{
  "id": 1358468,
  "name": "Southern Anthracite Coal Mining Company v. Rice",
  "name_abbreviation": "Southern Anthracite Coal Mining Co. v. Rice",
  "decision_date": "1922-11-27",
  "docket_number": "",
  "first_page": "94",
  "last_page": "98",
  "citations": [
    {
      "type": "official",
      "cite": "156 Ark. 94"
    }
  ],
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    "name_abbreviation": "Ark.",
    "id": 8808,
    "name": "Arkansas Supreme Court"
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    "name": "Ark."
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    {
      "cite": "131 Ark. 562",
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      "reporter": "Ark.",
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    {
      "cite": "58 Ark. 353",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Ark.",
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    {
      "cite": "131 Ark. 562",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Ark.",
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        1578602
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  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T20:27:22.366486+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
    "batch": "2018"
  },
  "casebody": {
    "judges": [],
    "parties": [
      "Southern Anthracite Coal Mining Company v. Rice."
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "Humphreys, J.\nThis suit of appellee against appellant for damages growing out of the death of her husband while working in appellant\u2019s coal mine was predicated on sec. 7271 of Crawford & Moses\u2019 Digest, which is as follows:\n\u201cThe owner, agent or operator of any mine shall keep a sufficient amount of timber, when required, to be. used as props, so that the workmen can, at all times, be able to properly secure the said working place from caving in, and it shall be the duty of the owner, agent, or operator to send down all such props when required, and deliver said props to the place where cars are delivered.\u201d It was alleged that Martin Rice, the husband of appellee, was a coal miner in the employ of appellant in a room of the seventh west entry Mine No. 2, in Pope .County; that, while engaged in mining coal in said room, a part of the roof fell upon and fatally injured him, on account of appellant\u2019s failure to furnish props to secure his working place, after proper demand had been made for same.\nAn answer was filed by appellee denying the material allegations in the complaint, and interposing the further defenses of contributory negligence and assumed risk on the part of said employee, in the following words: \u201cB37 way of affirmative defense, the defendant states that the deceased was guilty of negligence, and that such negligence was the proximate cause of his injury and death, and also that said deceased, knowing of the condition of the place in which he was engaged at work, thereby assumed the risk incident to working in such place.\u201d\nA demurrer was filed to 'the pleas of contributory negligence and assumed risk, which was sustained bj7 the court, over the objection and exception of appellant.\nThe cause was submitted to the jury upon the pleadings, testimony of the witnesses, and instructions of the court, which resulted in a judgment and verdict in favor of appellee, from which is this appeal. Appellant\u2019s first insistence for reversal is, that the court erred in sustaining the demurrer to the pleas of contributory negligence and assumption of the risk. The suit was based upon an alleged violation of the statute by failing to furnish props, passed for the protection of miners. In suits against corporations upon statutes enacted for the safety of their employees, the defense of contributory negligence and assumed risks is not available. Secs. 7145 and 7146, Crawford & Moses\u2019 Digest; Western Coal & Mining Co. v. Watts, 131 Ark. 562.\nAppellant\u2019s next insistence for reversal is that the court erred in refusing to give its requested instruction No. 2, which, among other things, instructed that it was not only necessary for 'Martin Rice to request props from the person whose duty it was made to furnish props, but also to request them at the place where it was the custom in said mine to make such request. The instruction was erroneous in that it placed the burden upon the miner to order the props at some particular place. The statute is mandatory in imposing the duty upon the mine owner, agent, or operator to send down props, when requested, and to deliver them where the cars for hauling out coal are delivered. It is immaterial at what particular place the request for props should be made, if made to one whose duty it was to bring or send them. The testimony was in conflict as to whether Martin Rice made a demand for the props from Charles Baker, the driver of the coal cars, whose duty it was to bring props, when requested to do so by the miners. The court correctly submitted the question to the jury as to whether Martin Rice made a demand upon Baker for the props, which presented the only issue in the case. The court properly refused the requested instruction because it embraced an issue not involved in the case.\nAppellant\u2019s next insistence for reversal is that the court permitted one of appellant\u2019s attorneys, in the course of his argument, to say to the jury: \u201cIt was the duty of the pit boss to have done everything in his power to make that room safe.\u201d The record does not support appellant in this insistence. \"While this remark was made by the attorney, it was excluded from the jury by the court, so could not have prejudiced them.\nAppellant\u2019s last insistence for reversal is that the court permitted one of appellee\u2019s attorneys to say to the jury: \u201cTf they give her a small verdict, there will be an appeal in this case. The attorneys take an advantage of everything, and they have a right to do it, and they mean to and will attempt it by every power, and you won\u2019t save a ease in the Supreme Court by your decision, no matter what amount you give in this case.\u201d While it was improper to comment upon whether appellant would take an appeal, we are unable to see how any prejudice could have resulted to appellant on account of the remark. The remark was not, in any sense, a request or suggestion for an unreasonable verdict. It is not claimed that the verdict was excessive. This court, in dealing with a similar remark, in the case of Vaughan v. State, 58 Ark. 353, said: \u201cThe remarks of the prosecuting attorney, while improper and unwarranted, were not prejudicial, as we take it, since * * * * the latter part, as to the right of appeal, must have been already known to every intelligent juror. The right of appeal, as a part of the procedure under our judicial system, is a matter of common knowledge.\u201d\nNo prejudicial error appearing, the judgment is affirmed.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "Humphreys, J."
