{ "id": 1562539, "name": "Hankins v. State", "name_abbreviation": "Hankins v. State", "decision_date": "1915-05-10", "docket_number": "", "first_page": "419", "last_page": "423", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "118 Ark. 419" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ark.", "id": 8808, "name": "Arkansas Supreme Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 34, "name_long": "Arkansas", "name": "Ark." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "98 Ark. 327", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1316132 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "449" } ], "opinion_index": -1, "case_paths": [ "/ark/98/0327-01" ] }, { "cite": "129 N. W. 234", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.W.", "case_ids": [ 2529526 ], "opinion_index": -1, "case_paths": [ "/nd/21/0133-01" ] }, { "cite": "69 Ark. 322", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 8722514 ], "opinion_index": -1, "case_paths": [ "/ark/69/0322-01" ] }, { "cite": "69 Ark. 449", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 8724207 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": -1, "case_paths": [ "/ark/69/0449-01" ] }, { "cite": "98 Ark. 327", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1316132 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/98/0327-01" ] }, { "cite": "129 N. W. 234", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.W.", "case_ids": [ 2529526 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nd/21/0133-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 426, "char_count": 8112, "ocr_confidence": 0.427, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.392552054677732e-08, "percentile": 0.2755535168266567 }, "sha256": "cca116c15f4c81cd0f5f34da2285446549c4fa092aa5f1fd437d167e6f6b84a5", "simhash": "1:9e7b7c64f0854bac", "word_count": 1366 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T17:53:29.321926+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "Hankins v. State." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "McCulloch, O. J.\nAppellant is charged with the crime of administering poison to a certain horse named \u201cWat-tan\u201d, the property of one W. H. Shanks. The indictment charges that appellant knowingly administered strychnine to snid horse, and was framed under the \u2022following statute:\n\u201cEvery person who shall knowingly /administer any poison to .any horse, ass, \u00a1mule or to any cattle, hog, \u2022sheep, goat or dog, or maliciously expose any poisonous .substance with intent that the same shall be taken or swallowed by 'any of the aforesaid animals, shall on conviction be punished in the manner prescribed by law for feloniously .stealing property of the value of the animal so poisoned; and the jury who shall try such case shall assess the amount of damages, if any /actual damage \u25a0has Occurred, occasioned by .such poisoning or intent to poison, \u00a1and the court 'shall render judgment in favor of the party injured for threefold the 'amount so assessed by the jury.\u201d Kirby\u2019s Digest, \u00a7 1892.\nThe evidence /addutoed on the trial wias mainly to establish /circumstances which tended to show that appellant administered the poison to the horse and that the horse died from the effects .of it. The owner found the -horse dead in the stall when he went out to feed early in the morning, and there is sufficient testimony to connect the defendant circumstantially with the /commission of the crime.\nIn making up the trial jury, appellant exhausted all his peremptory challenges, .and there 'are several assignments oif error with respect to rulings \u2018of the court in passing on the competency of jurors. One of the veniremen disclosed the fact on his voir dire that be was a justice of the peace in the county \u00a1at that time, and appellant challenged him peremptorily on that ground, but the court overruled the challenge for the .alleged reason that -appellant had failed to exercise his right of challenge before the attorney for the State passed on the juror. It appears that the juror disclosed the fact that he was a justice of the peace when [being\u2019 cross-examined by appellant\u2019s counsel, amid the question of his competency was dully challenged. We think that the challenge was exercised in apt time and that the \u00a1court erred in disregarding it. Langford v. State, 98 Ark. 327. The Attorney General has confessed error \u00a1on this point, and we \u00a1are of \u00a1the opinion that the \u00a1confession is well founded. The statute provides that the fact that a \u201cjuryman is a postmaster, justice of the peace or county official\u201d affords grounds for peremptory challenge. Kirby\u2019s Digest, \u00a7 4537. This error of the court calls for a reversial of the judgment.\nThere \u00a1are \u00a1many other assignments of error which need not be discussed for the reason that the same matters may not arise in the next trial.\nThere is one, however, which relates to the question of the \u00a1conrelcltness of an instruction of the court, \u00a1and as that question may arise in the next trial we deem it proper \u00a1to consider it. Iin instruction No. 8 the court told the jury that if appellant \u201cplaced strychnine poison in the place for the purpose of having \u201cWattan\u201d to take it, and .that \u201cWattan\u201d did take it into his .stomach, then you will find that defendant \u00a1administered said strychnine to \u201cWattan.