{
  "id": 8720348,
  "name": "Garrison v. State",
  "name_abbreviation": "Garrison v. State",
  "decision_date": "1921-04-25",
  "docket_number": "",
  "first_page": "370",
  "last_page": "373",
  "citations": [
    {
      "type": "official",
      "cite": "148 Ark. 370"
    }
  ],
  "court": {
    "name_abbreviation": "Ark.",
    "id": 8808,
    "name": "Arkansas Supreme Court"
  },
  "jurisdiction": {
    "id": 34,
    "name_long": "Arkansas",
    "name": "Ark."
  },
  "cites_to": [
    {
      "cite": "36 Ark. 653",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Ark.",
      "case_ids": [
        1872361
      ],
      "opinion_index": -1,
      "case_paths": [
        "/ark/36/0653-01"
      ]
    },
    {
      "cite": "125 Ark. 47",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Ark.",
      "case_ids": [
        1553223
      ],
      "opinion_index": -1,
      "case_paths": [
        "/ark/125/0047-01"
      ]
    },
    {
      "cite": "47 S. W. 1015",
      "category": "reporters:state_regional",
      "reporter": "S.W.",
      "opinion_index": -1
    },
    {
      "cite": "13 Ark. 703",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Ark.",
      "case_ids": [
        8728483
      ],
      "opinion_index": -1,
      "case_paths": [
        "/ark/13/0703-01"
      ]
    },
    {
      "cite": "112 Ark. 477",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Ark.",
      "case_ids": [
        1538798
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/ark/112/0477-01"
      ]
    },
    {
      "cite": "141 Ark. 442",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Ark.",
      "case_ids": [
        1593010
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/ark/141/0442-01"
      ]
    },
    {
      "cite": "129 Ark. 106",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Ark.",
      "case_ids": [
        1580474
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/ark/129/0106-01"
      ]
    },
    {
      "cite": "125 Ark. 47",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Ark.",
      "case_ids": [
        1553223
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/ark/125/0047-01"
      ]
    }
  ],
  "analysis": {
    "cardinality": 341,
    "char_count": 6158,
    "ocr_confidence": 0.485,
    "pagerank": {
      "raw": 1.1680281956219356e-07,
      "percentile": 0.5855955308591351
    },
    "sha256": "d300d65b8d4a46ccd220f4be854c73146b58bd0f66dc69be6eb0ecb9e7f8db99",
    "simhash": "1:bccf77d97169498e",
    "word_count": 1032
  },
  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T16:10:39.547829+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
    "batch": "2018"
  },
  "casebody": {
    "judges": [],
    "parties": [
      "Garrison v. State."
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "Humphreys, J.\nAppellant was indicted, tried and convicted in the Newton Circuit Court for selling whiskey, and, as a punishment therefor, sentenced to the State penitentiary for a term of one year. From that judgment is this appeal.\nThe indictment was assailed in the trial court on the ground that it did not name the person to whom the alleged illegal sale of intoxicating liquors was made. Over the objection and exception of appellant, the court sustained the indictment, and it is contended that reversible error, was committed in doing so. The contention is made that, since the offense has been raised to the grade of a felony, it is necessary to allege the name of the purchaser in the indictment, so as to inform the accused of the particular charge he is called to meet. The identical point raised here was before the court in the case of McNeil v. State, 125 Ark. 47, at which time the court ruled adversely to the contention of appellant. Appellant suggests that this was not a well-considered case, and should be overruled. Subsequent consideration of the rule announced in that case convinced us of its soundness, and it was reaffirmed. Springer v. State, 129 Ark. 106.\nAppellant\u2019s next insistence for reversal is that Ober Martin, a witness for the State, was permitted to testify contrary to the first testimony given by him. Dewey Martin, the main prosecuting witness, testified that he bought whiskey from appellant at appellant\u2019s home in the presence of Ober Martin. When Ober Martin was placed on the stand by the State, he first testified that Dewey Martin never purchased the whiskey from appellant in his presence, but that Dewey Martin stopped at appellant\u2019s home, and, after he came out, witness saw him with some whiskey. Over the objection and exception of appellant, the prosecuting attorney was permitted to ask Ober Martin whether he had not admitted to him, in a conversation that morning, that he