{ "id": 1537548, "name": "Grand Lodge Ancient Order United Workmen v. Wood", "name_abbreviation": "Grand Lodge Ancient Order United Workmen v. Wood", "decision_date": "1914-06-29", "docket_number": "", "first_page": "502", "last_page": "508", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "113 Ark. 502" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ark.", "id": 8808, "name": "Arkansas Supreme Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 34, "name_long": "Arkansas", "name": "Ark." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "55 Ark. 593", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1322223 ], "opinion_index": -1, "case_paths": [ "/ark/55/0593-01" ] }, { "cite": "61 Ark. 549", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1902322 ], "opinion_index": -1, "case_paths": [ "/ark/61/0549-01" ] }, { "cite": "35 Ark. 412", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1873882 ], "opinion_index": -1, "case_paths": [ "/ark/35/0412-01" ] }, { "cite": "41 Tex. 93", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Tex.", "opinion_index": -1 }, { "cite": "16 Ark. 384", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 8725284 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "436" } ], "opinion_index": -1, "case_paths": [ "/ark/16/0384-01" ] }, { "cite": "64 Conn. 161", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Conn.", "opinion_index": -1 }, { "cite": "81 Hun, 287", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Hun,", "case_ids": [ 3534647 ], "opinion_index": -1, "case_paths": [ "/nys/30/0775-01" ] }, { "cite": "80 Ark. 196", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "opinion_index": -1 }, { "cite": "15 N. E. 220", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.", "opinion_index": -1 }, { "cite": "105 Fed. 172", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.", "case_ids": [ 3828096 ], "opinion_index": -1, "case_paths": [ "/f/105/0172-01" ] }, { "cite": "79 Fed. 46", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.", "case_ids": [ 69060 ], "opinion_index": -1, "case_paths": [ "/f/79/0046-01" ] }, { "cite": "84 Cal. 570", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Cal.", "case_ids": [ 1949022 ], "opinion_index": -1, "case_paths": [ "/cal/84/0570-01" ] }, { "cite": "181 U. S. 49", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 8297223 ], "opinion_index": -1, "case_paths": [ "/us/181/0049-01" ] }, { "cite": "22 Wall. 793", "category": "reporters:scotus_early", "reporter": "Wall.", "opinion_index": -1 }, { "cite": "130 Wis. 61", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Wis.", "case_ids": [ 8700515 ], "opinion_index": -1, "case_paths": [ "/wis/130/0061-01" ] }, { "cite": "120 Fed. 475", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.", "case_ids": [ 3820916 ], "opinion_index": -1, "case_paths": [ "/f/120/0475-01" ] }, { "cite": "27 S. E. 29", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.", "opinion_index": -1 }, { "cite": "64 Atl. 903", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "A.", "opinion_index": -1 }, { "cite": "44 N. E. 1099", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.", "opinion_index": -1 }, { "cite": "68 Ark. 464", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1334091 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/68/0464-01" ] }, { "cite": "249 Mo. 192", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Mo.", "case_ids": [ 8842767 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/mo/249/0192-01" ] }, { "cite": "80 Ark. 190", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1491161 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/80/0190-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 692, "char_count": 13500, "ocr_confidence": 0.488, "pagerank": { "raw": 5.8456412912380444e-08, "percentile": 0.36311132425095055 }, "sha256": "c1500b478086ccb2dd0900e309d61631168d6f149b0873db537dcd6357700de9", "simhash": "1:1ebe7d1fe266ce56", "word_count": 2387 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T15:15:31.349152+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "Grand Lodge Ancient Order United Workmen v. Wood." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "McCulloch, C. J.\nThis is an action to recover the amount of a benefit certificate or policy issued by appellant, a fraternal benefit society, to one of its members, William L. Wood, who died on June 10, 1913. The policy was payable to appellee, who is the infant son of the member.