{ "id": 1583216, "name": "Brock v. Turner", "name_abbreviation": "Brock v. Turner", "decision_date": "1921-02-14", "docket_number": "", "first_page": "421", "last_page": "425", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "147 Ark. 421" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ark.", "id": 8808, "name": "Arkansas Supreme Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 34, "name_long": "Arkansas", "name": "Ark." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "104 Ark. 445", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "opinion_index": -1 }, { "cite": "111 Ark. 54", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1540404 ], "opinion_index": -1, "case_paths": [ "/ark/111/0054-01" ] }, { "cite": "51 Ark. 61", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 8720154 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "152" } ], "opinion_index": -1, "case_paths": [ "/ark/51/0061-01" ] }, { "cite": "116 Ark. 328", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1532242 ], "opinion_index": -1, "case_paths": [ "/ark/116/0328-01" ] }, { "cite": "68 Conn. 177", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Conn.", "case_ids": [ 774671 ], "opinion_index": -1, "case_paths": [ "/conn/68/0177-01" ] }, { "cite": "124 Ark. 548", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1555048 ], "opinion_index": -1, "case_paths": [ "/ark/124/0548-01" ] }, { "cite": "90 Ark. 152", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1513873 ], "opinion_index": -1, "case_paths": [ "/ark/90/0152-01" ] }, { "cite": "105 Ark. 558", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1347061 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/105/0558-01" ] }, { "cite": "51 Ark. 61", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 8720154 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/51/0061-01" ] }, { "cite": "105 Ark. 558", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1347061 ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ark/105/0558-01" ] }, { "cite": "111 Ark. 54", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1540404 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ark/111/0054-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 433, "char_count": 8423, "ocr_confidence": 0.513, "pagerank": { "raw": 7.940172758574813e-08, "percentile": 0.46212288824560815 }, "sha256": "e564d5edee88853235a44bc68d81a3cd159fb46c7f25e3361597f2eed52292a5", "simhash": "1:a2cef4757374772e", "word_count": 1480 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T19:16:35.379050+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "Brock v. Turner." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "Smith, J.\nThe decision of this case turns upon the construction of the following will:\n\u201cI give, devise and bequeath to my beloved husband, John F. Marshall, all of my personal property and real estate, as follows, towit: Forty acres, being the southeast quarter of the northwest quarter of section eleven (11), township four (4), range 32 west, containing sixty acres, more or less. Also all chattel property of any kind, including money on hand, notes, household goods, etc. And if there should hereafter be any legal heirs of any of this, my estate, then and in that event it is my will and testament that all such may be paid the sum of one dollar in money to each. \u2019 \u2019\nThe will was executed by Mrs. Marshall, the testatrix, on February .1, 1908. On September 2, 1909, she acquired the real estate which forms the subject-matter of the litigation, and after her death, February 1, 1913, her brothers and sisters and the children of certain brothers' and sisters claimed the property which she had acquired subsequent to the execution of the will as her heirs at law. Did the property acquired after the execution of the will pass under it?\nWe answer the question in the affirmative. In the first place, there is a presumption against partial intestacy. Of course, no controlling effect is to be given to this presumption, but it is one which must always be taken into account when the language employed in a will is sufficiently ambiguous to require the application of rules of construction in extracting its meaning.\nThe will devises \u201call of my personal property and real estate.\u201d It is apparent that the adjective \u201call\u201d modifies both classes of property \u2014 the real estate as well as the personal property. The sentence immediately following the one which undertakes a specific description of all the land then owned by the testatrix undertakes a description of the personal property. Its language is: \u201cAlso all chattel property of any kind, including money on hand, notes, household goods, etc.\u201d The phrase \u201con hand\u201d referred, of course, to the time of death. Manifestly, there was no purpose to devise specific pieces of money owned by the testatrix at the time of the execution of the will; nor is it to be believed that she did not intend to collect the notes then due her but meant to keep them for the benefit of her husband at her death.\nThe will, of course, was made in contemplation of death, and the property disposed of was that \u201con hand\u201d when that event occurred. No other construction of the will appears possible so far as tbe personal property is concerned; and we think the testatrix made no distinction between her real estate and her personal property in. this respect.