{ "id": 1564956, "name": "Maynard v. Henderson", "name_abbreviation": "Maynard v. Henderson", "decision_date": "1915-02-08", "docket_number": "", "first_page": "24", "last_page": "29", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "117 Ark. 24" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ark.", "id": 8808, "name": "Arkansas Supreme Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 34, "name_long": "Arkansas", "name": "Ark." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "21 Utah, 192", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Utah", "case_ids": [ 8871727 ], "opinion_index": -1, "case_paths": [ "/utah/21/0192-01" ] }, { "cite": "95 Me. 265", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Me.", "case_ids": [ 672894 ], "opinion_index": -1, "case_paths": [ "/me/95/0265-01" ] }, { "cite": "59 Ark. 187", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1327651 ], "opinion_index": -1, "case_paths": [ "/ark/59/0187-01" ] }, { "cite": "23 Ark. 378", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1866125 ], "opinion_index": -1, "case_paths": [ "/ark/23/0378-01" ] }, { "cite": "78 N. C. 372", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8693493 ], "opinion_index": -1, "case_paths": [ "/nc/78/0372-01" ] }, { "cite": "48 Am. Dec. 146", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "Am. Dec.", "opinion_index": -1 }, { "cite": "31 N. E. 1047", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.", "opinion_index": -1 }, { "cite": "44 Ark. 458", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1893403 ], "opinion_index": -1, "case_paths": [ "/ark/44/0458-01" ] }, { "cite": "67 Ark. 517", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1152570 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/67/0517-01" ] }, { "cite": "75 Ark. 21", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "8 Conn. 348", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Conn.", "case_ids": [ 6753446 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/conn/8/0348-01" ] }, { "cite": "15 Hun 410", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Hun", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "19 Conn. 107", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Conn.", "case_ids": [ 6753745 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/conn/19/0107-01" ] }, { "cite": "53 Ark. 259", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "66 Ark. 382", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1909711 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/66/0382-01" ] }, { "cite": "37 Ark. 517", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "78 N. C. 372", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8693493 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/78/0372-01" ] }, { "cite": "31 N. E. 1047", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.", "opinion_index": 0 } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 572, "char_count": 11575, "ocr_confidence": 0.442, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.6656051110431775e-07, "percentile": 0.6951250825820348 }, "sha256": "19c0c277e06a5e332c1dd021863a81910e464d7c37cfa2958fa01701ca9739e5", "simhash": "1:b9ffc1c27e30fda7", "word_count": 2077 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T17:56:14.924196+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "Maynard v. Henderson." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "\u25a0Smith, J.\nAppellant, L. F. Maynard, sued as next friend for his infant .son, and stated the following facts \u25a0 as constituting his cause of action. That on July 19, 1897, one Eli Abbott conveyed to his daughter, Nevada P. Maynard, a tract of land situated in Randolph County, Arkansas, comprising 440 acres. That said lands were granted to said Nevada P. Maynard .and \u201cto her natura! heirs,\u201d and the consideration therefor was the love .and affection of the father for his daughter. That on December 1, 1897, the said Nevada P. Maynard died intestate, leaving her surviving her husband and the said Victor P. Maynard, her only child and natural heir. That while the deed recited a consideration of $5,000, there was in fact no consideration, except love \u00a1and affection, and that the term, \u201cnatural heirs, \u2019 \u2019 used in said deed was intended and understood by both grantor and grantee to mean heirs of her. body, and was so expressed at and before the time of the execution of said deed by said grantor. That on July 22, 1913, judgments were rendered in the Randolph circuit court against L. F. Maynard in his individual capacity, and an execution later issued against him, and was levied upon his curtesy interest in the lands above referred to, and on April 4,1914, the sheriff of that county sold said interest to appellees and executed a cer \u2022 tifioate of purchase, and, upon the expiration of the period of redemption, will make a deed therefor, which will Constitute a cloud on the title of said infant. A demurrer to this complaint was sustained, and, appellant declining to amend, the complaint was dismissed, and this appeal has been duly prosecuted.\nThe question in the case is whether L. F. Maynard had curtesy in these lands, and that question is decided by a determination of the construction to be given the deed to Nevada P. Maynard.