{ "id": 1566979, "name": "Fernwood Mining Company v. Pluna", "name_abbreviation": "Fernwood Mining Co. v. Pluna", "decision_date": "1919-05-12", "docket_number": "", "first_page": "459", "last_page": "464", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "138 Ark. 459" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ark.", "id": 8808, "name": "Arkansas Supreme Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 34, "name_long": "Arkansas", "name": "Ark." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "53 Ark. 117", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1911707 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/53/0117-01" ] }, { "cite": "5 Ark. 536", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 8727732 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/5/0536-01" ] }, { "cite": "72 Ark. 601", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1505581 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/72/0601-01" ] }, { "cite": "84 Ark. 316", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1524375 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/84/0316-01" ] }, { "cite": "91 Ark. 5", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1511829 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/91/0005-01" ] }, { "cite": "99 Ark. 344", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1314403 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/99/0344-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 511, "char_count": 10646, "ocr_confidence": 0.469, "pagerank": { "raw": 2.6982059704099985e-07, "percentile": 0.8281865081709398 }, "sha256": "1c0cc3e781f9cafe9da4d75e52dbc0b0d12eccac4f2d8aa43f2bfc3c8dca0761", "simhash": "1:7b7573ba445bb44e", "word_count": 1845 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T20:29:27.907161+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Mr. Justice SMITH concurs in these views." ], "parties": [ "Fernwood Mining Company v. Pluna." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "HART, J.,\n(On motion to quash the stay bond granted). Appellee was severely injured while working as an employee of appellants in their mine in Johnson County, Arkansas. He sued them for damages and recovered judgment in the circuit court for $25,000, and the judgment was affirmed in this court. The question now presented for the determination of the court is whether or not appellants are entitled to a stay of judgment for six months under section 3253 of Kirby\u2019s Digest as amended by Act 202 of the Acts of 1909. See Parker v. Wilson, 99 Ark. 344.\nThe act in question read as follows:\n\u201cNo stay shall be allowed upon a judgment or decree against any collecting officer or attorney at law, or agent for a deliquency or default in executing or fulfilling the duties of his office or place, or failing to pay over money collected by him in such capacity, or against a principal by his surety, or of a debt due by obligation having the force of a judgment, or of a judgment or decree for specific property, or for the property or its value, or a judgment or decree enforcing a lien in favor of a vendor or mortgagee, or a judgment for personal injury or injuries resulting in death caused by neglect or default of another. In the cases mentioned in this section which a stay is not allowed, the execution shall be so endorsed by the clerk.\u201d Acts of 1909.\nThe only change in the section of Kirby\u2019s Digest just referred to made by the Legislature of 1909 is the inclusion in the section of these words, \u201cor a judgment for personal injury or injuries resulting in death caused by neglect or default of another.\u201d It is the contention of counsel for appellants that the adjective \u201cpersonal\u201d qualifies both the words \u201cinjury\u201d and \u201cinjuries.\u201d Hence they contend that the statute does allow a stay in personal injury cases of this character, and that only injuries resulting in death caused by the neglect of another are excepted by the provisions of the statute.\nOn the other hand, it is contended by counsel for appellee that the words \u201cpersonal injury\u201d denote an action for negligently causing bodily harm not resulting in death; and the words' \u201cinjuries resulting in death\u2019\u2019 refer to the special statutory action growing out of death caused by the wrongful doing of another referred to above.\nIt is a settled rule of construction of statutes that when the Legislature uses words which have a fixed and well known legal signification, they are presumed to have been used in that sense,- unless the contrary intention clearly appears. Stale v. Jones, 91 Ark. 5; Townsend v. Penrose, 84 Ark. 316; Beasley v. Equitable Securities Company, 72 Ark. 601, and Buckner et al. v. Real Estate Bank, 5 Ark. 536.\nOur statute does not define the meaning of the term \u201cpersonal injury\u201d as is the case in New York and other states.\nBlackstone says that the right of personal security consists in a person\u2019s legal and uninterrupted enjoyment of his life, his limbs, his body, his health, and his reputation. Lewis\u2019 Blackstone, Vol. 1, *129. A violation of these rights at common law is called an \u201cinjury to the person\u201d or \u201cpersonal injury\u201d as contradistinguished to a wrong to a person\u2019s property rights. In the ordinary acceptation of the term and the one almost universally used by the legal profession, the words \u201cpersonal injury\u201d denote bodily harm not resulting in death and an action for \u201cpersonal injury\u201d or for \u201cpersonal injuries\u201d mean an action for negligently causing bodily harm not resulting in death.\nOn the other hand, the common law never designated an action for negligently causing death as an action for \u201cpersonal injury.\u201d Such an action was unknown to the common law and is a creation of statute. It was long ago settled in this State that the right to recover when death ensued did not exist in the character of cases like the present. At 'common law an action for the recovery of damages for the wrongful killing of a human being was the result of the statute of 9 and 10 Victoria passed in 1846 and known as Lord Campbell\u2019s Act. That act, in effect, provides that an action may be maintained whenever death is caused by the wrongful act or neglect which would have entitled the person injured to maintain an action if death had not ensued and such action is for the benefit of certain named persons. Statutes substantially similar to Lord Campbell\u2019s Act in these respects have been enacted in a majority of the States, including our own. Davis v. Railway, 53 Ark. 117. So it will be seen that there is a legal distinction between the meaning of the term \u201cpersonal injury\u201d and the words \u201cinjuries resulting in death.