{ "id": 1378546, "name": "McKee v. American Trust Company", "name_abbreviation": "McKee v. American Trust Co.", "decision_date": "1924-12-01", "docket_number": "", "first_page": "480", "last_page": "489", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "166 Ark. 480" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ark.", "id": 8808, "name": "Arkansas Supreme Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 34, "name_long": "Arkansas", "name": "Ark." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "32 Ark. 553", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1877113 ], "opinion_index": -1, "case_paths": [ "/ark/32/0553-01" ] }, { "cite": "133 Ark. 157", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1575063 ], "opinion_index": -1, "case_paths": [ "/ark/133/0157-01" ] }, { "cite": "103 Ark. 298", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1352028 ], "opinion_index": -1, "case_paths": [ "/ark/103/0298-01" ] }, { "cite": "133 Ark. 380", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1575127 ], "opinion_index": -1, "case_paths": [ "/ark/133/0380-01" ] }, { "cite": "52 Ark. 326", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1913429 ], "opinion_index": -1, "case_paths": [ "/ark/52/0326-01" ] }, { "cite": "120 Ark. 165", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1561024 ], "opinion_index": -1, "case_paths": [ "/ark/120/0165-01" ] }, { "cite": "52 Ark. 290", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1913369 ], "opinion_index": -1, "case_paths": [ "/ark/52/0290-01" ] }, { "cite": "49 Ark. 131", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1309165 ], "opinion_index": -1, "case_paths": [ "/ark/49/0131-01" ] }, { "cite": "31 Ark. 236", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1879227 ], "opinion_index": -1, "case_paths": [ "/ark/31/0236-01" ] }, { "cite": "29 Ark. 252", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "opinion_index": -1 }, { "cite": "1 Ark. 21", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 8728258, 8728263 ], "opinion_index": -1, "case_paths": [ "/ark/1/0021-01", "/ark/1/0021-02" ] }, { "cite": "23 Ark. 587", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1866001 ], "opinion_index": -1, "case_paths": [ "/ark/23/0587-01" ] }, { "cite": "85 Ark. 464", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1523322 ], "opinion_index": -1, "case_paths": [ "/ark/85/0464-01" ] }, { "cite": "123 U. S. 623", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 3523081 ], "opinion_index": -1, "case_paths": [ "/us/123/0623-01" ] }, { "cite": "148 Ark. 504", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 8721499 ], "opinion_index": -1, "case_paths": [ "/ark/148/0504-01" ] }, { "cite": "94 Ark. 27", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1545329 ], "opinion_index": -1, "case_paths": [ "/ark/94/0027-01" ] }, { "cite": "87 Ark. 587", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1519111 ], "opinion_index": -1, "case_paths": [ "/ark/87/0587-01" ] }, { "cite": "69 Ark. 521", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 8724778 ], "opinion_index": -1, "case_paths": [ "/ark/69/0521-01" ] }, { "cite": "64 Ark. 83", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1907371 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": -1, "case_paths": [ "/ark/64/0083-01" ] }, { "cite": "58 Ark. 407", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1329130 ], "opinion_index": -1, "case_paths": [ "/ark/58/0407-01" ] }, { "cite": "54 Ark. 101", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1320453 ], "opinion_index": -1, "case_paths": [ "/ark/54/0101-01" ] }, { "cite": "130 Ark. 128", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 8718272 ], "opinion_index": -1, "case_paths": [ "/ark/130/0128-01" ] }, { "cite": "153 Ark. 202", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1362230 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/153/0202-01" ] }, { "cite": "127 Ark. 595", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1550247 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/127/0595-01" ] }, { "cite": "123 Ark. 180", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1556249 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/123/0180-01" ] }, { "cite": "85 Ark. 346", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1523273 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/85/0346-01" ] }, { "cite": "173 U. S. 404", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 8298171 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/173/0404-01" ] }, { "cite": "58 Ark. 435", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "95 U. S. 319", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 3384078 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "324" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/95/0319-01" ] }, { "cite": "123 U. S. 623", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 3523081 