{ "id": 1532231, "name": "Barnett Brothers v. Wright", "name_abbreviation": "Barnett Bros. v. Wright", "decision_date": "1914-12-21", "docket_number": "", "first_page": "44", "last_page": "47", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "116 Ark. 44" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ark.", "id": 8808, "name": "Arkansas Supreme Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 34, "name_long": "Arkansas", "name": "Ark." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "90 Ark. 340", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1513903 ], "opinion_index": -1, "case_paths": [ "/ark/90/0340-01" ] }, { "cite": "83 Ark. 334", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1527140 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "460" }, { "page": "357" } ], "opinion_index": -1, "case_paths": [ "/ark/83/0334-01" ] }, { "cite": "30 Ark. 568", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1881136 ], "opinion_index": -1, "case_paths": [ "/ark/30/0568-01" ] }, { "cite": "31 Ark. 486", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1879256 ], "opinion_index": -1, "case_paths": [ "/ark/31/0486-01" ] }, { "cite": "85 Ark. 223", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1523294 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/85/0223-01" ] }, { "cite": "38 Ark. 127", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1900482 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/38/0127-01" ] }, { "cite": "90 Ark. 340", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1513903 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/90/0340-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 386, "char_count": 6810, "ocr_confidence": 0.472, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.817452955073075e-07, "percentile": 0.7187351463347863 }, "sha256": "9f5c3f5ce5febb0bfb5a2ef1b1702323714412ed91c2af75ae01bdc6634c081b", "simhash": "1:e1fba7fc403a9648", "word_count": 1157 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T15:16:08.473761+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "Barnett Brothers v. Wright." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "McCuhloch, C. J.\nAppellants instituted this action in the circuit court of Hot Spring Oounty to enforce a lien for the price of labor performed by one Alexander, a mechanic, for appellee in the construction of a house on a lot owned by the latter. Alexander assigned his claim to appellants, after having filed the claim in the 'Office of the circuit clerk of the county, verified by affidavit, as provided by statute. \u00edn the affidavit of verification, the property was described as \u201cthe dwelling house of John W. Wright, which is situated on part of the northeast quarter of the southwest quarter of the southwest quarter, of section 13, township 4 south, range 17 west, containing one acre of land.\u201d The lot is accurately described by metes and bounds in the amended complaint. The court sustained a demurrer to the complaint on the ground that the description in the affidavit of verification, which is exhibited with the complaint, is insufficient to. accurately identify the property sought to be charged with the lien. Appellants declined to plead further, and judgment was rendered dismissing the complaint.\nThe complaint describes the property accurately and states a cause of action. Therefore, it is good on demurrer. The affidavit was not the 'basis of the cause of action, and did not become a part of the pleadings so as to be reached by demurrer. Such is the rule in actions at law. Sorrells v. McHenry, 38 Ark. 127; Euper v. State, 85 Ark. 223.\nThe statute (Kirby\u2019s Digest, \u00a7 6128), provides that \u201cif the action, counterclaim or set-off is founded on a note, bond, bill or other writing as evidence of indebtedness, the original, or a copy thereof, must be filed as part of the pleading,\u201d but the affidavit does not constitute the \u201cevidence of indebtedness\u201d on which the action is founded.\nEven if the .affidavit could be considered in testing the sufficiency of the complaint, we are of the opinion that the description therein is sufficient. That is to say, it is sufficient when challenged by demurrer. The words furnisfi. the key to a description of the property sought to be charged, and are sufficient to let in extrinsic proof in aid thereof. Eddy v. Loyd, 90 Ark. 340.\nThe language of the affidavit is equivalent to a statement that the property sought to be charged with the lien is a certain lot, one acre in area, owned by appellee, on which his. dwelling house is situated, and evidence aliunde is admissible to identify the property.