{ "id": 8717467, "name": "Cosby v. Hurst", "name_abbreviation": "Cosby v. Hurst", "decision_date": "1921-05-30", "docket_number": "", "first_page": "11", "last_page": "14", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "149 Ark. 11" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ark.", "id": 8808, "name": "Arkansas Supreme Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 34, "name_long": "Arkansas", "name": "Ark." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "56 Ark. 476", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1326161 ], "opinion_index": -1, "case_paths": [ "/ark/56/0476-01" ] }, { "cite": "2 A. L. R. 474", "category": "reporters:specialty", "reporter": "A.L.R.", "opinion_index": -1 }, { "cite": "140 Ark. 558", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1594418 ], "opinion_index": -1, "case_paths": [ "/ark/140/0558-01" ] }, { "cite": "47 Ark. 86", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1888715 ], "opinion_index": -1, "case_paths": [ "/ark/47/0086-01" ] }, { "cite": "147 Ark. 439", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1583357 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/147/0439-01" ] }, { "cite": "148 Ark. 181", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 8718712 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/148/0181-01" ] }, { "cite": "66 Ark. 486", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1909738 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/66/0486-01" ] }, { "cite": "63 Ark. 412", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 8723462 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/63/0412-01" ] }, { "cite": "33 Ark. 233", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 8723301 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/33/0233-01" ] }, { "cite": "140 Ark. 558", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1594418 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/140/0558-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 354, "char_count": 6840, "ocr_confidence": 0.483, "pagerank": { "raw": 3.3613281692858266e-07, "percentile": 0.8753018033097683 }, "sha256": "a8f79bf7969a038d8a006adc6c4b254dee8f332771147a68e816381617fa905d", "simhash": "1:d1135f52c2fadc58", "word_count": 1181 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T20:38:49.179900+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "Cosby v. Hurst." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "McCulloch, C. J.\nAppellee is an attorney at law and a member of the Washington County bar, and he instituted this action against appellant in the chancery court of that county to recover the amount of fees alleged to be due for professional services rendered in connection with a claim of appellant against an insurance company,. It is alleged in the complaint that appellant made claim in the sum of $1,000 against the Fayetteville Mutual \u2019 Benefit Association under a policy issued to appellant\u2019s wife, now deceased, that appellant employed appellee to collect the claim from said insur-anee company, and that appellee \u2018 'prepared the necessary papers and presented the matter to the Fayetteville Mutual Benefit Association in the usual manner;\u201d that, after such presentation and after investigation made by the said company, the latter notified appellee that the claim would be allowed and would be paid as soon as reached in the regular order of business; that subsequently appellee was notified by the insurance company that payment would be made on June 15, 1919, and that a cheek was made out by the company payable to appel-lee as attorney for appellant, but that, after the performance of said services by appellee and before the delivery of the check, appellant employed another attorney to handle the claim for him and notified the said insurance company not to turn over the check or make any payment to appellee. The complaint contains the further allegation that appellant is insolvent, and the prayer of the complaint is that a lien be declared in appellee\u2019s favor for the amount of his fee in the sum of $150 on said claim against the insurance company, which said company was made a defendant in the action. Appellant appeared by attorney and demurred to the complaint on the ground that it did not state a cause of action within the .jurisdiction of the chancery court and also filed a motion to transfer the cause to the circuit court. The court overruled the demurrer and the motion to transfer, and, the defendant declining to plead further, decree was rendered against him and against the Fayetteville Mutual Benefit Association for the recovery of the sum of $150, which was declared to be a lien on appellant\u2019s claim against said insurance company.