{
  "id": 1561117,
  "name": "McDaniel, State Treasurer v. Herrn",
  "name_abbreviation": "McDaniel v. Herrn",
  "decision_date": "1915-10-11",
  "docket_number": "",
  "first_page": "288",
  "last_page": "294",
  "citations": [
    {
      "type": "official",
      "cite": "120 Ark. 288"
    }
  ],
  "court": {
    "name_abbreviation": "Ark.",
    "id": 8808,
    "name": "Arkansas Supreme Court"
  },
  "jurisdiction": {
    "id": 34,
    "name_long": "Arkansas",
    "name": "Ark."
  },
  "cites_to": [
    {
      "cite": "100 Ark. 175",
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      "reporter": "Ark.",
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          "page": "315, note 2"
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    {
      "cite": "32 Miss. 650",
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      "reporter": "Miss.",
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        11262037
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    {
      "cite": "102 Ark. 205",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Ark.",
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        1353971
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    {
      "cite": "100 Ark. 175",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Ark.",
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        1312216
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  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T19:47:48.789730+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
    "batch": "2018"
  },
  "casebody": {
    "judges": [],
    "parties": [
      "McDaniel, State Treasurer v. Herrn."
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "Wood, J.,\n('after stating the facts). The above act provides that all property in the 'State, which shall pass by will or iby the intestate laws, or by sale or gift in possession to take effect after the death of the grantor or donor shall ibe liable to ia tax for the use of the State, which shall constitute a lien-on the property charged with the tax.\nSection 3 of the act is as follows: \u201cWhen the property or any interest therein shall pass to a grandfather, grandmother, father, mother, husband, wife, lineal descendant, brother, sister, or any adopted \u00a1child, in every such case the rate 'of tax shall be one dollar on every hundred dollars of the clear market value of such property received; provided that any estate which may be valued at less than five thousand dollars ($5,000) shall not be subject to >any tax, the excess over such sum only being taxed.\u201d\n.The sole question presented by this appeal is whether or not the $5,000.00 specified in section 3 is to be deducted from the \u00a1amount of the value of the entire estate as the property of the decedent and the tax imposed too. the remainder, or whether the amount exempted is to be deducted only after the property, or interest therein, of the respective parties has been passed or distributed to and received by them. In other words, as to whether the tax is to be imposed according to the value of the property or interest therein of the respective individuals named as beneficiaries in the act after the property has been passed or distributed to and received by them, or \u00a1whether it should be imposed upon the classes on the value of the entire estate after deducting the $5,000.00 exemption specified.\nSection 4 of the .act provides: \u201cWhen the property or \"any interest therein shall pass to an uncle, aunt, niece, nephew, or any lineal descendant of the same, in every such case the rate of tax shall be two dollars on every one hundred dollars of the clear market value of such property received in excess 'of the sum of $2,000.00.\u201d\nAppellant relies upon State v. Handlin, 100 Ark. 175, as authority for his contention that the $5,000.00 must be deducted from the value of the entire estate mentioned and passing finder the statute before the same has been passed or distributed to those named as beneficiaries under the statute, and that the tax is to be imposed upon the remainder and paid by all the distributees or beneficiaries of the estate under the statute, regardless of whether they have received an amount in excess of $5,000.00 or not. But no such question was raised or considered there. In that case we said: \u201cThe only question presented by this appeal is the validity of the act of the Legislature approved May 17, 1907, amending .the inheritance tax law. The constitutionality of the act is challenged, it being contended that it makes an arbitrary classification of estates and exempts from taxation estates of the third class exceeding $50,000.00 in value. \u2019 \u2019\nIn the case of State v. Handlin, supra, we 'held that' the statute, which was very similar to the one under consideration, was a provision for an inheritance tax and not for a tax on property; that it provided for a tax upon the privilege of the