{
  "id": 1559447,
  "name": "Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry. Co. v. Earl",
  "name_abbreviation": "Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry. Co. v. Earl",
  "decision_date": "1916-01-03",
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  "first_page": "514",
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      "cite": "121 Ark. 514"
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  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T19:35:38.519565+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
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    "judges": [],
    "parties": [
      "Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry. Co. v. Earl."
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "\u25a0 Wood, J.,\n(after stating the facts). Under section 5396 of Kirby\u2019s Digest, which makes the filing of a mortgage for record notice to all persons of its existence, appellant had notice of appellee\u2019s rights under his mortgage. \u201cIn the absence of \u25a0stipulations to the contrary the mortgagee of personal property shall have the legal title thereto and the right of possession.\u201d .Section 5410, Kirby\u2019s Digest. But until the mortgagee has actually taken possession, .and :so long as lie permits the mortgagor to retain possession the latter occupies the position of a \u25a0bailee and he has such a special ownership in the property that imposes upon him the duty of protecting it from wrongdoers and that would make him liable to the beneficial owner if he failed to do so.\nThis permissive possession and special ownership and the duties and responsibilities incident thereto gave to the mortgagor the right to maintain an action against third parties for the negligent destruction or conversion of the property. The .authorities as a general rule so hold. Wilkes v. Southern Railway Co., 85 S. Car. 346, 67 S. E. 292, 21 A. and E. Anno. Cases, 79, and cases in note; 5 A. & E. Enc. of Law (2 ed.) 999, note.\nWe have a statute that gives any person having a special ownership in 'live stock killed or wounded by any railroad trains running in this State the right to sue for the damages sustained. Section 6776 Kirby\u2019s Digest.\nOur decisions recognize the right of one having a special property under the statute to maintain suit for damages against the railway company that killed or wounded the live stock. St. Louis, I. M. & S. Ry. Co. v. Biggs, 50 Ark. 169-79; Railway v. Taylor, 57 Ark. 136. Speaking of the right to \u00a1maintain the suit in Railway v. Biggs, supra, we said: \u201cAnd this is declaratory of the common law, according to the principles of which the bailee of a chattel, whose term is unexpired, being answerable over to the .absolute owner, may sue for its full value, if it is injured or destroyed while in his possession, and if he recover, the action of him who has the reversionary interest is gone.\u201d Mr. Jones, after speaking of the right of the mortgagee to maintain a suit for damages against a stranger for an injury to mortgaged property, has this to say of the right of the mortgagor:\n\u201cBut the mortgagor, if in actual possession, has the same right of action against one who wrongfully injures or converts the mortgaged property, unless the mortgagee has intervened for his own protection. In this respect the rule is the same .as in 'the case of a bailment, namely, the joint owner of the property, or one having a special interest in it, can maintain trespass or case for injury to it, or trover for a conversion of it, but a judgment recovered by either is a bar to a suit by the other for the same cause of action, and it would seem that a voluntary payment of damages by the defendant to one would be a bar to a suit by the other. \u2019 \u2019 1 Jones, Chat. Mort., 447a.\nSince the mortgagor in possession has the right to maintain a .suit for damages against 'the wrongdoer for injury to the property, it follows as the logical, if not necessary, corollary of his doctrine that the mortgagor would have the right to settle with the wrongdoer without suit. Also that the wrongdoer, having the right to settle, and having settled with the mortgagor, would not be liable over to the mortgagee. This rule is in accord with the commendable policy of compromising and adjusting differences without going to law.\nA wrongdoer who is willing to settle for the injury he has done without litigation, should not be and is not forced to go to law. And when he has settled with either one of two parties who may have the equal right to \u2022sue him, he has satisfied the demands of the law. The law contemplates but one settlement or satisfaction for the same injury. Luse v. Jones, 39 N. J. Law, 707-8-12. See also Wilkes v. Ry. Co. supra; Logan v. Wabash Western R. Co., 43 Mo. App. 71.\nThe court therefore erred in rendering judgment in \u2022favor of the appellee against appellant and its judgment is reversed and the cause is dismissed.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "\u25a0 Wood, J.,"
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Tinos. 8. Busbee, Jno. T. Hides and H. T. Harrison, for appellant.",