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Hays, Ward & Hays, for appellant.",
      "E. G. Mitchell and Patterson & Ragon, for appellee."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "Southern Anthracite Coal Mining Company v. Rice.\nOpinion delivered November 27, 1922.\n1. Master and servant \u2014 violation of statute \u2014 defenses.\u2014Under Crawford & Moses\u2019 Dig., \u00a7\u00a7 7145-6, contributory negligence and -assumed risk are not -available as defenses in a case of -injury to \u2022a miner from failure to furnish props as required by \u00a7 7271, Id.\n2. Master and servant \u2014 duty of mine-owner to furnish props.\u2014 Under Crawford & Moses\u2019 Dig., \u00a7 7271, the duty to furnish props to prevent cave-in-s in mines and to deliver them where the cars for hauling out coal are delivered when requested by a workman, is imposed upon the mine -owner, agent or operator, and it is immaterial at what particular pl-ace the request for props is made, if made to one whose duty it is to furnish them.\n3. Master and servant \u2014 question for jury. \u2014 Where the testimony was in conflict as to whether deceased, a miner, made a demand for props \u00a1as required by the statute, the question was properly submitted to the jury.\n4. Trial \u2014 argument of attorney \u2014 prejudice.\u2014A remark of plaintiff\u2019s attorney, in argument to the jury, that \u201cit was the duty of \u25a0the pit boss to have done everything in his power to make that room safe,\u201d was not prejudicial where the court excluded the remark. \", '.\n5. Trial \u2014 argument of attorney \u2014 prejudice.\u2014A remark to the jury by plaintiff\u2019s attorney in argument: \u201cIf they (the jury) give her a small verdict, there will be an appeal in this case. The attorneys take an advantage of everything, and they have a right to do so, and they mean to and will attempt it by every power, and you won\u2019t save a case in the Supreme Court by your decision, no matter what amount you give in this case,\u201d was -not prejudicial error; it not amounting to a request or suggestion for an unreasonable verdict, and there being no claim that the verdict was excessive.\nAppeal from Pope Circuit Court; A. B. Priddy, Judge;\naffirmed.\nHays, Ward & Hays, for appellant.\nThe duty of making his working place safe devolves upon the miner. He is the sole'judge of its safety. 101 Ark. 205. Eice made no direct demand for props. Several of the miners were discussing the need for props, 'and Eice is alleged only to have said that if he did not receive props he was coming out at noon. This statement was not made to Baker, nor in his immediate presence, and he testified that no demand was made of him by Eice for props. The contributory negligence in the manner in which Eice ordered the props should have been left to the jury.' 116 Ark. 461.\nE. G. Mitchell and Patterson & Ragon, for appellee.\nSec. 7271, C. & M. Digest, requires the operator to furnish props when so requested and sec. 7145 provides that an employee killed or injured as a result of a violation of any statute enacted for the safety of employees, cannot be held to have been guilty of contributory negligence. Sec. 7146 holds that the servant did not assume the risk when the master was negligent. The same contentions were made in the case at 131 Ark. 562, and that case is controlling here."
  },
  "file_name": "0094-01",
  "first_page_order": 120,
  "last_page_order": 124
}