\nThe application, which formed a part of the contract, contained the following provision:\n\u201cI further agree that if, within two years after the date of my taking or receiving said Workman degree, my death should occur by suicide, whether sane or insane, except in delirium resulting from disease, or while under treatment for insanity, or after a judicial declaration of insanity, then the only sum which shall.be paid, or which is payable to my beneficiary in my benefit certificate, shall be the amount which I may have paid into the beneficiary fund of the order during my term of membership. \u2019 \u2019\nThe dead body of William L. Wood was found in a bedroom adjoining his store in Camden in the early morning of June 10,1913, and the evidence tends to show to a certainty that his death was caused by swallowing carbolic acid.\nThe sole issue of fact presented in the trial below was whether the acid was taken by accident or whether with suicidal intent.\nNo exceptions were saved to the instructions of the court. Therefore, the only question presented here is whether or not the evidence was-sufficient to sustain the verdict.\nDeceased was in the grocery business in Camden, Arkansas, and resided with his wife and son, the appellee herein, in that city. The evidence, as abstracted, does not show how far it was from his store to his residence. He and his wife occupied the same room but separate beds, and she testified that the last she saw of him was when he retired the night before his body was found in the room at the store. She testified that she did not know when he left the room, but when she was summoned to the store early next morning about 6 o \u2019clock she found the body still warm, as if death had ensued only a short time before. The body was found lying across the bed, in a small bedroom next to the store, about 5 o\u2019clock in the morning. The body was face downward, stretched across the bed, and the cover was partly turned down. The hands of deceased were extended forward and reached slightly over the edge of the bed. There was a strong odor of carbolic acid in the room and a broken bottle containing a little of the acid was found on the floor over behind the bed. The mouth of deceased gave indications that he had swallowed some of the acid. It was a six-ounce bottle, and one of the broken ends of the bottle contained a small amount of the acid. The evidence tends to show that Wood purchased the bottle of carbolic acid a few days before his death for the purpose of administering treatment to a horse which was worked to his delivery wagon. There were a number of other bottles on a shelf'in the room, among others a bottle of chill tonic and a bottle of pepsin. A physician testified that Wood suffered with indigestion and the use of pepsin had been prescribed for that ailment.\nThere was some testimony adduced by appellant to the effect that Wood brooded over the death of his little daughter, which occurred about a year before his death, and that he had become to some extent morose, and thus formed a suicidal intent, which he carried out by swallowing the carbolic acid.\nOther testimony adduced on behalf of appellee tended to show that deceased maintained a cheerful disposition up to the time of his death, and that his conduct displayed no disposition on his part to shorten his life.\nSeveral physicians were introduced as witnesses, who testified as experts on the question whether carbolic acid in sufficient quantity to produce death would likely have been unintentionally swallowed by deceased, or whether it would have been expelled from the mouth without swallowing it if there had been no intention to take the dose. There was a conflict in the testimony on that question. One of the physicians testified that it was possible for a person to take, by mistake, carbolic acid out of a bottle in quantity sufficient to produce death.\nWe are of the opinion that the evidence was sufficient to warrant the jury in finding that deceased\u2019s death resulted from accident in taking the carbolic acid by mistake, and not from taking it with suicidal intention.\nThe human instinct of self-preservation raises a presumption against suicide, and, as it was not conclusively shown that deceased came to his death as the result of an act committed with suicidal intent, the jury had the right to draw the inference that death resulted from accident, and not as the result of the use of carbolic acid with suicidal intent. Grand Lodge, etc., v. Banister, 80 Ark. 190.