{
  "id": 1594417,
  "name": "Greenhaw v. Williams",
  "name_abbreviation": "Greenhaw v. Williams",
  "decision_date": "1919-11-10",
  "docket_number": "",
  "first_page": "471",
  "last_page": "473",
  "citations": [
    {
      "type": "official",
      "cite": "140 Ark. 471"
    }
  ],
  "court": {
    "name_abbreviation": "Ark.",
    "id": 8808,
    "name": "Arkansas Supreme Court"
  },
  "jurisdiction": {
    "id": 34,
    "name_long": "Arkansas",
    "name": "Ark."
  },
  "cites_to": [
    {
      "cite": "35 Ark. 109",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Ark.",
      "case_ids": [
        1873889
      ],
      "pin_cites": [
        {
          "page": "110"
        }
      ],
      "opinion_index": -1,
      "case_paths": [
        "/ark/35/0109-01"
      ]
    },
    {
      "cite": "84 Ark. 325",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Ark.",
      "opinion_index": -1
    }
  ],
  "analysis": {
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    "simhash": "1:600fd5a5501f6ee3",
    "word_count": 927
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  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T17:17:16.496432+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
    "batch": "2018"
  },
  "casebody": {
    "judges": [],
    "parties": [
      "Greenhaw v. Williams."
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "HUMPHREYS, J.\nAppellant, foster father of Vivian McLaughlin, instituted habeas corpus proceedings against appellee, the grandfather of said Vivian McLaughlin, in the Howard Chancery Court, to obtain the custody of said child.\nThe bill, in substance, alleged that appellant had adopted Vivian McLaughlin at the April term, 1912, of the probate court in said county; that at the time of the adoption she was seven years old; that early in the year 1919, Vivian McLaughlin left appellant\u2019s and went to appellee \u2019s home, where she has since remained, through the encouragement and advice of appellee; that appellee is unlawfully harboring and refusing to surrender the custody of said child to appellant.\nAppellee filed a response, denying the allegation of the complaint charging that he is unlawfully harboring and refusing to surrender the custody .of said child; and, in justification, alleged that he is the grandfather of Vivian\u2019 McLaughlin, who had in the first instance come to his house as a visitor; that she informed him that appellant and wife had maltreated her by whipping and beating her with a window stick; that appellant came to his premises after her, and, when she refused to return to him,-appellant abused the child in his presence until he interfered and prevented further abuse; that said child is now fourteen years old and of sufficient intelligence to choose her own guardian; that appellee is able and willing to keep, maintain and educate her.\nTo this response, appellant filed a demurrer, on the ground that no defense was stated therein. The demurrer was overruled by the court, over the objection and exception of appellant.\nThereupon the court proceeded to hear the cause upon the bill, response and evidence, from which it found the issues in favor of appellee and dismissed the bill for the want of equity.\nFrom the judgment of dismissal, an appeal has been duly prosecuted to this court.\nIt is insisted that the court erred in overruling the demurrer to the response, because, it is said, the response only sets up hearsay matter as an affirmative defense. The following portion of the response is clearly hearsay: \u201cYour respondent says that she, the said Vivian McLaughlin, declared her intention of not returning to the home of Mr. Greenhaw and wife, saying that they had maltreated her, whipped her and beat her with a window stick. * * * .\u201d But the response contained the following allegation which is not hearsay: \u201cMr. Greenhaw abused Vivian in his (appellee\u2019s) presence till he told him not to further abuse her.\u201d \"While the latter allegation is general, it is more than a mere conclusion. It is a defense defectively stated. If appellant desired to be more specifically informed as to the nature and character of the abuse offered by him to the child in the presence of appellee, he should have filed a motion to require appellant to make this allegation more definite and certain. This allegation opened the way for proof, and it is recorded in the judgment that the court heard the case upon the pleadings and evidence. The evidence is not set out in the transcript. It is shown by the pleadings that appellant was of no blood kin to the girl, and'that she was fourteen years of age. The evidence may have revealed that appellant was an improper person to have the control and custody of a girl child of her age on account of the character of treatment offered her by him in the presence of appellee. The inference must be indulged that the findings and decree of the chancellor were supported by the weight of the evidence.\nNo error appearing in the record, the decree is affirmed.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "HUMPHREYS, J."
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "W. C. Rodgers, for appellant.",
      "The appellee, pro se."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "Greenhaw v. Williams.\nOpinion delivered November 10, 1919.\n1. Appeal and error \u2014 evidence not in record. \u2014 In a chancery appeal the decree recited that the court heard the case upon the pleadings and evidence. Held, where the evidence heard does not appear in the transcript, it will be presumed that the findings of the chancellor were supported by the evidence.\n2. Pleading and practice \u2014 sufficiency of answer \u2014 action for custody of child. \u2014 In an action for the custody of a child, the response alleged that the petitioner abused the child in the appellee\u2019s presence till he told petitioner not to further abuse her. Held, under this allegation appellee could introduce testimony of petitioner\u2019s conduct toward the child.\nAppeal from Howard Chancery Court; James D. Shaver, Chancellor;\naffirmed.\nW. C. Rodgers, for appellant.\nThe court erred in overruling the demurrer to the response. The onus was on the defendant to fortify by a preponderance of the testimony all the affirmative defenses he set up. 84 Ark. 325. But there is not even an allegation that plaintiff or anyone by his direction or consent maltreated, whipped or beat the girl with a window stick, etc. This statement is a mere conclusion and vulnerable to demurrer. 35 Ark. 109, 110; 43 Id. 296, 305; 72 Id. 478, 484; 121 Id. 194-6. And even this is all hearsay and incompetent. It was the duty of the chancellor to consider the competent testimony. 127 Id. 43;8-446. The cause should be reversed with directions to sustain the demurrer of plaintiff.\nThe appellee, pro se.\nThe evidence sustains the findings of the chancellor. The best interests of the minor child is the criterion, and the finding of the chancellor that the foster mother, Mrs. Greenhaw, was a woman of fitful temper and an unfit person to rear and educate the girl and the decree should be affirmed or appeal dismissed."
  },
  "file_name": "0471-01",
  "first_page_order": 497,
  "last_page_order": 499
}