\nIt is conceded by counsel for appellee that there is no statutory lien in appellee\u2019s favor for the reason that there was no judgment rendered and no action instituted on appellant\u2019s claim against the insurance company. \u2022 Crawford & Moses\u2019 Digest, sections 628 and 6304 But it is contended that appellant had a common-law lien, independent of the statute, on the papers in his hands evidencing appellant\u2019s claim against the insurance company. The validity of this sort of claim was recognized hy this court in the case of Gist v. Hanley, 33 Ark. 233. But the difficulty with appellee\u2019s contention is that he has not set forth in his complaint a state of facts which would confer a lien, in that he does not allege that the policy or other evidence, if any, of appellant\u2019s claim against the insurance company was turned over to him and still remains in his possession. Such a lien at common law was, as we understand, on the evidence of indebtedness in the hands of the attorney, and not on the debt itself. This being true, appellee has not shown in the complaint that he had in his possession any papers on which he was entitled to a lien.\nIt is next contended by counsel for appellee in support of the decree that the allegations of insolvency were sufficient to confer jurisdiction on the chancery court, and that the insurance company, as appellant\u2019s debtor, having been made a party to the suit, appellee is entitled to an equitable garnishment. The mere allegation of insolvency was not, however, sufficient to show that the remedy at law was inadequate, and it does not show a cause of action cognizable in equity. The basis of a suit in equity for the sole purpose of recovery of money is the inadequacy of legal remedies. Davis v. Arkansas Fire Ins. Co., 63 Ark. 412; Euclid Avenue National Bank v. Judkins, 66 Ark. 486; Horstmann v. LaFargue, 140 Ark. 558; Henslee v. Mobley, 148 Ark. 181. There are no allegations which set forth grounds for equitable relief. Newmcm v. Neal, 147 Ark. 439. Nothing is added to the force of the complaint by the formal statement that ap-pellee had no adequate remedy at law. That was a mere conclusion, and according to the facts alleged there was no reason why a garnishment in an action at law would not have afforded an adequate remedy.\nThe court erred in refusing to transfer the cause to the circuit court, and for that reason the decree is reversed and the cause is remanded with directions to transfer the cause, unless further grounds are stated for equitable relief.", "type": "majority", "author": "McCulloch, C. J." } ], "attorneys": [ "John Mayes, for appellant.", "W. N. Ivie and II. L. Pearson, for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "Cosby v. Hurst.\nOpinion delivered May 30, 1921.\n1. Attorney and client \u2014 lien on evidence of debt. \u2014 At common law an attorney has a lien upon his client\u2019s evidence of indebtedness in his hands, but not upon the debt itself, and hence a complaint in equity seeking to fix a lien on the proceeds of the client\u2019s insurance policy did not state facts which would confer -a lien where it did not -allege that the policy or other evidence, if any, was in the possession of the attorney.\n2. Equity \u2014 inadequacy of legal remedy. \u2014 As the basis of a suit in equity for the sole purpose of recovery of money is the inadequacy of legal remedies, equity has no jurisdiction of a suit by an attorney against his client and an insurance company to recover compensation for his efforts in effecting a settlement of a claim under an insurance policy on the ground of the client\u2019s insolvency; it not appearing that garnishment at law would not afford an adequate remedy.\n8. Equity \u2014 pleading.\u2014Nothing is added to a complaint in equity seeking to enforce an equitable garnishment by the formal statement that plaintiff has no adequate remedy at law; such statement being a mere conclusion.\nAppeal from Washington Chancery Court; B. F. Me-Mahan, Chancellor;\nreversed.\nJohn Mayes, for appellant.\n1. It was error to refuse to transfer the cause to the law court.\n2. It was error in overruling appellant\u2019s demurrer. Appellee had no lien as an attorney under our statute. C. & M. Digest, \u00a7 6304; 47 Ark. 86; 140 Ark. 558; 109 Id. 171; 8 U. S. (Law. Ed.), Forde v. Lawson.\nW. N. Ivie and II. L. Pearson, for appellee.\nAppellee was entitled to a common-law lien and the allegations of insolvency were sufficient to give the chancery court jurisdiction. 6 C. J., p. 784, \u00a7 395; 2 A. L. R. 474.\n2. Equitable garnishment has always been recognized in courts of equity and the statutes of this State. C. & M. Dig., \u00a7\u00a7 4366-7, 4906; 56 Ark. 476. The chancery court had jurisdiction of the subject-matter, and was clearly right in overruling the demurrer and motion to transfer." }, "file_name": "0011-01", "first_page_order": 37, "last_page_order": 40 }