{ "id": 1311091, "name": "Hamlin v. State", "name_abbreviation": "Hamlin v. State", "decision_date": "1911-12-11", "docket_number": "", "first_page": "257", "last_page": "259", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "101 Ark. 257" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ark.", "id": 8808, "name": "Arkansas Supreme Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 34, "name_long": "Arkansas", "name": "Ark." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "85 Ark. 539", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "opinion_index": -1 }, { "cite": "66 Ark. 115", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "opinion_index": -1 }, { "cite": "2 Tex. App. 432", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "White & W.", "opinion_index": -1 }, { "cite": "97 S. W. 708", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.W.", "opinion_index": -1 }, { "cite": "40 N. W. 193", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.W.", "opinion_index": -1 }, { "cite": "64 N. C. 339", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8682635 ], "opinion_index": -1, "case_paths": [ "/nc/64/0339-01" ] }, { "cite": "85 Ark. 536", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1523275 ], "opinion_index": -1, "case_paths": [ "/ark/85/0536-01" ] }, { "cite": "44 Ark. 115", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1893427 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/44/0115-01" ] }, { "cite": "66 Ark. 59", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "60" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "85 Ark. 539", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "opinion_index": 0 } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 289, "char_count": 5354, "ocr_confidence": 0.599, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.436057418262789e-08, "percentile": 0.2779453551152982 }, "sha256": "a685e228a53a55b301fd4c345f2444ca6f1e618006fc67b4aaed7c809da50f00", "simhash": "1:a228d5e08d9270bd", "word_count": 967 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T18:07:15.186986+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "Hamlin v. State." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "Kirby, J.\nAppellant was indicted by the grand jury of Woodruff County, Arkansas, for the crime of murder in the first degree, and upon trial was convicted of voluntary manslaughter, and sentenced to five years\u2019 imprisonment in the penitentiary.\nHe appealed fi\u2019om the judgment, and complains here that the court erred in overruling his challenge of a certain juror for cause.\nNone of the testimony heard on the trial is included in the transcript, and the bill of exceptions recites:\n\u201cMr. Marsh, a qualified elector, summoned as a juror on the special venire on his voir dire, in answer to the following questions, made the following answers: Q. By Mr. Daggett: The plea in this case is self-defense. Can you go into the jury box and try this defendant as fairly and impartially, give him the benefit of every reasonable doubt and the presumption of innocence, as you would if he were a white man charged with the same offense? A. I could not. By Mr. Daggett: I submit, your honor, this juror is disqualified. By the Court: Q. If a negro was charged with the murder of a negro, could you go into the jury box and give him as fair and impartial a trial as you would a white man charged with murdering a white man? \u25a0 A. How is that? Q. Could you go into the jury box and give a negro charged with the murder of a negro the same fair and impartial trial as you would a white man charged with killing a white man? A. Yes, I suppose I could. Q. Well, you\u2019ll have to answer, \u2018yes\u2019 or \u2018no.\u2019 A. Yes.\u201d\nThe court thereupon declared him a competent juror, over the objection of appellant and he was challenged peremptorily by appellant, who exhausted his peremptory challenges before the jury was completed.\nThe answer of the juror to the first question was positive and unequivocal, and disclosed a prejudice in his mind that would have prevented his giving the defendant such a fair and impartial trial as the law entitled him to' under such circumstances as were included within the question asked; but, to the question of the court, asking if he could go into the jury box and give a negro, charged with the murder of a negro, the same fair and impartial trial as he would give a white man, charged with killing a white man, he answered, \u201cYes, I suppose I could,\u201d and then, \u201cYes,\u201d without qualification. It is manifest from the question of the court that it was applicable to the condition, existing and from the juror\u2019s answers thereto that he could, under such circumstances, give the defendant, a negro, charged with the killing of a negro, the same fair and impartial trial that he could give a white man charged with the murder of a white man.\nAlthough the answer to the first question indicated that such a prejudice existed in the mind of the juror against a negro that he probably would not have been able to give a defendant of the negro race, who is entitled to the same fair and impartial trial as any man, without regard to his race or color, a fair trial, his answers to the other questions disclosed that he could give the defendant, charged with the murder of a man of his own race, the same fair and impartial trial that he could give any defendant under any circumstances, and the court committed no error in denying defendant\u2019s challenge and declaring him competent. Strong v. State, 85 Ark. 539; Hardin v. State, 66 Ark. 59, 60; Maclin v. State, 44 Ark. 115.\nThe judgment is affirmed.", "type": "majority", "author": "Kirby, J." } ], "attorneys": [ "Charles E. Daggett, for appellant.", "Hal L. Norwood, Attorney General, and William H. Rector, assistant, for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "Hamlin v. State.\nOpinion delivered December 11, 1911.\nJury \u2014 competency op juror.- \u2014 Where, on trial of a negro for murder of another negro, a juror said that he could not give the defendant the benefit of every reasonable doubt and the presumption of innocence as he would if the defendant were a white man charged with the same offense, but said that he could give a negro charged with murder of a negro the same fair and impartial trial as he would a white man charged with killing a white man, it was not error to overrule defendant\u2019s challenge for cause.\nAppeal from Woodruff Circuit Court, Southern- District; J. S. Thomas, Special Judge;\naffirmed.\nCharles E. Daggett, for appellant.\nIn holding the juror, Marsh, competent, the court deprived appellant of an inalienable right. The question is not whether a juror can try a negro for .killing a negro, or a white man for killing a white man, with the same degree of impartiality, but it is, \u201cCan you give the defendant a fair and impartial trial according to the law and the evidence, and not allow any prejudice you might have against his race to influence your verdict?\u201d 26 Am. St. Rep. (Fla.) 75; 85 Ark. 536; 64 N. C. 339; 40 N. W. 193; 97 S. W. 708; 2 Tex. App. 432.\nHal L. Norwood, Attorney General, and William H. Rector, assistant, for appellee.\nThe evidence taken at the trial is not brought into the record, and, in view of the court\u2019s holding the juror to be competent, it must be presumed that appellant is a negro and that he was charged with killing another negro. The burden is upon him to show that he was prejudiced by the acceptance of this juror, and by being required to exhaust all his peremptory challenges before the jury was completed, and this burden he has not met. From his answers to the court\u2019s questions the venireman was a good juror, and no prejudice resulted to appellant from the court\u2019s holding him qualified to serve as a juror. 66 Ark. 115; Id. 59-60; 85 Ark. 539." }, "file_name": "0257-01", "first_page_order": 277, "last_page_order": 279 }