge, P.A., by: J. Brent Stan-dridge, for appellant.",
      "Dustin McDaniel, Att\u2019y Gen., by: Karen Virginia Wallace, Ass\u2019t Att\u2019y Gen., for appellee."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "Barbara FOWLER v. STATE of Arkansas\nCA CR 06-943\n259 S.W.3d 478\nCourt of Appeals of Arkansas\nOpinion delivered June 20, 2007\n[Rehearing denied August 1, 2007.]\nThe Law Offices of J. Brent Standridge, P.A., by: J. Brent Stan-dridge, for appellant.\nDustin McDaniel, Att\u2019y Gen., by: Karen Virginia Wallace, Ass\u2019t Att\u2019y Gen., for appellee."
  },
  "file_name": "0283-01",
  "first_page_order": 319,
  "last_page_order": 321
}