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/123/0623-01" ] }, { "cite": "87 Ark. 587", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1519111 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/87/0587-01" ] }, { "cite": "69 Ark. 521", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 8724778 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/69/0521-01" ] }, { "cite": "58 Ark. 407", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1329130 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/58/0407-01" ] }, { "cite": "130 Ark. 128", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 8718272 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/130/0128-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 883, "char_count": 20292, "ocr_confidence": 0.525, "pagerank": { "raw": 5.901627965027585e-08, "percentile": 0.3691591671946897 }, "sha256": "fd08768f9da10cf77809057c7e560ee831829c3bbaea692fcf8723abc4c4c645", "simhash": "1:e31642b0872cde96", "word_count": 3529 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:22:16.783155+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "McKee v. American Trust Company." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "Smith, J.\nThis suit was brought by the State Bank Commissioner against the American Trust Company, its officers and stockholders, to enjoin them from further violating \u00a7 6 of act 627 of the Acts of the 1923 General Assembly (General Acts 1923, page 515). Act 627 is an act entitled \u201cAn act to amend act 113 of the Acts of the General Assembly of 1913, entitled \u2018An act for the regulation and control of banks, trust companies and savings banks\u2019 as amended.\u201d\nThe act is a very comprehensive one of twenty sections, and amends the State banking laws in many important particulars, especially act 113 of the General Assembly of 1913.\nAfter amending act 113 of the Acts of 1913 in several particulars, \u00a7 6 of act 627 provides that act 113 \u201cbe further amended by adding thereto an additional section reading as follows:\n\u201cAll persons, firms, associations and corporations, except such as discharge the burden of proving their authority under the laws of another.State or of the United States, and except those organized under the .provisions of act 632 of the Acts of the General Assembly of 1921, or except such as are subject to the supervision of and have authority from the Bank Commissioner to engage in the business, or a substantial part thereof, of a bank, trust company, savings bank, * * *, are prohibited from using in this State, as a portion of or in connection with their place of business, their name or title, or in connection with their office or other place of business, or in reference to themselves in their stationery or advertising, any of the words, or phrases, along or in combination with any other word or phrase, of \u2018bank,\u2019 \u2018banks,\u2019 \u2018banker,\u2019 \u2018bankers,\u2019 \u2018banking,\u2019 \u2018Federal reserve,\u2019 \u2018trust company,\u2019 \u2018trust,\u2019 * * *, or any other word or phrase which tends to induce the belief that the party using it is authorized to engage in the business of a bank, trust company, savings bank, * * *; and all person, firms, associations and corporations, under whatever name or title, and in whatsoever form, except mutual or cooperative banks * * * and other corporations organized under the provisions of act 632 of the Acts of the General Assembly of 1921, with the other exceptions as aforesaid, are prohibited from doing or soliciting business in this State, substantially in the manner, or so as to induce the belief that the business is that, in whole or part, of a hank, savings bank, trust company, * * * either by the sale of contract, or of shares of its capital stock, upon partial or installment payments thereof, or by the receipt of money, savings, dues or other deposits, or by the issuance of certificates of deposit or certificates of deposit or certificates of investment of money, savings or dues * # * M\nIt is further provided in \u00a7 6 that a violation of the provisions of that section shall constitute a misdemeanor, and be punishable by a fine of $25 for each day \u201cduring which it is committed or repeated.\u201d And that section further authorizes and directs the Bank Commissioner \u201cto institute and prosecute in his own name, as such, in any court of competent jurisdiction, in civil suit in the nature of quo warranto, or for an injunction, or for any other appropriate remedy, in order that thereby the violation of any provision of this or said other acts, or ultra vires action, or the usurpation or threatened usurpation or misuse of any of the powers conferred by this or said other acts upon banks, trust companies, savings banks, or building and loan associations, may thereafter be prevented. \u2019 \u2019\nThe complaint alleged that the defendant, American Trust Company, was violating this act, in that it was doing business under a name which implied that it was a trust company, when, in fact, it was not, and there was a prayer that the defendant be enjoined from further using the words \u201ctrust company\u201d in connection with its business.