\nWe think this construction of the will is reinforced by the concluding sentence thereof. The testatrix knew that she had brothers and sisters who .might survive her or be themselves survived by their own descendants. She referred to them as a class- \u2014 as they will exist at th\u00e9 time of her death \u2014 and she designates the part they each and all of them are to have of \u2018 \u2018 my estate. \u2019 \u2019 The phrase \u2018 \u2018 my estate\u201d as certainly comprehends real estate as it does personal property, and the part of that estate given to each of these heirs is \u201cthe sum of one dollar in money to each. \u2019 \u2019\nWe conclude, therefore,' that it was the purpose of the testatrix to dispose of the estate which she might own at the time of her death; and when a will manifests that purpose, it includes after-acquired property of which the testator or testatrix dies seized and possessed. Patty v. Goolsby, 51 Ark. 61; Galloway v. Darby, 105 Ark. 558.\nThe court -below so construed the will and entered judgment in accordance with that construction; and that judgment is therefore affirmed.", "type": "majority", "author": "Smith, J." }, { "text": "McCulloch, C. J.\n(dissenting). I think the majority is giving too much force to the presumption against partial intestacy, and in so doing have disregarded and overturned the express language of the will of the testator. We have recognized the. force of that rule in many of our decisions, but have usually qualified the statement of it by saying that the presumption of partial intestacy does not arise where \u201csuch intention clearly appears from the language used in the instrument. \u2019 \u2019 Galloway v. Darby, 105 Ark. 558; Webb v. Webb, 111 Ark. 54.\nIn the present case the language of the will unmistakably showed what the intention of the testator was. He willed all the property that he owned at that time, and it is manifest that he had no intention of willing anything else. He described the particular property that he intended to convey, and that was all he owned at that time. He did not own the property now in controversy.\nIn interpreting the language of the will for the purpose of ascertaining the intention of the testator we should treat it as having spoken as of the date of the execution of the will. Webb v. Webb, supra. At that time the land in controversy was not owned by the testator; and, since the language used applied only to specific property which he then owned, there is no room to apply the doctrine of presumption against partial intestacy. Nor should we give any additional force to the presumption by -reason of the fact that the heirs were cut off with a nominal legacy. That only shows that, out of the property sought to be conveyed under the will, his intention was to limit the bequest to the heirs to a nominal one. It seems to me to be that the effect of the court\u2019s decision in this case is to make a will for the testator which he did not see fit to make for himself \u2014 that is, to include after-acquired property which the testator evidently did not have in mind when he executed the will, and did not use appropriate language to convey.", "type": "dissent", "author": "McCulloch, C. J." } ], "attorneys": [ "Minor Pipkin, for appellants.", "Norwood & Alley, for appellees." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "Brock v. Turner.\nOpinion delivered February 14, 1921.\n1. Wills \u2014 presumption against partial intestacy. \u2014 The presumption against partial intestacy, though not controlling, must always be taken into account when the language employed in a will is so ambiguous as to require construction.\n2. Wills \u2014 after-acquired real estate. \u2014 A wife\u2019s will, leaving to her husband \u201call of my personal property and real estate as follows, towit, describing a certain tract, also all chattel property,\u201d etc., held to apply to real estate acquired after the execution of the will.\n3. Wills \u2014 after-acquired property. \u2014 Where a will manifests a purpose to dispose of after-acquired property, such effect will be given to it.\nAppeal from Folk Circuit Court; James S. Steel, Judge;\naffirmed.\nMinor Pipkin, for appellants.\nThe will does not show an intent on the part of the testatrix to give her husband, J. F. Marshall, or any one else the land acquired after executing the will. The intention as shown by the words used should be carried out. 90 Ark. 152. But construction is unnecessary here, as there is no ambiguity, nor inconsistent or repugnant clauses. 124 Ark. 548. The testatrix had in mind no other land than that described in the will, and only intended a gift of lands then owned hy her and no other. 68 Conn. 177. It is clear the testatrix died intestate as to the after-acquired lands. It was her intent to devise only the lands described in the will and this intent should be effectuated. 116 Ark. 328.\nThe presumption against partial intestacy is not applicable here. Ill Ark. 54; Page on Wills 545; 142 111. 214.\nNorwood & Alley, for appellees.\nThe will shows an intent to dispose of all the .property of which she died seized .and to make her husband the sole beneficiary and appellees holding under him are the legal owners, and the lower court so held and properly.\nThe will should be construed to cover after-acquired property. It was the intention to dispose of the whole estate existing at time of death. 51 Ark. 61.\nThe presumption is against partial intestacy. 51 Ark. 61; 90 Id. 152; 104 Id. 448; 115 Id. 9. The words \u201cthe remainder and residue of my money\u201d in a will made by one who had no real estate at the time will pass after-acquired realty where the will shows an intent not to die intestate and to exclude the heirs except as they were given legacies. 11 L. E. A. 767. This case is not like 111 Ark. 54.\nThe purpose of construction of a will is to ascertain the intention of the testator from the language used, and when ascertained, it must prevail. 104 Ark. 445. There was no children, and it is clear she intended to leave what she had to her husband, and the court so held." }, "file_name": "0421-01", "first_page_order": 445, "last_page_order": 449 }