right of succession to property, and, as such, was not subject to the same test with respect to its equality and uniformity as taxes levied upon property. True, Mr. Justice Kirby, speaking for the \u00a1court, said: \u2018 1 The (manifest intention of the act was to levy the .taxes alike upon all property of the estate, determining the tax by the \u00a1amount of the value of .the property in the different classes in which it wtas .'divided, and it was not intended that estates above $50,000 in value, passing to strangers, should escape the payment of the tax. \u2019 \u2019\nThe appellant relies upon this language of the opinion to support his contention that the tax must be levied upon the entire estate as of the property of the decedent, after deducting the amount of the exemption specified. But the above language of the \u00a1opinion must be considered with reference to the question then before the court for decision, and when so considered it will be seen that it had no reference whatever to the issue now to be decided. The language used was merely by way of argument to show that the classification provided by the act for determining the amount of the inheritance tax to be paid did not render the .act unconstitutional. The contention in that case was that the act was unconstitutional because under the classification therein provided estates exceeding in value the sum of $50,000 were exempt from taxation, and that, therefore, the \u00a1act violated the provision of the 'Constitution requiring that taxes shall be equal and uniform. The language quoted above was used in answer to that contention.\nIn the latter part of the opinion in that case the court' said: \u201cThe statute, so construed, violates no equality provisions of the Constitution, \u00a1and it, .being a \u00a1statute taxing privileges and not property, does not conflict with the uniformity provision. But it divides the value of estates passing to certain classes of persons into certain amounts, a reasonable classification for the purpose of laying or levying 'a progressive inheritance tax, and treats all persons within the classes designated alike and without discrimination, and is a valid enactment.\u201d\nThe words \u201cproperty or any interest therein,\u201d and the word \u201cestate,\u201d as used in the section above quoted, have reference to the property, or any interest therein, after it has been passed, transferred ior distributed to and received by the respective persons mentioned in the statute, whether they take ias individual or corporate legatees, or devisees, vendees, donees or grantees, heirs, next of kan, etc., and the amounts of $5,000 and '$2,000 show the value of the estate for which an inheritance tax shall be imposed on the persons receiving the same, according to the respective idasisifications into which the statute divides them. This was declared to be the meaning of the words \u201cestate\u201d and \u201cproperty\u201d in .an .act passed in 1913, repealing the act now under review. See Act 197 of the Acts of 1913. This is the correct interpretation of these- words ias used in the statute now under consideration.\nThere would be no ambiguity whatever about the statute were it not for the word \u00a3 \u00a3 estate \u2019 \u2019 used in section 3 of the act above in the clause, \u201c provided that every estate, \u2019 \u2019 etc. But when the wo rid \u2018\u00a3 estate \u2019 \u2019 as there used is considered in connection with the language of the remainder of the section and the' language of section 4, it is clear that the term \u201cestate\u201d wias used synonymously with the words \u201cproperty or any interest therein. \u2019\u2019 The words \u201cestate\u201d and \u201cproperty\u201d are frequently used-as convertible terms; they :are often synonymous in meaning, depending upon the context. -See Funk & Wagnall\u2019s New Standard Dictionary of the English Language, \u201c Estate,\u201d \u201cproperty.\u201d\nIt is la well established canon of interpretation that the object to be attained land the purpose of the Legislature .are'to be kept in mind in construing a statute. If the language used in a statute is susceptible of more than one -construction, then the meaning must be given to it which is in harmony with the purpose to be attained rather than a construction which would tend to defeat it. 23 Am. & Eng. Enc. Law (1 -ed.), p. 319, .and oases cited in note.\nIn St. Louis, I. M. & S. Ry. Co. v. State, 102 Ark. 205-208, we quoted from Green v. Weller, 32 Miss. 650, as follows: \u201cThe true sense in which words are used in a statute is to be -ascertained generally by taking them in tiheir ordinary 'and popular signification, or, if they be terms of art, in their technical meaning. But it is also a cardinal rule of exposition that the intention is to be deduced from the whole, and every part of the statute, taken and compared together \u2014 from the words and context, and such construction adopted as will effectuate the intention of the law-makers.