#### The State vs. Minyard.

An indictment charging defendant with maliciously and contemptuously disturbing and disquieting a congregation assembled for religions worship, without alleging the manner of disturbance, is insufficient.

It is not necessary, however, to charge the.manner of disturbance in any language more explicit than that used in the statute, (Dig., ¶. 370, sec. 1,) as “by profanely swearing,” or “by using indecent gestures,” &o., as the case maybe.

Appeal from Conway Circuit Court.

This was an indictment in the Conway Circuit Court, for disturbing a religious congregation, determined in the Conway Circuit Court, at September term, 1850, before the lion. William: IT. Feild, Judge.

The indictment was, in substance, as follows :

“The grand jurors, &c., &c., present that Jacob Minyard, Clark Fletcher, Francis M. Hollylield, and George Roberts, late of, &c., on the 29th day of July, A. D. 1849, with force and arms, in the county aforesaid, maliciously and contemptuously did disturb -and disquiet a certain congregation, assembled in the county aforesaid for religious worship, contrary to the form of the statute,” &c., &c.

Defendant Minyard moved to quash the indictment, because, 1st: It did not describe in what manner the congregation was disturbed; 2d: It charged no offence in law; and 3d: It was uncertain and insufficient.

The court quashed the indictment, and the State appealed.

Clendenin, Alt. Gen-, for the State.

The indictment is in the words of the statute, (sec. 1, art. 6, c/t. 51, Dig.;) the offence consists in disturbing the persons assembled for public worship; the aggravation of the offence consists in the manner of doing so, which is matter of proof.

*157Walker & Ceben, contra,

contended that the indictment should charge the manner of disturbance; that it must charge, with certainty and precision, the defendant to have committed the acts under the circumstances and with the intent mentioned in the statute, {Arch. Cr. PI. 46, 47); that an indictment must show how the party committed the offence, and when- and where it was done. Stale vs. Ratliff, 5 Eng. 532.

Mr. Justice Scott

delivered the opinion of the Court.

The statute in question does not make every possible, malicious or contemptuous disturbance or disquietude of a congregation or private family assembled for religious worship a misdemeanor, although its provisions are very general, and embrace almost every such case that may occur. It is, therefore, necessary that the disturbance proceeded for, which we have said is the gist of the offence, (State vs. Ratliff, 5 Eng. 530,) should be described as well in order that it may be determined whether or not the statutory offence has been charged, as that the accused may know the “nature and cause of the accusation against him.” It is not necessary, however, to describe it in language any more explicit than that used in the statute, (Digest, page 370, sec. 1,) as “by profanely swearing,” or “by using indecent gestures,” or “by threatening language” to some person so assembled, or “by committing violence” upon some said person. All greater particularity of description beyond the general description in the words of the statute, or by words of fully equal import, are properly matters of evidence to establish the distinction charged, and are not necessary matters of averment. (See, as to this principle, Moffatt vs. The State, 6 Eng. 178-9.) The indictment before us falls short of this reasonable and convenient certainty, and is therefore fatally defective in matter of substance. The Circuit Court ruled properly in granting the motion to quash, and its judgment must be affirmed.