      "Sellers & Sellers, for appellee."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry. Co. v. Earl.\nOpinion delivered January 3, 1916.\n1. Chattel mortgages \u2014 filing notice. \u2014 Where a chattel mortgage is \u2022filed under Kirby\u2019s Digest,'\u00a7 5396, third parties are put on notice of the same.\n2. 'Chattel mortgages \u2014 possession by mortgagor \u2014 duty to mortgagee. \u2014A mortgagor in possession of a mortgaged chattel, occupies the position of a bailee, -with\u00bb a special ownership in the property, which imposes on him the duty to protect it from wrongdoers, and making him liable to the mortgagee, if he fails to do* so.\n3. 'Chattel mortgages \u2014 injury to chattel \u2014 right of mortgagor to sue. \u2014 The mortgagor in possession of a horse, although the same is subject to a chattel mortgage, may sue a railway company for damages for killing the same.\n4. Chattel mortgages \u2014 injury to chattel \u2014 settlement by mobtgagob \u2014right of mortgagee. \u2014 The mortgagor who is in possession of a horse, may settle with a railway company for damages when the horse was wrongfully killed by a railway train, and having so settled the mortgagee does not have a right of action against the railway.\n5. Negligence \u2014 compromise\u2014discharge from liability. \u2014 A wrongdoer who is willing to settle for the injury he has done without litigation, should not be and is not forced to go to law; and when he has settled with either one of two parties who may have the equal right to sue him, he has satisfied the demands of the law. The law contemplates but one settlement or satisfaction for the same injury.\nAppeal from Perry Circuit Court; Guy FulJc, Judge;\nreversed.\nSTATEMENT BY THE COURT.\nThis suit w.as instituted by the appellee to reoover damages from appellant for killing appellee\u2019s horse. Appellee alleged that he was the owner of the horse by virtue of a mortgage executed to him \u00a1by Edmond Person; that his mortgage had been duly recorded before the horse was killed; that the debt of $150.00 which the mortgage was given to secure was past due and unpaid; that the horse was of the value of $150.00; that appellant\u2019s agents negligently caused a train to strike and kill the horse, to appellee\u2019s damage in'the above sum, for which \u25a0appellee prayed judgment.\nAppellant .answered denying the allegations of negligence .and pleading in \u00a1bar of .appellee\u2019s .action that the horse was in possession of Edmond Person when it was killed .and that Person claimed to be the owner thereof; that appellant had .settled all damages for the killing of the horse by paying to Edmond Person the sum of $195.00, and had obtained from him a full release.\nThe issues were submitted to the court sitting as a jury upon the following agreed statement of facts:\n\u201cIt was .agreed 'that the property in question was not in possession of the mortgagee at the time it was killed, and that it was in the possession of the mortgagor, personally.\n\u201cThat the horse in controversy was originally the property of one Edmond Person; that prior to the alleged \u00a1killing of the horse, said Person had executed a mortgage or deed of trust upon the horse, for the purpose of securing an indebtedness in favor of R. D. Earl, the plaintiff in this case; that said mortgage was duly acknowledged and recorded in the office of the recorder of Perry County, prior to the killing of the horse.\n\u201cIt. is further admitted that the facts of this case entitled the plaintiff to recover as a matter of law, if the settlement alleged in the answer by the defendant with Edmond Person is not a \u00a1defense to the action, notwithstanding .the fact that Person had legally executed a mortgage upon 'the horse, which was legally recorded prior to the \u00a1killing of the horse \u00a1and the settlement of the. defendant with Person.\n\u201cIt is further admitted that the defendant made payment to Person of the value of the horse, prior to the institution of this action and prior to presentation by the plaintiff to the defendant of any claim as such mortgagee.\u201d\nThe court rendered judgment in favor of appellee against appellant in the sum of $150.00, .and this_ appeal was taken.\nTinos. 8. Busbee, Jno. T. Hides and H. T. Harrison, for appellant.\n1. The mortgagor was entitled to maintain an action against defendant to recover the value of the horse. The settlement with 'the mortgagor precludes the mortgagee from recovery. Kirby\u2019s Dig., \u00a7 6776; 50 Ark. 169-179; 1 N. H. 239; 1 Smith\u2019s Lead. Oases, pt. 1, top p. 701-2; 57 Ark. 140; 105 Pac. 901-908; 39 N. J. Law. 707-8, 712; 137 Am. iSt. Rep. 890, 893; 84 Mo. App. Ill; Jones on Chat. Mortg. (2 ed.), \u00a7 447-a, pp. 418, 419.\nSellers & Sellers, for appellee.\nThe cases cited supra, do not apply. They all simply hold that a mortgagor has \u2022 such an interest as to entitle him to sue. A citation of authorities that the mortgagee may sue for injury of mortgaged property would not assist the court in this case. 56 Ark. 473. Here we have a legally executed and recorded mortgage. All parties had notice from the date of filing. Kirby\u2019s Dig., \u00a7 \u00a7 5396, 5410. The mortgagee is the legal owner, and a settlement with the mortgagor is no fear."
  },
  "file_name": "0514-01",
  "first_page_order": 538,
  "last_page_order": 542
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