{ "id": 1555026, "name": "Chunn v. London & Lancashire Fire Insurance Company", "name_abbreviation": "Chunn v. London & Lancashire Fire Insurance", "decision_date": "1916-05-29", "docket_number": "", "first_page": "327", "last_page": "331", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "124 Ark. 327" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ark.", "id": 8808, "name": "Arkansas Supreme Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 34, "name_long": "Arkansas", "name": "Ark." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "99 Ark. 558", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1314401 ], "opinion_index": -1, "case_paths": [ "/ark/99/0558-01" ] }, { "cite": "69 Ark. 380", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 8723340 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": -1, "case_paths": [ "/ark/69/0380-01" ] }, { "cite": "44 N. J. L. 220", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.J.L.", "case_ids": [ 363317 ], "opinion_index": -1, "case_paths": [ "/njl/44/0220-01" ] }, { "cite": "85 N. Y. 162", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.Y.", "case_ids": [ 2182395 ], "opinion_index": -1, "case_paths": [ "/ny/85/0162-01" ] }, { "cite": "2 L. R. A. (N. S.) 521", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L.R.A.N.S.", "opinion_index": -1 }, { "cite": "62 Atl. 289", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "A.", "opinion_index": -1 }, { "cite": "34 Ark. 480", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1875707 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "604" } ], "opinion_index": -1, "case_paths": [ "/ark/34/0480-01" ] }, { "cite": "91 Ark. 128", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1511821 ], "opinion_index": -1, "case_paths": [ "/ark/91/0128-01" ] }, { "cite": "24 Ark. 250", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "opinion_index": -1 }, { "cite": "42 Ark. 542", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 8725156 ], "opinion_index": -1, "case_paths": [ "/ark/42/0542-01" ] }, { "cite": "172 S. W. 837", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.W.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "115 Ark. 555", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1533789 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/115/0555-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 473, "char_count": 7717, "ocr_confidence": 0.485, "pagerank": { "raw": 2.4157867404961467e-07, "percentile": 0.8004765914923998 }, "sha256": "34cb8b2e58b63913024e036ff27260e06383772d79d393c8f693253b6c3bc136", "simhash": "1:b2b5d9367cd5e29c", "word_count": 1362 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T18:14:49.378710+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "Chunn v. London & Lancashire Fire Insurance Company." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "Smith, J.\nThis is the second appeal of this case, and a statement of the material facts will be found in the opinion on the former appeal. Chunn v. London & Lancashire Fire Ins. Co., 115 Ark. 555, 172 S. W. 837.\nA Mr. Candor, who was the manager of the electric light plant in the city of Searcy, where appellant\u2019s house was located, was asked the question, \u201cI will ask you if it is not a fact that frequently the wiring of a house ignites and burns it?\u2019\u2019 But an objection was sustained to the question. The insurance company claimed the fire was of incendiary origin, and this question was intended to furnish a possible explanation of the origin of the fire. However, it appeared that immediately preceding this question the witness was asked, \u201cDo you know how that building was wired, and whether or not it was properly wired?\u201d and he answered, \u201cI do not know.\u201d No other attempt was made to show that anything about the wiring of this house could have been responsible for the fire. The answer of the witness, therefore, could only have furnished a speculative or possible cause for the fire, and we think no error was committed in excluding the answer.\nA witness named Smith was permitted, over appellant\u2019s objection, to testify that a lounge which was destroyed in the fire was without value. It was the contention of the insurance company that appellant had removed from the building most of the furniture of any value, and \u2022appellant had proved the loss of this lounge. It is urged that the witness did not show himself qualified to testify as to the value of the lounge. This witness, however, had gone to the house a few days before the fire for the purpose of looking at the furniture with a view of buying some of it, and while there had observed the lounge, and answered that it had no value. The witness evidently had some personal knowledge of values, and we think no error was committed in permitting him to testify that this simple article of' furniture had no value, as this was not an article about which expert evidence was necessary.\nA witness, W. L. Burnett, was asked the question, \u201cI will put the question to you, did you or not a few days prior to the time of the fire go to this building and put new locks on the back doors, and do certain other repair work on the building?