{
  "id": 8727811,
  "name": "The State vs. Minyard",
  "name_abbreviation": "State v. Minyard",
  "decision_date": "1851-07",
  "docket_number": "",
  "first_page": "156",
  "last_page": "157",
  "citations": [
    {
      "type": "official",
      "cite": "12 Ark. 156"
    }
  ],
  "court": {
    "name_abbreviation": "Ark.",
    "id": 8808,
    "name": "Arkansas Supreme Court"
  },
  "jurisdiction": {
    "id": 34,
    "name_long": "Arkansas",
    "name": "Ark."
  },
  "cites_to": [],
  "analysis": {
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  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T17:49:49.158040+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
    "batch": "2018"
  },
  "casebody": {
    "judges": [],
    "parties": [
      "The State vs. Minyard."
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "Mr. Justice Scott\ndelivered the opinion of the Court.\nThe statute in question does not make every possible, malicious or contemptuous disturbance or disquietude of a congregation or private family assembled for religious worship a misdemeanor, although its provisions are very general, and embrace almost every such case that may occur. It is, therefore, necessary that the disturbance proceeded for, which we have said is the gist of the offence, (State vs. Ratliff, 5 Eng. 530,) should be described as well in order that it may be determined whether or not the statutory offence has been charged, as that the accused may know the \u201cnature and cause of the accusation against him.\u201d It is not necessary, however, to describe it in language any more explicit than that used in the statute, (Digest, page 370, sec. 1,) as \u201cby profanely swearing,\u201d or \u201cby using indecent gestures,\u201d or \u201cby threatening language\u201d to some person so assembled, or \u201cby committing violence\u201d upon some said person. All greater particularity of description beyond the general description in the words of the statute, or by words of fully equal import, are properly matters of evidence to establish the distinction charged, and are not necessary matters of averment. (See, as to this principle, Moffatt vs. The State, 6 Eng. 178-9.) The indictment before us falls short of this reasonable and convenient certainty, and is therefore fatally defective in matter of substance. The Circuit Court ruled properly in granting the motion to quash, and its judgment must be affirmed.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "Mr. Justice Scott"
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Clendenin, Alt. Gen-, for the State.",
      "Walker & Ceben, contra,"
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "The State vs. Minyard.\nAn indictment charging defendant with maliciously and contemptuously disturbing and disquieting a congregation assembled for religions worship, without alleging the manner of disturbance, is insufficient.\nIt is not necessary, however, to charge the.manner of disturbance in any language more explicit than that used in the statute, (Dig., \u00b6. 370, sec. 1,) as \u201cby profanely swearing,\u201d or \u201cby using indecent gestures,\u201d &o., as the case maybe.\nAppeal from Conway Circuit Court.\nThis was an indictment in the Conway Circuit Court, for disturbing a religious congregation, determined in the Conway Circuit Court, at September term, 1850, before the lion. William: IT. Feild, Judge.\nThe indictment was, in substance, as follows :\n\u201cThe grand jurors, &c., &c., present that Jacob Minyard, Clark Fletcher, Francis M. Hollylield, and George Roberts, late of, &c., on the 29th day of July, A. D. 1849, with force and arms, in the county aforesaid, maliciously and contemptuously did disturb -and disquiet a certain congregation, assembled in the county aforesaid for religious worship, contrary to the form of the statute,\u201d &c., &c.\nDefendant Minyard moved to quash the indictment, because, 1st: It did not describe in what manner the congregation was disturbed; 2d: It charged no offence in law; and 3d: It was uncertain and insufficient.\nThe court quashed the indictment, and the State appealed.\nClendenin, Alt. Gen-, for the State.\nThe indictment is in the words of the statute, (sec. 1, art. 6, c/t. 51, Dig.;) the offence consists in disturbing the persons assembled for public worship; the aggravation of the offence consists in the manner of doing so, which is matter of proof.\nWalker & Ceben, contra,\ncontended that the indictment should charge the manner of disturbance; that it must charge, with certainty and precision, the defendant to have committed the acts under the circumstances and with the intent mentioned in the statute, {Arch. Cr. PI. 46, 47); that an indictment must show how the party committed the offence, and when- and where it was done. Stale vs. Ratliff, 5 Eng. 532."
  },
  "file_name": "0156-01",
  "first_page_order": 156,
  "last_page_order": 157
}