\nMr. Phillips, in his work on Mechanic\u2019s Liens (3 ed., \u00a7 379), discussing the rules of law established by decisions of court with reference to the essentials of a description of property sought to be charged with a. mechanic\u2019s lien, says: \u201cAmong those laid down, and probably the best rule to be adopted, is, that if there appear enough in the description to enable a party familiar with the locality to identify the premises intended to be described with reasonable certainty, to the exclusion of others, it will be sufficient. There is great reluctance to set aside a mechanic's claim, merely for loose description, as the acts generally contemplate that the claimants should prepare their own papers; and it is not necessary that the description should be either full or precise. It is enough that the description points out and indicates the premises, so that, by applying it to the land, it can be found and identified. A description that identifies is sufficient, though inaccurate. If the description identifies the property by reference to facts, that is, if it points clearly to a piece of property, and there is only one that will answer the description, it is sufficient.\u201d\nIn the same section, the author gives numerous illustrations of rather loose descriptions which have been upheld by various courts.\nThe same rule is in substance stated with approval by other text writers on the subject. Boisot on Mechanic\u2019s Liens, \u00a7 431; Roekel on Mechanic\u2019s Liens, \u00a7 103.\nThe statute (Kirby\u2019s Digest, \u00a7 4994) expressly authorizes an assignment of a claim of this kind, and Alexander, the original claimant, is not a necessary party to the action.\nThe circuit court erred in sustaining the demurrer, and the judgment is reversed and the cause remanded with directions to overrule the demurrer.", "type": "majority", "author": "McCuhloch, C. J." } ], "attorneys": [ "Appellants, pro se.", "E. H. Vance, Jr., for appellee; Albert W. Jernigan, of counsel.", "Mehaffy, Reid <& Mehaffy, in reply for appellants." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "Barnett Brothers v. Wright.\nOpinion delivered December 21, 1914.\n1. Mechanic\u2019s liens \u2014 affidavit.\u2014In an action to enforce a mechanic\u2019s lien, the affidavit filed in the circuit court is not the \u00a1basis of the cause of action, and is not a part of the pleadings which could be reached toy demurrer, nor does it constitute the evidence of indebtedness on which the action is founded.\n2. Mechanic\u2019s liens \u2014 affidavit\u2014sufficiency of description \u2014 evidence. \u2014 The affidavit given to procure a mechanic\u2019s lien, will be held sufficient, when the complaint in the action to enforce the lien is tested on demurrer, which describes the property as a certain lot, one acre in area, owned hy defendant, on which his dwelling house is situated, and evidence aliunde is admissible to identify the property.\n3. Mechanic\u2019s liens \u2014 description of property. \u2014 The description of property sought to be charged with a mechanic\u2019s lien is sufficient, if there appears enough in the description to enable a party familiar with the locality to identify the premises intended to be described, with reasonable certainty, and to the exclusion of all other property.\n4. Mechanic\u2019s liens \u2014 assignment of claim \u2014 parties.\u2014The rights of the lienor in a claim for a mechanic\u2019s lien may toe assigned under Kirby\u2019s Digest, \u00a7 4994, and the original claimant is not a necessary party to the action.\nAppeal from Hot Spring Circuit Court; W. E. Evans, Judge;\nreversed.\nAppellants, pro se.\n1. Tbe court erred in sustaining the demurrer. The carpenter had a lien for his work. Kirby\u2019s Dig., \u00a7 4970. The description was sufficient, but, if not a defective description, is no ground of demurrer. Kirby\u2019s Dig., \u00a7 6136.\n2. Mechanic\u2019s liens may be enforced in the circuit court, although the amount is less than $100. 31 Ark. 486; Kirby\u2019s Dig., \u00a7 4983. A substantial compliance with the law is all that is required, as mechanic\u2019s lien laws are liberally construed. 30 Ark. 568.\nE. H. Vance, Jr., for appellee; Albert W. Jernigan, of counsel.\n1. The sworn statement for a lien \u201ccontaining a correct description of the property,\u201d was not filed within ninety days. Kiriby\u2019s Dig., \u00a7 4981, p. 1072.\n2. The description was fatally defective. 83 Ark. 334; 59 Id. 460; 69 Id. 357; lb. 357; 77 Id. 542; 93 Id. 176; 94 Id. 306. Alexander had no lien and none passed to appellants by the assignment.\nMehaffy, Reid <& Mehaffy, in reply for appellants.\nThe lien was, filed in .time (Kirby\u2019s Dig., \u00a7 4981), and the description as amended is sufficient. 90 Ark. 340; 52 Id. 302; 30 Id. 568; 49 Id. 475; 51 Id. 302." }, "file_name": "0044-01", "first_page_order": 60, "last_page_order": 63 }