was present when Dewey Martin purchased the whiskey from appellant. Ober Martin admitted making the statement, and then testified that he was present when his cousin, Dewey Martin, purchased the whiskey from appellant. Appellant insists that this was an impeachment or contradiction of the State\u2019s own witness in a manner contrary to. section 4186 of Crawford & Moses\u2019 Digest, which is as follows:\n\u201cThe party producing a witness is not allowed to impeach his credit by evidence of bad character, unless it is a case in which it was indispensable that the party should produce him; but he may contradict him with other evidence,'and by showing that he has made statements different from his present testimony.\u201d\nThis statute, if applicable in criminal cases, allows the party producing the witness, if surprised and prejudiced by the statement made, to show that he had made a different statement from his present testimony. Doran v. State, 141 Ark. 442. The fact first testified to by Ober Martin was a surprise and prejudicial to the State. Therefore, the question propounded by the prosecuting attorney to the witnesses as to whether he had not made a different statement was clearly admissible as laying the foundation for a contradiction. Jonesboro, Lake City & East. Rd. Co. v. Gainer, 112 Ark. 477. Of course, it was unnecessary to prove the . contradictory statement by other witnesses after Ober Martin admitted making a different statement from that to which he had testified.\nAppellant\u2019s last insistence for reversal is that the court, over the objection and exception of appellant, permitted the prosecuting attorney to cross-examine him as follows:\n\u201cQ. Now, isn\u2019t it a fact that you have been making whiskey for three years?\n\u201cA. No, sir; I haven\u2019t made a drop of whiskey or sold a drop of whiskey.\n\u201cQ. As a matter-of fact,.aren\u2019t people out there getting mighty tired of the way you are doing?\n\u201cA. No, sir; I don\u2019t. * * *\u201d\nThe appellant answered the questions in, the negative, so no prejudice resulted to him on this account.\nNo error appearing in the record, the judgment is affirmed,",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "Humphreys, J."
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Gwy L. Trimble, for appellant.",
      "J. S. Utley, Attorney General, Elbert Godwm and W. T. Hammock, Assistants, for appellee."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "Garrison v. State.\nOpinion delivered April 25, 1921.\n1. Intoxicating liquors \u2014 indictment\u2014name op purchaser. \u2014 An indictment for illegally selling whiskey need not name the person to whom the alleged sale was made.\n2. Witnesses \u2014 impeaching one\u2019s witness. \u2014 Under Crawford & Moses\u2019 Digest, \u00a7 4186, prohibiting a party from impeaching the character of a witness produced by him, but allowing such witness to be contradicted with other evidence and by showing that he has made statements different from his present testimony, the prosecuting attorney can ask a witness for the State, who testified that no sale of whiskey was made in his presence, whether he had not stated to the prosecuting attorney that morning that he was present when the sale was made, and the testimony of the witness, in reply to such question, that he made that statement, was admissible.\n8. Criminal law \u2014 cross-examination op accused. \u2014 It was not prejudicial error to permit the prosecuting attorney to cross-examine the accused as to whether he had been making whiskey for three years, and whether the neighbors were getting tired of his conduct, where accused answered both questions in the negative.\nAppeal from Newton Circuit Court; J. M. Shinn, Judge;\naffirmed.\nGwy L. Trimble, for appellant.\nThe indictment is insufficient because it does not show the name of the purchaser of the whiskey. 13 Ark. 703; 68 Id. 188; 47 S. W. 1015. Only two witnesses testified to the sale, and one of these was discredited, and that discredited the other, and the verdict is not supported by any evidence.\nJ. S. Utley, Attorney General, Elbert Godwm and W. T. Hammock, Assistants, for appellee.\n1. The indictment was not insufficient because it did not name the purchaser of the liquor (125 Ark. 47), and that objection should be overruled. The law has been changed. A party may now impeach his own witness where it is indispensible. C. & M. Digest, \u00a7 4186.\nIf the witness was impeached, Ms credibility was a question for the jury, and if believed by the jury it was sufficient to sustain the verdict. 36 Ark. 653; 32 Id: 220.\n2. The evidence sustains the judgment."
  },
  "file_name": "0370-01",
  "first_page_order": 394,
  "last_page_order": 397
}