\n(1) Equity will interpose to prevent the execution of a deed, which it would cancel as a cloud, if it were executed. 5 R. C. L. 663. Talieferro v. Barnett, 37 Ark. 517. And the execution of a deed by the sheriff would constitute a cloud on the infant\u2019s title. White Sewing Machine Co. v. Wooster, 66 Ark. 382.\nThis sheriff\u2019s deed will not only purport to convey an interest in these lands, but will actually convey an interest, if the term, \u201cnatural heirs,\u201d is to be given the meaning contended for by .appellee.\nIn the case of Johnson v. Knights of Honor, 53 Ark. 259, it was held that the word \u201cheirs,\u201d when used in any legal instrument, with no context to explain it, should be understood in its legal and technical sense. There is nothing in the context of the deed under consideration to indicate the term, \u201cnatural heirs,\u201d was not used in its legal and technical .sense. This conveyance was not to the daughter and her heirs general, but to her and her \u201cnatural heirs,\u201d and as we can not assume this word \u201cnatural\u201d wias surplusage, we must give it its technical meaning, whatever that may be, when thus used.\nBouvier\u2019s Dictionary gives the following definition of natural heirs: \u201cAs used in a will and by way of ex-ecutory devise, .they are considered as of the same legal import as \u2018heirs of the body.\u2019 \u201d\nThe definition given in Anderson\u2019s Dictionary is \u201cHeir of the body or natural heir. An heir begotten of the body, a lineal descendant.\u201d\nBlack\u2019s Law Dictionary, however, defines the term as follows: \u201cHeirs by consanguinity as distinguished from heirs by adoption, and also as distinguished from collateral heirs.\u201d\nFour cases are cited in support of the definition given in Black\u2019s Law Dictionary as follows: Smith v. Pendell, 19 Conn. 107; Markover v. Krauss, 31 N. E. 1047; Miller v. Churchill, 78 N. C. 372; Ludlum v. Otis, 15 Hun 410.\nThe case of Ludlum v. Otis, involved the construction of the will of a testator who left no descendants. The syllabus in that case is as follows: \u2018 \u2018 The testator left him surviving a mother, a sister and cousins, but no widow or children. Held, that by the term, his \u2018natural heirs,\u2019 the testator meant his mother and sister.\u201d\nWe quote the following language from the opinion in that case: \u201cWho were his natural heiris? We should say to a man reared and educated in New York the term, \u2018natural heirs,\u2019 would be understood .and regarded as a mother and sister, rather than cousins in any degree. * # * It results from these views that the devise of New York property is to his mother and sister as his natural heirs, or that the devises are so indefinite as to invalidate it as a devise to any one, and in that case the property descends to the mother and sister, and, after the death of the mother, to the sister alone.\u201d\nThe North Carolina ease cited above supports the definition given by Bouvier land Anderson. The syllabus in that case is as follows: \u201cWhere .a testatrix bequeathed a \u00a1certain sum to each of two sisters, M. and N., and, \u2018in the event of the death of either without natural heirs,\u2019 the .amount I have bequeathed shall go to the survivor.\u2019 Held, that the words, \u2018natural heirs,\u2019 mean children or issue, and, upon the death of M., the bequest to \u25a0her goes to N. \u2019 \u2019\nThe ease of Markover v. Krauss involved the construction of \u00a1a \u00a1statute of the .State of Indiana relating to the \u00a1adoption of children.\nThe New York case \u00a1and the North Carolina case referred to above construe the wills of testators who used the term, \u201cnatural heirs,\u201d but there were no children or descendants of \u00a1children to whom that term could be \u00a1applied in either of those cases. The remaining case cited in support \u00a1of Black\u2019s definition is the case of Smith v. Pendell, 19 Conn. 107, in which case the testator devised his lands to his granddaughter in the following terms: '\n\u201cAnd to my beloved granddaughter, Elizabeth Smith, I do give all the remainder of my lands and estate, hoping that she may live to enjoy the same, but if the said Elizabeth Smith \u00a1should die leaving no natural heirs, my will is that the \u00a1same shall go to my said daughter-in-law, Hannah Smith, mother of the said Elizabeth, and to be her own.\u201d\nIn construing this will that court \u00a1said: \u2018 \u2018 The words, \u2018natural heirs,\u2019 and \u2018heirs \u00a1of the body,\u2019 in a will and by way of executory devise, are considered as of the same legal import. The cases are very numerous which confirm this construction, many of which are referred to in the case last cited (Hudson v. Wadsworth, 8 Conn. 348.).\u201d\nWhile the subject is not free from doubt, we think the term, \u201cnatural heirs,\u201d is not to be construed as meaning heirs general. To so \u00a1construe the term would be to treat the word \u201cnatural\u201d as .surplusage; and we think the definition given in Bouvier\u2019s and Anderson\u2019s dictionaries is to be preferred to -the ene given in Black\u2019s Dictionary, in so far as those definitions differ.