\nThe evidence shows that the mother and guardian of appellee, the beneficiary under the policy, in making out proof of loss, stated that the death of deceased resulted from suicide, and appellant cites authorities to the effect that, in a suit on the policy, this constitutes prima facie evidence of suicide.\nThat question is not presented, for, as has already been stated, there were no exceptions saved to the instructions, and we have only before us, for decision, the question of the sufficiency of the evidence.\nWhether the statements in the proof of loss changed the burden of proof, we need not decide, but, aside from that question, the jury had the right, in weighing the evidence, to draw inferences from the human instinct of self-preservation in determining whether or not death resulted from suicide, or resulted from accident. This is so, regardless of the question where the burden of proof in the case rests.\nError is assigned in the ruling of the court in refusing to permit counsel for appellant to propound the following hypothetical question to an expert witness:\n\u201cAssuming that there is a shelf six inches wide, and four or five bottles on it, one bottle of ink, and a bottle of liniment, and a bottle of antiseptic, and a bottle of essence of pepsin, and one of chill tonic, and a bottle of pure carbolic acid, and one of coal oil, and a party was found with a lot of carbolic acid that bad run out of Ms moutb and had run down his cheek, enough to burn it, and there was a splotch of carbolic acid on the floor, and a splotch over behind the bed, and a man was lying in repose on his left arm, the cover practically undisturbed, or rather smooth, and the bottle was broken behind the bed, and the odor of carbolic acid being pronounced, in your opinion, would you say death resulted from suicide, or whether it was accidental?\u201d\nThat witness, as well as others introduced by appellant, were permitted to testify as experts as to the effect of swallowing carbolic acid; but it will be observed that this question submitted to the witness the issue to be determined by the jury, namely, whether all the evidence in the case showed that the acid was taken with suicidal intent, or by mistake.\nThe parties had the right to take the opinion of experts upon questions involved in the case wMch could only be answered by those who have expert knowledge on the subject; but it was improper to submit to an expert all the evidence in the case and take Ms opinion upon that issue, for that would amount to an evasion of the province of the jury. Castaine v. United Railways Co., 249 Mo. 192.\nIt was entirely proper to ask the opinion of the witness concerning the effect of swallowing carbolic acid in a given quantity and under given circumstances, but it would have been Mghly improper to have permitted this witness to sum up all the evidence in the case, in matters not exclusively within the knowledge of an expert.\nThere is one other question in the case properly raised, and that relates to the qualifications of one of the jurors who sat in the trial of the case. The juror in question was a member of the regular panel, and was accepted by the parties as one of the jurors in this case. Several months before the trial, he had been adjudged insane and sent to the State Hospital for Nervous Diseases, and confined there for a short period, when he was paroled. He was regularly selected on the jury, probably without knowledge on the part of those who selected him, and served throughout the term of the court. The sheriff and some of the other officers about the court knew of this fact, but it appears not to have been within the knowledge of the attorneys on either side of this case. Appellant\u2019s attorneys ascertained the status of the juror after the trial of the case and\" incorporated the point of his incompetency as one of the grounds for a new trial. A number of affidavits produced by appellee \u2014 those of the sheriff and quite a number of jurors who served with the one in question \u2014 all state that he was perfectly sane and in normal mental condition, and that they discovered nothing wrong with him throughout his service of about three weeks on the jury.\nIf it be conceded that the juror was technically disqualified from jury service by reason of his not having been legally emancipated from the disability of insanity, the proof shows with reasonable certainty that he was not, in fact, mentally disqualified from performing jury service, and that no prejudice resulted from his being accepted on the jury.\nThe statute provides that \u201cno verdict shall be void or voidable because any of the jurymen fail to possess any of the qualifications required.