{
  "id": 1584956,
  "name": "W. P. Brown & Sons Lumber Company v. Sims",
  "name_abbreviation": "W. P. Brown & Sons Lumber Co. v. Sims",
  "decision_date": "1920-11-29",
  "docket_number": "",
  "first_page": "253",
  "last_page": "255",
  "citations": [
    {
      "type": "official",
      "cite": "146 Ark. 253"
    }
  ],
  "court": {
    "name_abbreviation": "Ark.",
    "id": 8808,
    "name": "Arkansas Supreme Court"
  },
  "jurisdiction": {
    "id": 34,
    "name_long": "Arkansas",
    "name": "Ark."
  },
  "cites_to": [
    {
      "cite": "8 Ky. Law Rep. 706",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Ky. L. Rptr.",
      "opinion_index": -1
    },
    {
      "cite": "71 Pac. 946",
      "category": "reporters:state_regional",
      "reporter": "P.",
      "case_ids": [
        1546049
      ],
      "opinion_index": -1,
      "case_paths": [
        "/ariz/8/0221-01"
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    {
      "cite": "105 Ark. 450",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Ark.",
      "case_ids": [
        1347091
      ],
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      "case_paths": [
        "/ark/105/0450-01"
      ]
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    {
      "cite": "90 Ark. 417",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Ark.",
      "opinion_index": 0
    }
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  "analysis": {
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  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T19:50:44.134973+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
    "batch": "2018"
  },
  "casebody": {
    "judges": [],
    "parties": [
      "W. P. Brown & Sons Lumber Company v. Sims."
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "McCulloch, C. J.\nAppellant is a foreign corporation engaged in the lumber business in this State, and is the owner of personal property here. Its local manager usually attended to the listing of its property for taxation. This is an action instituted by appellant in chancery against the collector of taxes for Prairie County to restrain the latter from attempting to collect taxes on appellant\u2019s property for the year 1918. It is alleged in the complaint that the valuation of appellant\u2019s property was excessive, and that the error was caused by the conduct of the county assessor.\nAccording to the allegations of the complaint, the county assessor called on appellant\u2019s local manager to assess the property for the year 1918, and said manager, not having sufficient information at hand to make out a correct list of appellant\u2019s taxable property, made a list from the assessment for the last preceding year (1917) and delivered it to the assessor, the allegation of the complaint is that the manager did this under advice of the assessor and upon the latter\u2019s promise that a correct list would be accepted when furnished later. The list for the year 1917, as furnished by the assessor, showed a valuation of $92,200, but subsequently appellant furnished from its home office in the State of Kentucky a correct list of the taxable property in Prairie County for the year 1918 of the valuation of $26,680 and said list was mailed to the assessor, but the latter failed to substitue the correct list according to his promise, and the taxes were extended on the tax books upon the valuation originally furnished by the manager. The chancery court' sustained a demurrer and dismissed the complaint for want of equity.\nWe are of the opinion that the court was correct in its decision. Courts of equity will grant relief against void tax assessments, but not against those which are merely erroneous on account of over-valuation where a statutory remedy by appeal is afforded. Clay County v. Brown Lumber Co., 90 Ark. 417; Clay County v. Bank of Knobel, 105 Ark. 450.\nIt was the duty of appellant to cause its taxable property to be correctly listedat the time specified by law, and it had no right to rely on the unauthorized promise of the assessor to substitute another list to be furnished later. The alleged broken promise of the assessor did not constitute such an. unanticipated casualty as to render the excessive assessment invalid. Appellant should have pursued the remedy afforded by statute to correct the assessment, and, having failed to do so, it can not resort to a court of equity for relief.\nAffirmed.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "McCulloch, C. J."
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Cooper Thweatt, for appellants.",
      "Emmet Vaughan, for appellee."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "W. P. Brown & Sons Lumber Company v. Sims.\nOpinion delivered November 29, 1920.\n1. Taxation \u2014 assessment \u2014 remedy for overvaluation. \u2014 Equity will grant relief against void tax assessments, but not against those which are merely -erroneous for overvaluation, where a statutory remedy by , appeal is afforded.\n2. Taxation \u2014 breach of assessor\u2019s promise to substitute correct list. \u2014 Where the agent of a foreign corporation submitted to the assessor a list of the corporation\u2019s property containing an excessive valuation, relying upon the assessor\u2019s promise to accept a corrected list after it should be obtained, the breach of the assessor\u2019s promise to substitute the corrected list did not constitute such an unanticipated casualty as to render the excessive assessment invalid.\nAppeal from Prairie Chancery Court, Southern District; Jolm M. Elliott, Chancellor;\naffirmed.\nCooper Thweatt, for appellants.\nWe agree with the lower court that the assessment for 1918 is governed by act 234, Acts 1917, but plaintiff was not negligent in not supplying its resident agent with all the data to make a proper assessment at the time reauired by the statute. There is no statute making it tbe duty of a nonresident to supuly its resident agent with a list of its property. Plaintiff was not negligent, and is not estopped from seeking relief in chancery. 7 Am. Digest (Key No. Series), p. 2527. art. 462 (a), \u25a0 \u2018Taxation.\u201d If a taxpayer makes application for a reduction of his assessment and furnishes satisfactory proof of a mistake, it is the duty of the assessor to correct it. 37 Cyc. 1018. The assessor has power to lower an assessment, and a promise to do so when he knew the assessment was too high gave plaintiff the right to apply to equity for relief. 37 Cyo. 1266, 1079, 7111; 18 Am. Deo. Digest, \u25a0\u00a7 451 (r).\nEquity will interfere to prevent excessive overvaluation of a person\u2019s property. 71 Pac. 946; 8 Arizona, 221; 18 Am. Dec. Dig., \u00a7 6085 (e); 8 Ky. Law Rep. 706. Under the above authorities the allegations of the complaint show fraud and justify the interference of a court of equity. They also show that appellant had no adequate relief at law, as he was misled by the assessor\u2019s silence until too late to appeal to the county court..\nEmmet Vaughan, for appellee.\nThe opinion of the chancellor defines clearly the remedy of appellant, and he should have pursued it. The county court clearly had jurisdiction. Aft. 7, \u00a7 2, Const. 1874; act 234, Acts 1917. The chancery court had no jurisdiction to afford relief against appellant\u2019s own negligence."
  },
  "file_name": "0253-01",
  "first_page_order": 277,
  "last_page_order": 279
}