{ "id": 1350592, "name": "Jones v. State", "name_abbreviation": "Jones v. State", "decision_date": "1912-07-01", "docket_number": "", "first_page": "261", "last_page": "267", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "104 Ark. 261" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ark.", "id": 8808, "name": "Arkansas Supreme Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 34, "name_long": "Arkansas", "name": "Ark." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "84 N. Y. 565", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.Y.", "case_ids": [ 2181033 ], "opinion_index": -1, "case_paths": [ "/ny/84/0565-01" ] }, { "cite": "71 N. Y. 481", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.Y.", "case_ids": [ 2167954 ], "opinion_index": -1, "case_paths": [ "/ny/71/0481-01" ] }, { "cite": "2 Am. St. Rep. 373", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Am. St. Rep.", "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "382" } ], "opinion_index": -1 }, { "cite": "131 Am. St. Rep. 339", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Am. St. Rep.", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "343" } ], "opinion_index": -1 }, { "cite": "85 S. W. 328", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.W.", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "329" } ], "opinion_index": -1 }, { "cite": "107 S. W. 1133", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.W.", "opinion_index": -1 }, { "cite": "91 N. C. 545", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8697093 ], "opinion_index": -1, "case_paths": [ "/nc/91/0545-01" ] }, { "cite": "42 Fed. 23", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "24" } ], "opinion_index": -1 }, { "cite": "81 Pa. St. 312", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Pa.", "opinion_index": -1 }, { "cite": "95 Ark. 114", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1543568 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": -1, "case_paths": [ "/ark/95/0114-01" ] }, { "cite": "39 Ark. 211", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1898633 ], "opinion_index": -1, "case_paths": [ "/ark/39/0211-01" ] }, { "cite": "74 Ark. 534", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "opinion_index": -1 }, { "cite": "67 Ark. 156", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1152597 ], "opinion_index": -1, "case_paths": [ "/ark/67/0156-01" ] }, { "cite": "21 Wis. 496", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Wis.", "case_ids": [ 11286294 ], "opinion_index": -1, "case_paths": [ "/wis/21/0496-01" ] }, { "cite": "87 Pa. St. 365", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Pa.", "case_ids": [ 1057895 ], "opinion_index": -1, "case_paths": [ "/pa/87/0365-01" ] }, { "cite": "61 Ark. 502", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "opinion_index": -1 }, { "cite": "73 Ark. 600", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1503971 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "602" } ], "opinion_index": -1, "case_paths": [ "/ark/73/0600-01" ] }, { "cite": "131 Am. St. Rep. 399", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Am. St. Rep.", "opinion_index": -1 }, { "cite": "70 Ark. 329", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1509480 ], "opinion_index": -1, "case_paths": [ "/ark/70/0329-01" ] }, { "cite": "68 Ark. 34", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1334063 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "38" } ], "opinion_index": -1, "case_paths": [ "/ark/68/0034-01" ] }, { "cite": "40 Ark. 97", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1897160 ], "opinion_index": -1, "case_paths": [ "/ark/40/0097-01" ] }, { "cite": "38 Ark. 519", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1900464 ], "opinion_index": -1, "case_paths": [ "/ark/38/0519-01" ] }, { "cite": "5 Wall. 107", "category": "reporters:scotus_early", "reporter": "Wall.", "case_ids": [ 3457492 ], "opinion_index": -1, "case_paths": [ "/us/72/0107-01" ] }, { "cite": "178 U. S. 510", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 3612857 ], "opinion_index": -1, "case_paths": [ "/us/178/0510-01" ] }, { "cite": "96 Ark. 89", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "opinion_index": -1 }, { "cite": "118 N. W. 276", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.W.", "opinion_index": -1 }, { "cite": "55 Ark. 502", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1322296 ], "opinion_index": -1, "case_paths": [ "/ark/55/0502-01" ] }, { "cite": "76 Ark. 303", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1501120 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "308, 322" } ], "opinion_index": -1, "case_paths": [ "/ark/76/0303-01" ] }, { "cite": "100 Pa. St. 63", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Pa.", "case_ids": [ 498398 ], "opinion_index": -1, "case_paths": [ "/pa/100/0063-01" ] }, { "cite": "65 Pa. St. 311", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Pa.", "case_ids": [ 430683 ], "opinion_index": -1, "case_paths": [ "/pa/65/0311-01" ] }, { "cite": "105 Am. St. Rep. 762", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Am. St. Rep.", "opinion_index": -1 }, { "cite": "95 Ark. 114", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1543568 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/95/0114-01" ] }, { "cite": "67 