\u201d Kirby\u2019s Digest, \u00a7 4494.\nPursuant to that statute, we have held that objection after verdict, on the ground of disqualification of a juror, comes too late. James v. State, 68 Ark. 464.\nWe are of the opinion that there was no error in refusing to grant a new trial on account of the technical disqualification of the juror.\nThere are other assignments, but nothing else which we deem it necessary to discuss. Judgment affirmed.", "type": "majority", "author": "McCulloch, C. J." } ], "attorneys": [ "Carmichael, Brooks, Powers & Rector, for appellant.", "Creed Caldwell and II. 8. Poivell, for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "Grand Lodge Ancient Order United Workmen v. Wood.\nOpinion delivered June 29, 1914.\n1. Benefit insurance \u2014 suicide\u2014evidence.\u2014Evidence held sufficient to warrant a finding by the jury that deceased, the holder of a benefit certificate, died as a result of the accidental taking of carbolic acid, and not .by suicide. (Page 506.)\n2. Suicide \u2014 question for jury. \u2014 In an action on a benefit certificate of insurance, the jury has the right, in weighing the evidence, to draw inferences from the human instinct of self-preservation in determining whether death resulted from suicide, or resulted from accident; and this is so regardless of the question of where the burden of proof rests. (Page 506.)\n3. Evidence \u2014 expert testimony \u2014 hypothetical question \u2014 opinion on all the evidence. \u2014 Parties to a trial have the right to take the opinion of experts upon questions involved in the case which can only be answered by those who have expert knowledge on the subject; but it is improper to submit to an expert all the evidence in the case and take his opinion upon that issue, for that amounts to an invasion of the province of the jury. (Page 507.)\n4. Evidence \u2014 benefit insurance \u2014 expert witness \u2014 testimony of.\u2014 In an action on a benefit insurance certificate, when the issue of suicide is involved, it is proper to ask the opinion of an expert witness concerning the effect of swallowing carbolic acid, in a given quantity and under given circumstances, but it would be highly improper to permit this witness to sum up all the evidence in the case, in matters not exclusively within his knowledge of an expert, and give his opinion thereon. (Page 507.)\n5. Juror \u2014 insanity\u2014disqualification.\u2014Although a juror may be technically disqualified from jury service by reason of his having once been adjudged insane, and his not having been legally emancipated from the disability of insanity, when the proof shows that he was not, in fact, mentally disqualified from performing jury service, and that no prejudice resulted from his being accepted on the jury, the verdict will not be disturbed. (Page 508.)\n6. Jukobs \u2014 disqualifications\u2014objeotions.\u2014An objection to a juror, on the ground of disqualification, if made after verdict, comes too late. (Page 508.)\nAppeal from Ouachita Circuit Court; W. E. Patterson, Judge;\naffirmed.\nCarmichael, Brooks, Powers & Rector, for appellant.\n1. Where the defense is suicide within two years from date of policy, proofs of death showing that the cause of death was suicide is prima facie evidence thereof. ' Best on Ev., \u00a7 273; 44 N. E. 1099; 64 Atl. 903; 27 S. E. 29; 120 Fed. 475; 130 Wis. 61; 22 Wall. 793; 181 U. S. 49; 84 Cal. 570; 79 Fed. 46.\n2. Self-destruction means suicide. 105 Fed. 172; 150 TJ. S. 468; 29 111. App. 437.\n\u2022 3. Doctor Newton\u2019s report was a part of the proof of death and admissible. 44 N. T. Supp. 581; 15 N. E. 220; 80 Ark. 196; 81 Hun, 287.\n4. The juror, Bomack, was insane. Kirby\u2019s Dig., \u00a7 \u00a7 4506-8; 64 Conn. 161; 29 Ark. Ill; 2 111. (1 Scam.) 476. \u201cJury\u201d means a jury of twelve men. 16 Ark. 384-410; 8 Id. 436; 47 Id. 568; 32 Id. 17-25; 41 Tex. 93.\nCreed Caldwell and II. 8. Poivell, for appellee.\n1. No objections were saved to the giving and refusal of instructions. 35 Ark. 412; 94 Id. 147; 96 Id. 379; 104 Id. 375.\n2. Suicide is never inferred \u2014 it must be proven. The jury are the judges of the facts. 61 Ark. 549; 80 Id. 190.\n3. Doctor Newton\u2019s testimony was immaterial.\n4. Expert testimony would not have thrown any light on the question. 55 Ark. 593; 62 Id. 70.\n5. Objection to a juror after verdict comes too late. Kirby\u2019s Dig., \u00a7 4494." }, "file_name": "0502-01", "first_page_order": 522, "last_page_order": 528 }