{
  "id": 1366067,
  "name": "McClain v. State",
  "name_abbreviation": "McClain v. State",
  "decision_date": "1922-01-16",
  "docket_number": "",
  "first_page": "266",
  "last_page": "269",
  "citations": [
    {
      "type": "official",
      "cite": "151 Ark. 266"
    }
  ],
  "court": {
    "name_abbreviation": "Ark.",
    "id": 8808,
    "name": "Arkansas Supreme Court"
  },
  "jurisdiction": {
    "id": 34,
    "name_long": "Arkansas",
    "name": "Ark."
  },
  "cites_to": [
    {
      "cite": "133 Ark. 599",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Ark.",
      "opinion_index": -1
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    {
      "cite": "136 Ark. 372",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Ark.",
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    {
      "cite": "150 Ark. 461",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Ark.",
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        1367919
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      "case_paths": [
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    {
      "cite": "149 Ark. 348",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Ark.",
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        8719724
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      "weight": 2,
      "opinion_index": -1,
      "case_paths": [
        "/ark/149/0348-01"
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    },
    {
      "cite": "133 Ark. 314",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Ark.",
      "case_ids": [
        1575151
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      "case_paths": [
        "/ark/133/0314-01"
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  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T19:18:51.844541+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
    "batch": "2018"
  },
  "casebody": {
    "judges": [],
    "parties": [
      "McClain v. State."
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "McCulloch, C. J.\nAppellant was indicted and tried in the circuit court of Lincoln County for the statutory offense of drunkenness \u201cat any public gathering of any kind, or upon any public highway, street, park or thoroughfare, or on any train in this State.\u201d Crawford & Moses\u2019 Digest, \u00a7 2626.\nThere was evidence tending to establish the charge, but it is contended that the court erred in the admission of certain testimony.\n.Two of the witnesses, Vick and Reed, testified that they met appellant one night between 7 and 8 o\u2019clock in an automobile which had halted on the roadside; that they had a conversation with appellant, and he appeared to be intoxicated. The witnesses stated that this occurred near the boundary line between Lincoln and Jefferson counties and was on the Jefferson County side of the line, but that appellant\u2019s car was headed in the direction of Star City in Lincoln County. Appellant moved to exclude this testimony on the ground that it did not tend to show the commission of the alleged offense in Lincoln County.\nThe venue may be proved in a criminal case by circumstances as well as by direct testimony on the subject. Spivey v. State, 133 Ark. 314. The testimony of these witnesses shows that appellant was on a public highway near the county line \u2014 so close to the line that they were not entirely certain which side he was on, but thought that he was on the Jefferson County side \u2014 and that his car was headed in the direction of Star City in Lincoln County. It was night, and it was reasonable to infer that appellant would immediately cross the line into Lincoln County, where he resided and where he occupied an official position, and that he was intoxicated when he traveled along the road in that county. In overruling appellant\u2019s motion to exclude this testimony, the court said, in the presence of the jury, that \u201cof course the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he (appellant) was drunk in Lincoln County.\u201d\nThe court gave an instruction in which it was stated that it devolved on the State to prove that the offense was committed \u201cat the time and place mentioned in the indictment,\u201d and appellant\u2019s counsel objected to this instruction on the ground that the instruction failed to state that it was necessary for the State to prove that the offense was committed in Lincoln County, as alleged in the indictment. It was charged in the indictment that the offense was committed in Lincoln County, and that the court told the jury that it was necessary for the State to prove the commission of the offense \u201cat the time and place mentioned in the indictment.\u201d The court also stated in the presence of the jury at the time appellant\u2019s objection was overruled that the State must prove that appellant was drunk in Lincoln County. It is not conceivable that the jury could have been misled by the failure of the court to state specifically in its final instruction to the jury that the State must prove that the offense was committed in that county.\nThese are the only assignments of error argued in the brief, and, since we conclude that these assignments are not well founded, it follows that the judgment must be affirmed, and it is so ordered.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "McCulloch, C. J."
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "A. J. JoTwison and Rowell & Alexander, for appellant.",
      "J. S. TJtley, Attorney General, Elbert Godwin and W. T. Hammock, Assistants, for appellee."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "McClain v. State.\nOpinion delivered January 16, 1922.\n1. Drunkenness \u2014 on public highway \u2014 evidence.\u2014In a prosecution for being drunk on a public highway in a certain county, it was admissible to prove that defendant, while intoxicated, was seen driving an automobile on the highway near the county line, and that he was apparently going toward the county seat, where he resided, and where he occupied an official position.\n2. Drunkenness \u2014 instruction as to venue. \u2014 An instruction in a prosecution for being drunk on a public highway that it was necessary to prove the commission of the offense \u201cat the time and place mentioned in the indictment\u201d was not objectionable for failure to state that it devolved on the State to prove that the offense was committed in the county of the venue.\nAppeal from Lincoln Circuit Court; W. B. Sorrels, Judge;\naffirmed.\nA. J. JoTwison and Rowell & Alexander, for appellant.\nThe court erred in refusing to exclude the testimony of Mr. Vick and Mr. Reed relative to matters that happened in Jefferson County. The instruction approved in the case of Simmons v. State, 149 Ark. 348, although the same as the instruction in this case, is not controlling here, because in that case there was no testimony of anything which happened outside of the county in which the defendant was indicted. The court erred in its instruction in not limiting the offense to Lincoln county. Murry v. State, 150 Ark. 461.\nJ. S. TJtley, Attorney General, Elbert Godwin and W. T. Hammock, Assistants, for appellee.\nThe testimony of Mr. Vick was admissible for the purpose of showing the habits of defendant in getting drunk. 136 Ark. 372. The testimony of both Mr. Vick and Mr. Reed was properly submitted to the jury. 133 Ark. 599. The instruction complained of was proper. 149 Ark. 348."
  },
  "file_name": "0266-01",
  "first_page_order": 292,
  "last_page_order": 295
}