Ark. 156", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1152597 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "9" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/67/0156-01" ] }, { "cite": "90 Ark. 520", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1513891 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/90/0520-01" ] }, { "cite": "73 Ark. 602", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "74 Ark. 528", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 8723280 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "534" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/74/0528-01" ] }, { "cite": "70 Ark. 451", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1509511 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "8" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/70/0451-01" ] }, { "cite": "61 Ark. 494", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1902332 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "502" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/61/0494-01" ] }, { "cite": "101 Ark. 593", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1311016 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/101/0593-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 611, "char_count": 13168, "ocr_confidence": 0.573, "pagerank": { "raw": 3.810290188327107e-07, "percentile": 0.8978372870387424 }, "sha256": "ecdf1154a18456babd48ef8af440f0c4d9a4d77cd62aa82ff903d4bf88afd508", "simhash": "1:aaa8b4d3ae39b7d0", "word_count": 2169 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T19:15:24.321988+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "Jones v. State." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "Wood, J.,\n(after stating the facts). Section 7992 of Kirby\u2019s Digest is as follows:\n\u201cWhenever any presentment or indictment shall be filed in any circuit court of this State against any county or township officer, for incompetency, corruption, gross immorality, criminal conduct amounting to a felony, malfeasance, misfeasance or nonfeasance in office, such circuit court shall immediately order that such officer be suspended from his office until such presentment or indictment shall be tried. Provided,\" such suspension shall not extend beyond the next term after the same shall be filed in such circuit court, unless the cause is continued on the application of the defendant.\u201d\nAppellant contends that under the rule of ejusdem generis the words \u201ccriminal conduct amounting to a felony\u201d must be held to mean criminal conduct in office amounting to a felony. Appellant also contends that the grammatical construction also leads to the conclusion that the phrase \u201cin office\u201d modifies the words \u201ccriminal conduct amounting to a felony,\u201d and that therefore appellant can not be suspended under the above section unless he has been indicted for official misconduct amounting to a felony.\nThis court has often recognized and.applied the ancient maxim ejusdem generis in the construction of statutes. State v. Gallagher, 101 Ark. 593; Lee v. Huff, 61 Ark. 494, 502; Eastern Ark. Hedge Fence Co. v. Tanner, 67 Ark. 156, 9; Matthews v. Kimball, 70 Ark. 451, 8; St. Louis, I. M. & S. Ry. Co. v. Love, 74 Ark. 528, 534; State v. Chicago R. I. & P. Ry. Co., 95 Ark. 114.\nIn the opinion in the last ease above cited Judge Hart, quoting from Sutherland on Statutory Construction, tersely states the rale as follows: \u201cWhen general words follow an enumeration of particular things, such words must be held to include only such things or objects as are of the same kind as those specifically enumerated.\u201d\nIn Hempstead County v. Harkness, 73 Ark. 602, the court said: \u201cIt is an old and settled rule of statutory construction which confines the meaning of additional and general descriptive words to the class to which the preceding specific words belong.\u201d\n, But the rule has no application to the statute under consideration, for the reason that there are no specific terms in the statute followed by general terms. The phrase \u201ccriminal conduct amounting to a felony,\u201d under which appellant was suspended, is a general term, and this term is not preceded or followed by any more specific terms. The terms \u201cincompetency,\u201d \u201ccorruption,\u201d and \u201cgross immorality\u201d preceding, as well as the terms \u201cmalfeasance,\u201d \u201cmisfeasance\u201d and \u201cnonfeasance\u201d succeeding, the words \u201ccriminal conduct amounting to a felony\u201d are general terms.\nThe rule could have no application for the further reason that the terms employed are so entirely unlike and antagonistic in meaning and kind that they can not be brought by any sort of construction within the application of the rule of ejusdem generis. The literal meaning of ejusdem generis is \u201cof the same kind, class or nature.\u201d The words \u201cgross immorality,\u201d immediately preceding the phrase under consideration, refers to individual or personal attributes and habits, as contradistinguished from official misconduct or derelictions. There may be gross immorality in, or upon the part of, an individual during the time he may be holding office, but there can not be such thing as \u201cgross immorality in office.