\u201d Potter\u2019s Dwarris on Stat. 197, 201.\nNow it was the manifest purpose of the law makers, as gathered from the language -of the act under consideration, to exempt certain classes of individuals and the particular individuals coming within those classes from the tax imposed by the statute, unless those individuals receive property, or an interest therein, of a greater value than the .amount specified as exempting them from the tax. The purpose of the Legislature was not to tax all persons who might have property or who were beneficiaries of an estate under sections 3 and 4 of the statute, \u00a1but to tax only those persons of the classes named who might receive property of \u00a1the value of more than $5,000 and $2,000 respectively. But if the construction contended for by the .State be correct, then every beneficiary in the class mentioned in section 3 would \u00a1have to pay a part of the tax there imposed, regardless of whether the value of the property or interest therein which he or she received exceeded the sum of $5,000. If such had been the intention of the Legislature it seems clear to us that it would have made some provision in the statute for prorating the tax among the several recipients of the entire estate .of the decedent.\nIt follows that the judgment of the -circuit court is correct and it is therefore affirmed.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "Wood, J.,"
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Wm. L. Moose, Attorney General, and Jno. P. Streepey, Assistant, for appellant.",
      "Appellee, pro se."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "McDaniel, State Treasurer v. Herrn.\nOpinion delivered October 11, 1915.\nInheritance tax \u2014 exemptions\u2014distributees.\u2014-The amount exempted^ under the inheritance tax law, Act 303, Acts 1909, is to be deducted from the amount to be taxed, after the property, or interest therein of the respective parties, has been passed to or distributed to and received by them.\nAppeal from Sharp Circuit Court, Southern District; J. B. Baker, Judge;\naffirmed.\nSTATEMENT BY THE COURT.\nJames Cochran. died on the 26th day of May, 1911, leaving \u00a1an estate valued at $23,816.65. Annie P. C.ochran, his widow, received $5,207.40. Mrs. Herrn, the daughter of Cochran, received $9,304.62; and six \u00a1children and one grandchild of W. D. Cochran, deceased, the ison of James Cochran, deceased, received each the sum. of $1,329.23, or a total of $9,304.62.\nThis suit wa's brought by the appellant as State Treasurer, \u00a1against the appellee, who was the administrator of the estate of James Cochran, to collect inheritance taxes. The case \u00a1wias begun in the probate court, and upon \u00a1appeal to the \u00a1circuit court, upon the above facts, that court found that the amounts received by Mrs. Cochran and Mrs. Herrn in excess of $5,000 were subject to \u00a1a tax under Act 303 of the Acts of 1909, and aoeorddingly deducted from the amounts received from them respectively the sum of $5,000 and rendered judgment in accordance with his holding, from which this appeal has been duly prosecuted. No question is raised here as to whether the interest of Mrs. Cochran .as widow is subject to the tax.\nWm. L. Moose, Attorney General, and Jno. P. Streepey, Assistant, for appellant.\nWe think that the word \u201cestate\u201d as used in the act, refers to the residuum \u00a1of the decedent\u2019s property inventoried and appraised under the law, remaining after all claims of creditors,- costs of administration, etc., have been deducted therefrom; and it seems clear that only one exemption can be made for each class of beneficiaries, without regard to the number of individuals in that class.\nHere, all the beneficiaries are in -the \u00a1same class, the first class mentioned in the act of 1909; therefore, only one exemption,of five thousand dollars should be made. 100 Ark. 175.\nAppellee, pro se.\nThe question at issue in this case was not raised in the case of State v. Handlin, 100 Ark. 175, and that case does not apply.\nSection 4 of Act 303, Acts 1909, is so clear in its meaning as to need no interpretation. To construe section 3 of the act as contended for \u00a1by appellant would give a construction contrary to the policy of our laws of descents and distributions, unjust and unreasonable, more favorable to collateral heirs than to direct descendants. A reasonable interpretation of section 3 of the \u25a0act, in the light of the provisions of section 4, leads to the conclusion that the word \u201cestate\u201d in section 3 does not mean the whole property left by the decedent, but the property received by the heir or distributee. 23 Am. & Eng. Erne, of L. (1 ed.) 306, paragraph 5; Id. 315, note 2; Id. 358, 362, and notes."
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  "file_name": "0288-01",
  "first_page_order": 312,
  "last_page_order": 318
}