\u201d Appellee objected to this question on the ground that it. was not rebuttal testimony, it being asked after appellant had taken up her cause in rebuttal. Appellant\u2019s theory was that this proof would tend to show that she was making improvements on her place just prior to the time of the fire, and that she'was not contemplating a fire. But it appears that this was the third trial of this case, and the issues in it were well-defined and sharply drawn, and appellant had substantially developed her case. Of necessity, a large discretion must abide with the trial judge in permitting the introduction of evidence in rebuttal which is not strictly of a rebuttal nature, and we can not say that any error was committed here in this respect. ,\nIt is\" also insisted that the court erred in permitting Mrs. Phillips to detail a conversation had with appellant the day after the fire. In response to the question, \u201cWhat else did she say?\u201d this witness answered: \u201cShe said when she got the money, she was going to travel on it, and that she was going to see that no other woman enjoyed it.\u201d It was appellee\u2019s theory that this answer explained appellant\u2019s motive, and it was, therefore, competent for that purpose. It further appears that, without objection, appellant was asked practically the same question in her cross-examination and gave substantially the same answer.\nAppellant asked an instruction numbered 5, which reads as follows: \u2018 \u2018 The jury is further instructed that the plaintiff had the right to remove goods from her house, without notice to the defendant company, so long as the hazard was not increased thereby, the policies, of course, covering only the building and such goods as remained in the building. The jury, however, will not render a verdict of any kind concerning the goods, as that part of it has been adjudicated at a former trial. \u2019 \u2019\nThis instruction was not proper under the circumstances, as its effect was to tell the jury that appellant had the right to remove the goods from the house if the hazard was not thereby increased, when that circumstance might have been regarded by the jury as highly important as bearing upon the origin of the fire, althougii it did not increase the hazard from natural causes. Moreover, the \u2022instruction relates to the policies, one of which was on the house, and the other on the furniture, and the liability of the insurance company was, of course, affected by the amount of property left in the building.\nOther instructions appear to raise questions which were passed upon in the former opinion.\nUpon the whole case it appears that the instructions fairly submitted the case to the jury.\nPinding no prejudicial error, the judgment is affirmed.", "type": "majority", "author": "Smith, J." } ], "attorneys": [ "R. 8. Coffman, Rachels & Yarnell and John E. Miller, for appellant.", "Brundidge $ Neelly, for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "Chunn v. London & Lancashire Fire Insurance Company.\nOpinion delivered May 29, 1916.\n1. Evidence \u2014 opinion of witness \u2014 cause of fibe. \u2014 In an action to recover on a policy of fire insurance, it is not error to exclude a question addressed to a witness as to fire caused from defective electric wiring, where the witness had stated that he had no knowledge of the condition of the wiring in the particular house.\n2. Evidence \u2014 fire loss \u2014 value of article burned \u2014 proof.\u2014It is not error to permit a non-expert witness to testify in an action to recover on a policy of fire insurance, as to the value of certain articles of household furniture, which were destroyed.\n3. Evidence \u2014 rebuttal testimony \u2014 discretion of trial judge. \u2014 A large discretion abides with the trial judge in permitting the introduction of rebuttal testimony.\n4. Fire insurance \u2014 removal of property. \u2014 Where, shortly before a fire, plaintiff, the owner, removed certain property from the building, it is improper to tell the jury that plaintiff had the right to remove the property from the house, if the hazard was not thereby increased, the defense having 'been interposed that the fire was of incendiary origin.\nAppeal from White Circuit Court; J. M. Jackson, Judge;\naffirmed.\nR. 8. Coffman, Rachels & Yarnell and John E. Miller, for appellant.\n1. The court erred in its rulings' as to the admission of testimony. 1 Wharton on Ev., \u00a7 20; 42 Ark. 542; 5 Enc. of Ev. 15, and n\u00f3te, 523, and note 24. Witnesses must state facts. 24 Ark. 250. Opinions of witnesses having knowledge of particular facts are admissible as to value. 91 Ark. 128; Rogers Expert Testimony 13, and note 3. See, also, 10 Enc. Ev., p. 637; 34 Ark. 480; 99 Id. 604.\n2. Plaintiff\u2019s requested instruction No. 5 should have been given. 62 Atl. 289; 2 L. R. A. (N. S.) 521; 85 N. Y. 162; 39 Am. St. 365. \u201cVacant\u201d means naked or containing no article of value. 44 N. J. L. 220; 43 Am. St. 365; 13 A. & E. Enc. Law 273. Under the vacancy permit plaintiff had the right to remove all the personal property.\n3. It was error to give defendant\u2019s instruction No. 3. It is abstract and not applicable to this case. 69 Ark. 380; 80 Id. 260 ; 74 Id. 19; 77 Id. 109.\n4. The remarks of counsel were improper and preju- . dicial. 99 Ark. 558; 58 Id. 353; 48 Id. 106; 61 Id. 130,137; 62 Id. 516; 63 Id. 174; 65 Id. 389; 65 Id. 619; 70 Id. 179; 71 Id. 415; 72 Id. 138; 74 Id. 210, etc.\nBrundidge $ Neelly, for appellee.\nThere are no errors relative to the introduction and refusal of testimony. Nor are there any errors in the instructions. The remarks of counsel were wholly within the record in discussing the weight of circumstantial evidence. The judgment should be affirmed." }, "file_name": "0327-01", "first_page_order": 351, "last_page_order": 355 }