\u201d\nThe general terms \u201cincompetency,\u201d \u201cmalfeasance,\u201d \u201cmisfeasance\u201d and \u201cnonfeasance\u201d have reference to official conduct. The term \u201ccorruption\u201d might have reference to acts constituting official corruption, or it might be applied to individual delinquencies not in connection with his office, constituting corruption or dishonesty, as the term is evidently intended to mean.\nThe phrase \u201ccriminal conduct amounting to a felony\u201d may also be applied to official acts or to individual and personal acts, not connected with the office. But the term \u201cgross immorality\u201d could only be applied, as we have stated, to personal and individual qualities or characteristics, and not to official acts. Therefore, we are of the opinion that the well known canon of construction growing out of the application of the maxim ejusdem generis has no application to this statute.\nThere are no statutes making \u201cincompetency,\u201d \u201ccorruption,\u201d and \u201cgross immorality,\u201d as such, indictable offenses. Therefore, the Legislature must have intended by the use of these terms that when any one holding a public office was indicted for any \u201ccriminal conduct amounting to a felony,\u201d or for any offense which showed him to be corrupt or dishonest, or for any felony or misdemeanor which showed him to be \u201cgrossly immoral,\u201d and which, if proved, in the eyes of the law would render him incompetent to hold office, he should be suspended. In other words, the Legislature did not intend that an officer should perform the functions of his office while he was under presentment or indictment for any criminal conduct which, if proved, amounted to a felony, or that showed that the accused was grossly immoral or corrupt. This is the wise public policy which the Legislature manifestly intended to conserve.\nThat this is the proper construction is shown by the provision contained in section 7993, following the one under consideration, which provides for removal of the officer from office upon conviction of any of the offenses enumerated in the section under consideration; and also by the provision of the Constitution, art. 7, \u00a7 29, which is as follqws: \u201cThe circuit court' shall have jurisdiction upon information, presentment or indictment to remove any county or township officer from office for incompetency, corruption, gross immorality, criminal conduct, malfeasance, misfeasance or nonfeasance in office.\u201d\nIf an officer could not be suspended upon presentment or indictment under tiie section under consideration, then he could not be removed after conviction under the section following or under the constitutional provision supra. This would defeat the obvious purpose of the framers of the Constitution and statutes. If an officer could not be suspended upon presentment or indictment under section 7992, then he could not be removed from office under the following section and the constitutional provision above set forth, although he might be convicted of murder, or rape, or any of the heinous crimes inhibited by law.\n2. No rules of punctuation or grammatical construction could contravene the interpretation which we have given the statute. But, even if they did, these would not be permitted to overturn the plain and obvious intent of the Legislature, as gathered from the language of the act taken as a whole, and when construed with the Constitution and statutes in pari materia. \u201cThe law does not allow of a captious and strained intendment, for such nice pretense of certainty confounds true and legal certainty.\u201d Broom\u2019s Legal Maxims, 187.\nThe prepositional phrase \u201cin office,\u201d according to the technical rules of punctuation and grammar, would only limit or qualify the nouns \u201cmisfeasance\u201d and \u201cnonfeasance\u201d in the same part of the sentence with it as separated from the other parts of the sentence by commas, that is, the words \u201cmisfeasance\u201d and \u201cnonfeasance,\u201d immediately preceding it. As we have seen, it could not possibly modify the term \u201cgross immorality.\u201d\n. Appellant invokes the rule that when a series of substantives connected by the disjunctive conjunction is followed by a qualifying phrase, such phrase will be held to apply to, modify or qualify each and every member of the series. But, as we have shown, the prepositional phrase \u201cin office\u201d could not possibly qualify the noun \u201cgross immorality\u201d in the series, and therefore the rule does not apply. The term \u201cin office\u201d therefore must be held to qualify only the terms in the series to which it naturally belongs in order to make good sense out of the language used. When thus considered, we are of the opinion that the phrase \u201cin office\u201d was intended only to modify and limit the three nouns immediately preceding it, that is \u201cmalfeasance,\u201d \u201cmisfeasance,\u201d and \u201cnonfeasance,\u201d and that the sentence should be so punctuated as to give it that meaning. There are no set rules for punctuation. As judgment and taste are the guides to correct punctuation, the punctuation points which are required on principle may be omitted when they are disagreeable to' the eye or confusing to the mind, or they may be so arranged as to indicate the correct construction of the sentence as intended by its authors. Here the legislative intent is plain. See Adams\u2019 Pearson; Hill on the Foundations of Rhetoric, appendix; Starrett v. McKim, 90 Ark. 520.