\nA demurrer to the complaint was filed, and overruled, whereupon an answer was filed setting up numerous defenses.\nAmong other defenses set up was that the act which the Bank Commissioner sought to enforce was void for the following reasons:\n(1). Tbe act was not read upon three separate days in each house; nor were the rules suspended by a two-thirds vote of the members of each house, as required by22 of article 5 of the Constitution.\n\u2022 (2). The ayes and nays on the final passage of the bill were not recorded, as required by \u00a7 22 of article 5 of the Constitution.\n(3). The act did not have the necessary enacting clause, as required by \u00a7 19\u2019 of article 5 of the Constitution. An examination of the journals of the Senate and House of the 1923 General Assembly shows that the first and second objections to the act are not well taken.\nSection 19 of article 5 of the Constitution provides that \u201cthe style of the laws of the State of Arkansas shall be: \u2018Be it enacted by the General Assembly of the State of Arkansas.\u2019 \u201d An examination of act 627 shows that it contains this enacting clause. The separate sections of that act do not contain this clause; but the Constitution prescribes no such requirement.\nAnother objection to \u00a7 6, set up in the answer, is that it is, in fact, an amendment of a statute by reference to its title only. This objection is not tenable, as \u00a7 6 does not purport to amend act 113 by reference to its title, but amends this act, as amended, by adding a new section to it, and this additional section is a complete enactment in itself.\nOther defenses set up in the answer are:\n(a) . That there has been no violation of the statute.\n(b) . That to require defendant to discontinue the use of the words \u201ctrust company\u201d in the corporate name would deprive it of its property without due process of law.\n(c) . The act is void as an ex post facto law.\n(d) . Defendant is deprived of its right of trial by jury, in violation of the Constitution.\n(e) . The Bank Commissioner has no authority to maintain this suit.\nIn support of the allegations of the answer the following testimony was offered: Defendant is a domestic corporation, having its principal place of business at El Dorado; was duly organized under the laws of this State on August 16,1922, under the name of the American Trust Company, and the words \u201cTrust Company,\u201d are a part of the corporate name under which it has, since its organization, conducted its growing business. The defendant company commenced operations with an investment of $28,000, and its business has been enormously successful, and the president of the company estimated the value of all its assets at several million dollars. It has an enormous correspondence, which it has conducted under its corporate name, by which it has become known to these correspondents, to whom it has sent many thousands of letters and circulars, and has stationery and literature bearing its corporate name, which cost several thousands of dollars. Much of this literature was propaganda designed to sell stock in a concern known as \u201cMoney-Back Oil Company,\u201d for which defendant was acting as agent and trustee. There were follow-up letters having the letterhead1 \u201cAmerican Trust Company, Incorporated,\u201d intended to be sent to persons on the mailing lists who had not replied to the first letters. This literature insured the bringing in of two \u201cgushers,\u201d or to refund one-half the money paid for stock, and promises to return all money so paid if there was a failure to bring in one gusher, and there are representations calculated to arouse in the prospective investor the hope of \u201ca clean profit of 120 to 1, or better.\u201d Upon reading this literature, one marvels at the generosity which would assure such prospects of profit upon terms so free from risk of loss, yet, according to the testimony of the president of the defendant company, its operations have been so successful in acquiring oil leases that it has fulfilled all representations made, and is prepared to continue to do so.\nDefendant admits it is not authorized by its charter to do business as a bank .or trust company, but denies that it has ever made any representation that it was so authorized, or was, in fact, engaged as such. Its business is that of buying and selling oil leases and developing oil fields.\nThere was a general finding in favor of the defendant, and the complaint was dismissed, from which decree is this appeal.