{
  "id": 1341221,
  "name": "Walker v. Goodlet",
  "name_abbreviation": "Walker v. Goodlet",
  "decision_date": "1913-10-20",
  "docket_number": "",
  "first_page": "525",
  "last_page": "527",
  "citations": [
    {
      "type": "official",
      "cite": "109 Ark. 525"
    }
  ],
  "court": {
    "name_abbreviation": "Ark.",
    "id": 8808,
    "name": "Arkansas Supreme Court"
  },
  "jurisdiction": {
    "id": 34,
    "name_long": "Arkansas",
    "name": "Ark."
  },
  "cites_to": [
    {
      "cite": "94 Ark. 329",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Ark.",
      "case_ids": [
        1545390
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/ark/94/0329-01"
      ]
    }
  ],
  "analysis": {
    "cardinality": 259,
    "char_count": 4724,
    "ocr_confidence": 0.485,
    "pagerank": {
      "raw": 9.505882454708161e-08,
      "percentile": 0.5201318686919585
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    "sha256": "b5a1721c94342cdc86377dc99be7a1c8100589836f1f0a94f4c53f42644a0fd6",
    "simhash": "1:5b5354f430432f3a",
    "word_count": 817
  },
  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T15:57:49.083742+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
    "batch": "2018"
  },
  "casebody": {
    "judges": [],
    "parties": [
      "Walker v. Goodlet."
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "Wood, J.,\n(after stating the facts). As shown by the opinion on the former appeal, the only issue \u2018 \u2018 which the chancellor was called on by the pleadings to decide was whether or not the appellant here was under twenty-one years of age when he executed the deed.\u201d That being the only issue, fhe court erred in injecting into the case the issue as to whether or not the plaintiff below (appellant here) was liable for necessary supplies furnished him by the appellee. That was a new issue, and it could not be raised for the first time after the cause had been tried on another issue and a judgment directed in favor of the plaintiff.\nThis court having directed a decree to be entered in favor of the plaintiff, no issue of fact could be tendered thereon in the lower court. The chancery court, instead of entering a decree in favor of the plaintiff according to the mandate, permitted testimony to be taken and finally entered a decree in favor of the appellee, which was contrary to the directions of this court on the former appeal. The directions on the former appeal constituted the law of the case and the guide for the lower court in entering its decree. In Gaither v. Campbell, 94 Ark. 329-332, we said: \u201cA direction here is conclusive on the lower court unless matters are left open \u25a0for further proceedings below.\u201d\nHere, by the special directions of this court, nothing was left open for further adjudication. The decree ordered to be entered in favor of the plaintiff (appellant .here) was final. Under these directions the only decree that could be entered was one in favor of the appellant.\nFor the error indicated the decree is reversed and the cause remanded with directions to enter a judgment in favor of the plaintiff (appellant here) as heretofore directed.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "Wood, J.,"
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "J. W. Bishop and A. F. Auer, for appellant."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "Walker v. Goodlet.\nOpinion delivered October 20, 1913.\nAppeal and error\u2014directions to lower court\u2014new issue.\u2014Where, on an appeal, the Supreme Court directed a decree to he entered in favor of the plaintiff, the order is conclusive on the lower court, and it is error for the lower court to permit another issue to be raised and testimony taken on the same.\nAppeal from Hempstead Chancery Court; J ames D. Shaver, Chancellor;\nreversed.\nSTATEMENT BY THE COURT.\nThis is the second appeal in this case. When the case was here before we stated the issue as follows: \u201cThe plaintiff, Dan Walker, disaffirmed a deed of conveyance which he alleges was executed by him to the defendant, J. E. Goodlett, while he was under twenty-one years of age, and he instituted this action to cancel said conveyance.\n\u201cThe defendant denied in his answer that the plaintiff was under twenty-one years of age when he executed the deed, and this presented the only issue which the chancellor was called on by the pleadings to decide.\u201d\nOn the former appeal the case was \u201creversed and remanded with directions to enter decree for plaintiff in accordance with this opinion.\u201d The Chief Justice, in rendering the opinion, used this language: \u201cIt appears from the testimony that a part of the consideration for the conveyance was a debt for supplies furnished plaintiff by defendant to enable the former to make and gather a crop. The remainder of the consideration was a debt of Emma Walker, who joined in the conveyance. An infant can bind and encumber his estate for the value of necessities furnished to him, but can not irrevocably alienate his estate even for that purpose.\u201d\nThe appellant filed a mandate -in the lower court and asked a decree in accordance therewith. But the court construed the mandate to mean that the defendant below (appellee here) was entitled to reimbursement for necessaries, and granted the defendant sixty days in which, to take further testimony to ascertain the amount of supplies furnished plaintiff: (appellant here).\nAppellant filed his plea of res judicata, and afterward a motion to quash the depositions that were taken'. The court overruled the plea of res judicata, and the motion to quash the depositions, and rendered a decree in favor of the appellee for $188.18, and directed the land of appellant sold to satisfy the same, and this appeal has been duly prosecuted.\nJ. W. Bishop and A. F. Auer, for appellant.\nThere was no plea for necessaries furnished in the first instance, nor involved in the first appeal, and appellee is now barred from asserting such claim. It is res judicata. 127 Am. St. Eep. 363; 137 Am. St. Eep. 55.\nThe opinion on first appeal is the law of the case. The court\u2019s decree should be reversed, if for no other reason, because it directed that the land be sold, whereas this court held that the land could not be irrevocably alienated, and the chancellor\u2019s ruling is incompatible with the mandate in the case."
  },
  "file_name": "0525-01",
  "first_page_order": 543,
  "last_page_order": 545
}