\u201d Objection was made to tbis instruction \u00a1and the ruling of the court in giving it is now assigned \u00a1as error. It is argued 'that the \u00a1statute names 'two Independent methods in which the offense may be committed, and that \u00a1as -the indictment charges the offense to have been \u00a1committed in one of the prescribed modes, thiat of knowingly .administering poison, it cannot he established by proving the other method, that of maliciously exposing the poison. Our conclusion is that the instruction given by the court was correct, for the placing of the poison where the horse could get it, and with intent that the horse should get it, constituted the offense \u00a1of knowingly administering the poison if the horse in fact took the substance in bis stomach. There are, indeed, two methods prescribed for committing the offense. The first method, that of administering the poison, is not complete unless the \u00a1animal takes it; 'but the other offense is complete when the poison is maliciously exposed with intent that the same \u00a1shall be taken or \u00a1swallowed by any of the \u00a1animals mentioned, whether the poisonous substance is in fact taken by the \u00a1animal or not. The two methods \u00a1differ in that respect. But, after \u00a1all, exposing the poisonous substance with the intention that the \u00a1animal shall \u00a1get it constituted the offense of administering if the animal doeis in fact get it. Counsel for appellant cited a decision \u00a1of the Supreme Court of North Dakota (State v. Hakon, 129 N. W. 234) which sustains their contention, but we decline to take that view of the subject. The statute of North Dakota is very similar to our statute on the subject and the court, in the decision referred to, .said that if exposing the poison was not prescribed as \u00a1an independent method of committing the \u00a1crime, then it would constitute administering poison, but that \u2018because \u00a1of the fact that it did constitute an independent method it could not be considered as an element \u00a1of the offense of administering the poison. The reasoning of the ease does not appeal to us, for it seems clear to us that notwithstanding the fact that the statute makes the exposing of poison a crime, that may also constitute a part of the crime of administering and thus make out the crime if \u00a1the 'animal gets the poison thus exposed with such intentions.\nIt is also urged that it was improper for the court to permit damages to :be awarded, notwithstanding the statute which expressly provides that \u201cthe jury who shall try .such case shall assess the amount of damages, if \u00a1any actual damages has occurred, occasioned by such poisoning or intent to poison. \u2019 \u2019 No reason is given in the \u2022argument why the Legislature cannot authorize the trial together of \u00a1the civil action for damages and the criminal prosecution. We are aware of no constitutional prohibition against such procedure.\nFor the error iof the court, however, in refusing to \u25a0allow appellant to challenge the venireman who was a justice of 'the peace, the judgment is reversed and the cause remanded for a new trial. \u25a0'", "type": "majority", "author": "McCulloch, O. J." } ], "attorneys": [ "R. W. Baxter, G. 8. Pool and E. E. Williams, for \u25a0appellant.", "Wm. L. Moose, Attorney General and Jno. P. Streepey, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "Hankins v. State.\nOpinion delivered May 10, 1915\n1. Juries \u2014 peremptory challenge \u2014 justice of the peace. \u2014 Under Kirby's Digest, \u00a7 4537, it is error for the court to overrule the \u25a0challenge by defendant of a juror on the ground that he was a justice of the peace, when the challenge was made immediately after his cross-examination iby defendant\u2019s counsel.\n2. Criminal law \u2014 exposing poison to animal. \u2014 Under Kirby\u2019s Digest, \u00a7 1892, it is made a crime to administer poison to certain animals, and to maliciously expose poison with the intent that said animal shall swallow the same. Held, Exposing the poisonous substance with the intention that the animal shall get it, consitutes the offense of administering, if the animal does, in fact, get it.\n3. Actions \u2014 civil and criminal \u2014 may be tried together, when.\u2014 There is no constitutional prohibition against the Legislature\u2019s authorizing the trial together of a civil action for damages and the criminal prosecution, when poison has been administered by the defendant to an animal belonging the the prosecuting witness, as provided in Kirby\u2019s Digest, \u00a7 1892.\nAppeal from Ashley Circuit Court; Turner Butler, Judge;\nreversed.\nR. W. Baxter, G. 8. Pool and E. E. Williams, for \u25a0appellant.\n1. A justice of the peace is not fa competent juror. 69 Ark. 449. Defendants peremptory challenges were exhausted. Kirlby\u2019.s Dig. \u00a7 2367; 69 Ark. 322.\n2. Kirby\u2019s Dig. \u00a7 1892 embraces two crimes, one \u201cknowingly .administering\u201d and the other \u201cmaliciously exposing\u201d poison, etc. The court erred in its charge to the jury. 129 N. W. 234.\nWm. L. Moose, Attorney General and Jno. P. Streepey, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.\n\u2022Confesses error in the selection of a justice of the peace as a juror. 98 Ark. 327; 69 Id. 449. Defendant\u2019s peremptory challenges were exhausted. 69 Ark. 449-451." }, "file_name": "0419-01", "first_page_order": 441, "last_page_order": 445 }