\u201d We do not think there is anything in the language of the act to indicate that the words were used by the Legislature in other than their common or legal acceptation. The conjunction \u201cor\u201d between the term \u201cpersonal injury\u201d and the words \u201cinjuries resulting in death\u201d thus joins as alternatives terms expressing unlike things or ideas which is one of the meanings given it in the dictionary. Then the words \u201ccaused by neglect or default of another\u201d relate to or modify both terms. In the application of this well known rule of construction we think it is plain that the Legislature intended that an action like the present one should be included in the term \u201cpersonal injury\u201d and use the term \u201cpersonal injury\u201d to mean an action wherein a living party who is before the court has sustained an injury to his person and that the term \u201cinjuries resulting in death\u201d refers to the action for negligently causing death given by section 6285 of Kirby\u2019s Digest. Even if it should be said that the term \u201cpersonal injury\u201d should be given its broadest meaning as at the common law, it will be seen that it does not include the statutory action for wrongfully causing death.\nThe construction we have given the act harmonizes it by leaving no redundant words in it and giving to the words used their well understood, and commonly accepted meaning.\nIt follows that the motion to quash the stay bond will be granted.", "type": "majority", "author": "HART, J.," }, { "text": "MoCULLOCII, C. J.,\n(dissenting). The subject was dealt with by the lawmakers according to their unrestricted will, and there is no reason for attributing to them any intention other than that plainly expressed in the language of the statute. The statute in general terms declares the right of a judgment debtor to stay the judgment against him in all instances except those expressly mentioned, among others, \u201ca judgment for personal injury or injuries resulting in death caused by neglect or default of another.\u201d It seems to me that according to ordinary rules of interpretation the words \u201cresulting in death\u201d modify all that goes before on the subject embraced. It must- be and is conceded on all sides that the words \u2018 \u2018 caused by neglect or default of another\u201d relate back to and modify all that goes before, and if that be true, the preceding words \u201cresulting in death\u201d must also modify the words \u201cpersonal injury\u201d as well as the words \u201cinjuries.\u201d If the word \u201cor\u201d had been intended to disjoin the words \u201cpersonal injury\u201d from the word \u201cinjuries\u201d so as to make the words \u201cresulting in death\u201d relate solely to the latter, then the words \u201ccaused by neglect or default of another\u201d should also be so construed, but that would lead to an illogical result, and the mention of it shows, I think, that the construction given to the statute by the majority is incorrect.\nIt is plain to my mind that the framer of the statute meant to use the two words \u201cinjury\u2019\u2019 and \u201cinjuries\u201d to denote singular and plural, unnecessary, it is true, but a form of expression often resorted to. There is nothing to indicate that the language used was meant in any technical sense, or -meant in any sense except that judgment for injury or injuries resulting in death caused by neglect or default of another should be exempted from the general operation of the statute. It is peculiar to assume that the framer of the statute intended to change the number from singular to plural in describing the two different kinds of judgments. Such is not the ordinary inference to draw from the use of both singular and plural numbers, for the natural drift of mind in framing a sentence is to follow the same form and continue the use of the number first adopted. It is more reasonable to suppose that it was meant to use the singular and plural with reference to the same subject, rather than that the different numbers should be used with reference to two different subjects.\nAgain, the contention adopted by the majority leads to the result, as is so forcefully said by counsel, that the word \u201cpersonal\u201d does not qualify the word \u201cinjuries\u201d at all, and is limited in its operation to the word \u201cinjury.\u201d It is hardly conceivable that the Legislature would have made such a distinction.\nIf it was intended to exempt two different kinds of judgments from the allowance of stay, as the majority now hold, that is to say recoveries of judgments by individuals for injuries to their own persons caused by the neglect or default of another, and judgments rendered in favor of the next of kin or the personal representatives of decedents for injuries caused by neglect or default of another which resulted in the death of such decedents, then much more explicit and appropriate language would have been used to express that meaning. The plain English of the clause is, I think, that all judgments for personal injuries resulting in death are within the exemption and that all others may be stayed. The framer of the statute had his own reasons for making the distinction in the kinds of judgments to be exempted from stay and it is not within our province to inquire into those reasons, for the legislative will on the subject is supreme, whether reasonably or arbitrarily exercised.\nMr. Justice SMITH concurs in these views.", "type": "dissent", "author": "MoCULLOCII, C. J.," } ], "attorneys": [], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "Fernwood Mining Company v. Pluna.\nOpinion delivered May 12, 1919.\n1. Statutes\u2014construction op language.\u2014When the Legislature uses words which have a fixed and well known legal signification, they are presumed to have been used in that sense unless the contrary intention clearly appears.\n2. Stay bond\u2014construction op statute\u2014\u201cpersonal injury.\u201d\u2014 Under Acts 1909, No. 202, providing that \u201cno stay shall be allowed against * * * a judgment for personal injury or injuries resulting in death caused by neglect or default of another,\u201d the words \u201cpersonal injury\u201d denote an action for bodily harm not resulting in death, and the words \u201cinjuries resulting in death\u201d refer to the special statutory action growing out of death caused by the wrongful act of another.\nAppeal from Johnson Chancery Court; Jordan Sellers, Chancellor;\n>stay bond quashed." }, "file_name": "0459-01", "first_page_order": 485, "last_page_order": 490 }