\nThe judgment of suspension is final. It is correct, and it is affirmed.", "type": "majority", "author": "Wood, J.," } ], "attorneys": [ "Gus Fulk and Vaughan & Akers, for appellant.", "Hal L. Norwood, Attorney General, and William H. Rector, Assistant, for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "Jones v. State.\nOpinion delivered July 1, 1912.\n1. Statutes \u2014 construction\u2014ejusdem generis. \u2014 -The rule that when general words follow an enumeration of particular things, such words must be held to include only such things or objects as are of the same kind as those specially enumerated has no application where there are no specific terms in the statute followed by general terms or where the terms employed are unlike and antagonistic in meaning. (Page 263.)\n2. Sheriffs and constables \u2014 indictment for criminal conudct\u2014 suspension. \u2014 Under Kirby\u2019s Digest, \u00a7 7992, providing that \u201cwhenever any presentment or indictment shall be filed in any circuit court of this State against any county or township officer for incompetency, corruption, gross immorality, criminal conduct amounting to a felony, malfeasance, misfeasance or nonfeasance in office, such circuit court shall immediately order that such officer be suspended from his office until such presentment or indictment shall be tried,\u201d etc., held that a constable may be suspended for \u201cany criminal conduct amounting to a felony,\u201d whether amounting to official misconduct or not. (Page 264.)\n3. Statutes \u2014 construction\u2014punctuation and grammar. \u2014 The rules of punctuation or grammar can not overturn the obvious legislative intent as gathered from the language of the statute as a whole, and when construed with the Constitution and the statutes in pari materia. (Page 266.)\n4. Officers \u2014 suspension\u2014grounds.\u2014The term \u201cin office\u201d in Kirby\u2019s Digest, t; 7902, authorizing the circuit court to suspend from office any. county or township officer for \u201cincompetency, corruption, gross immorality, criminal conduct amounting to felony, malfeasance, misfeasance or nonfeasance in office.\u201d limits only the words \u2018 \u2018malfeasance, misfeasance and nonfeasance.\u201d (Page 266.)\nAppeal from Pulaski Circuit Court, First Division; Robert J. Lea, Judge;\naffirmed.\nSTATEMENT BY THE COURT.\nAppellant, who was constable of Big Rock Township, in Pulaski County, Arkansas, was indicted by the grand jury of that county on May 23, 1912, for murder in the first degree. On May 25 the prosecuting attorney filed a petition asking the circuit court in which the indictment was pending to suspend the defendant from office. There was a demurrer to the petition, which was overruled, judgment of suspension was entered, and appellant appealed.\nGus Fulk and Vaughan & Akers, for appellant.\n1. The doctrine of ejusdem generis requires that the words \u201ccriminal conduct amounting to a felony\u201d be held to mean criminal conduct of the same kind or class as other offenses mentioned in the statute, i. e., criminal conduct in office amounting to a felony. Kirby\u2019s Dig., \u00a7 7992; art. 7, \u00a7 27, Const.; art. 5, \u00a7 8, Id.; art. 2, \u00a7 17, Id.; Kirby\u2019s Dig., \u00a7 \u00a7 617, 622, 685, 689, 690, 1613, 1874, 1954, 2449, 2450, 3553; 70 Ark. \u201d326-331; 118 N. W. 276; 96 Ark. 89; 178 U. S. 510; 5 Wall. 107; 38 Ark. 519; 40 Ark. 97; 68 Ark. 34, 38; 70 Ark. 329; 131 Am. St. Rep. 399; 73 Ark. 600, 602; 61 Ark. 502, 503 and cases cited; 87 Pa. St. 365; 21 Wis. 496; 67 Ark. 156; 74 Ark. 534; 39 Ark. 211; 95 Ark. 114. See also 36 Cyc. 1119 et seq.; 81 Pa. St. 312; 42 Fed. 23, 24; 91 N. C. 545; 107 S. W. 1133; 136 111. 22, 25;' 85 S. W. 328, 329; 131 Am. St. Rep. 339, 343; 2 Am. St. Rep. 373; Id. 382; 71 N. Y. 481; 84 N. Y. 565; 105 Am. St. Rep. 762; 9 Am. & Eng. Ann. Cases, 350, 358,\n2. Grammatical analysis shows that the phrase \u201cin office\u201d qualifies or modifies every member of the series, \u201cincompetency, corruption, gross immorality, criminal conduct amounting to a felony, malfeasance/ misfeasance or nonfeasance.\u201d 1 N. Mex. 583; 65 Pa. St. 311; 100 Pa. St. 63; 70 Id. 311, 314; 2 Daly (N. Y.) 66; 15 Abb. Pr. (N. Y.) 290; 76 Ark. 303, 308, 322; 55 Ark. 502.\nHal L. Norwood, Attorney General, and William H. Rector, Assistant, for appellee.\n1. It is patent that the doctrine of ejusdem generis is not applicable here.\n\u201cWhen general words in a statute follow an enumeration of particular things, such words must be held to include only such things or objects as of the same kind as those specifically enumerated.\u201d 95 Ark. 114, syllabus. The terms used in the statute involved in this case are all general, none specific.\n2. Appellant\u2019s construction of the clause \u201cin office\u201d is not possible because it would result in an absurdity. See art. 7, \u00a7 27, Const., and Kirby\u2019s Dig., \u00a7 7992." }, "file_name": "0261-01", "first_page_order": 279, "last_page_order": 285 }