\nHaving reached the conclusion that the term, \u201cnatural heirs,\u201d does not mean heirs general, we find the remaining questions involved in this ease have already been decided by this court. By statute, a common law fee tail is turned into a life estate in the first taker, and passes in fee simple to the person to whom the estate would first pass from that person according to the course of the common law. Kirby\u2019s Digest, \u00a7 735; Wheelock v. Simons, 75 Ark. 21.\nIn the case of Wilmans v. Robinson, 67 Ark. 517, it was decided (to quote the syllabus):\n\u201cA deed of conveyance to the grantee and her bodily 'heirs creates a fee tail at common law, whereby, under the statute, the grantee takes an estate for her natural life, with remainder in fee in her children. \u2019 \u2019\nThe opinion in that case quoted from Kerr on Beal. Property, section 496, as follows: \u201cThe rule in Shelley\u2019s case * * * is a rule of construction, and not of law; simply providing that where an estate of freehold is limited to a person, and the same instrument contains a limitation, either mediate or immediate to his heirs, or the heirs of his body, 'the word \u2018heirs\u2019 is a-word of limitation; that is, the ancestor takes the whole estate comprised in the term. If the limitation be to the heirs \u2018of his body,\u2019 he takes a fee-tail. If to his heirs generally, he takes a fee simple. \u2019 \u2019\nIt follows, therefore, that Nevada P. Maynard took an estate for life, with remainder in fee to the infant who sues here by his next friend, and, therefore, L. F. Maynard has no curtesy interest in the lands sold under the execution, and the decree of the court below will, therefore, be reversed and the cause will be remanded with directions to overrule the demurrer and for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.", "type": "majority", "author": "\u25a0Smith, J." } ], "attorneys": [ "8. A. D. Eaton, for appellant.", "A. J. Witt, for appellees." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "Maynard v. Henderson.\nOpinion delivered February 8, 1915.\n1. Cloud on title\u2014deed\u2014injunction.\u2014Equity will \u00a1interpose ,to .prevent\u2019 the execution of a deed which it would cancel as a cloud if it were executed.\n2. Deeds\u2014grant to m. and \u201cto her natural heirs.\u201d\u2014A grantor deeded lands to M. \u201c.and to her natural heirs.\u201d M. died leaving a husband and son surviving. Held, the term \u201cnatural heirs\u201d meant \u201cheirs of the body,\u201d and \u00a1that the land descended to M.\u2019s son.\n3. Estate tail\u2014passes, how.-\u2014Under Kirby\u2019s Digest, \u00a7 735, a common law fee tail is turned into a life estate in the first taker and passes in fee simple to the person to whom the estate would first pass from that person according to the course of the common law.\n4. Estate tail\u2014construction of deed.\u2014Droperty was deeded to M. and the heirs of her body. M. died, leaving a husband and son surviving. Held, the deed .gave to M. a fee tail estate, which, under the statute, is an estate for life, with remainder in fee to her son, and the husband took no interest whatever in the land.\nAppeal from Randolph Chancery Court; George T. Humphries, Chancellor;\nreversed.\n8. A. D. Eaton, for appellant.\n1. If the granting clause in the deed bad contained the words \u201cbodily heirs,\u201d or \u201cheirs of her body,\u201d there would be no question but that the deed conveyed to Nevada P. Maynard a 'life estate only, with remainder in fee to appellant, \u00a1and that her husband \u00a1surviving would have no curtesy right in the lands. Kirby\u2019s Dig., \u00a7 735; 44 Ark. 458.\nThe words, \u201cnatural heirs,\u201d as used in the deed .are of the .same legal import and effect as the words \u201cbodily heirs,\u201d or \u201cheirs of 'her body.\u201d 13 Cyc. 605; Id. 659, et seq.; Kirby\u2019s Dig., \u00a7 1343; 31 N. E. 1047; 48 Am. Dec. 146; 15 Hun (N. T.) 410; 78 N. C. 372; 21 Cyc. 430; 23 Ark. 378-387.\n2. If the sheriff\u2019s deed would create a cloud upon appellant\u2019s title, he has the right to maintain this suit. It .meets the test. 37- Ark. 315; 2 Words & Phrases, 1233; 7 Cyc. 255. See, also, Kirby\u2019s Dig., \u00a7 649.\nA. J. Witt, for appellees.\n1. The demurrer was properly sustained. Only the interest of L. F. Maynard was sold. If he had none, how could a sale of his interest create a cloud on the title of his minor son?\nA cloud on title is a title or incumbrance apparently valid, but, in fact, invalid; something which shows prima facie .some right of a third person to it, etc. See 2 Words & Phrases, 1233, and oases cited.\nVictor P. Maynard\u2019s rights can be adjudicated if appellees get a deed and >sue for possession; but L. F. Maynard ought not to 'be permitted, in his minor son\u2019s name to have adjudicated the question as to whether or not he, the father, has title, and thereby settle whether he should redeem or not.\n2. If this is to be treated as an action to reform the deed to Nevada P. Maynard, no cause of action is stated. 59 Ark. 187; 95 Me. 265; 21 Utah, 192; 34 Cyc. 967.\n3. The deed a.s made gives L. F. Maynard a curtesy interest in the land. The words, \u201cnatural heirs,\u201d are equivalent to \u201cheirs generally,\u201d and not \u201cheirs of her body.\u201d Black, Daw Diet., 801." }, "file_name": "0024-01", "first_page_order": 50, "last_page_order": 55 }