\nAppellee insists that it has become known to its correspondents by its present corporate name, and that it has valuable stationery and literature so stamped, and it insists that it would be deprived of valuable property rights if it were deprived of the right to continue to use its present corporate name.\nAppellee further insists that the decree of the court below was correct, as being in accordance with \u00a7 8 of article 2 of the Constitution, which provides that \u201cno person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process of law.\u201d\nThis provision of the Constitution must be read, however, in connection with \u00a7 8 of article 12 of the Constitution, which.reads as follows: \u201cCorporations may be formed under general laws, which laws may, from time to time, be altered or repealed. The General Assembly shall have the, power to alter, revoke or annul any charter of incorporation now existing and revocable at the adoption of this Constitution, or any that may hereafter be created, whenever, in their opinion, it may be injurious to th'e citizens of this State, in such manner, however, that no injustice shall be done to the corporators. \u2019 \u2019\nThis provision of the Constitution has been frequently construed by this court, and a late case interpreting it is that of Davis v. Moore, 130 Ark. 128, in which we quoted from Judge Battue\u2019s opinion in:the case of Leep v. Railway Co., 58 Ark. 407, as follows: \u201cNatural persons do not derive the right to contract from the Legislature. Corporations do. They possess only those powers or properties which the charters of their creation confer upon them, either expressly or as incidental to their existence; and these may be modified or diminished by amendment, or extinguished by the repeal of the charters.\u201d\nIn the case of Woodson v. State, 69 Ark. 521, Mr. Justice Riddick, speaking for the court, said: \u201cThe citizen does not derive his right to contract from the Legislature. The corporation does, and it possesses only such powers as may be conferred upon it by th\u00e9 legislative will, and these, under our Constitution, are liable to be altered, revoked or annulled by the power that granted them. Article 12, \u00a7 6, Const, of Ark. The plain purpose of this constitutional reservation was to keep corporations under legislative control. The only limitation on this power of the Legislature contained in our Constitution is that the alteration, revocation or annulment of the corporate powers must be made \u2018in such manner that no injustice shall be done to the corporators.\u2019 \u201d\nIn the case of Ozan Lbr. Co. v. Biddie, 87 Ark. 587, Mr. Justice Battle, again speaking for the court, said: \u201cThe reserved power to amend a charter, in the. absence of an express limitation, must be exercised upon terms that are just and reasonable. In Shields v. Ohio, 95 U. S. 319, 324, Mr. Justice Swayne, in delivering the opinion of the court, says: \u201cIt is urged that the franchise here in question was'property held by a vested right, and that its sanctity, as such, could not be thus invaded. The answer is, consensus facit jus. It was according to the agreement of the parties. The company took the franchise subject expressly to the power of alteration or repeal by the G-eneral Assembly. There is therefore no ground for just complaint against the State. * * *' The power of alteration and amendment is not without limit. The alterations must be reasonable; they must be made in good faith, and be consistent with the scope and object of the act of incorporation. Sheer oppression and wrong cannot be inflicted under the guise of amendment or alteration.\u2019 \u201d After reviewing other authorities to the same effect, Judge Battle continued: \u201cIt is obvious that this power to amend charters of corporations is in force under the Constitution of this State with'the same limitation. It was virtually so held' in Leep v. Railway Co., 58 Ark. 435. In that case, after a review of author-ties, it is said: \u2018It is obvious that the Legislature cannot, under the power to \u00e1mend, take from corporations' the right to contract; for it is essential to their existence.It can regulate it when the interest of the public demands it, but not to such an extent as to render it ineffectual or substantially impair the object of incorporation.\u2019 St. L. I. M. & S. R. Co. v. Paul, 173 U. S. 404; Union Sawmill Co. v. Felsenthal, 85 Ark. 346.\u201d\nThere is no attempt here to deprive appellee company of its right to contract; nor is there any attempt to confiscate the property which it has accumulated under its present corporate name. Its ownership of this property, consisting principally of oil leases, will not be impaired by requiring it to change its present corporate name. The State, in the exercise of its police power, has, through its General Assembly, directed that no one shall assume to do business under a name which carries the implication that it is a bank or a trust company, when it is not 'such in fact. It was thought wise to afford the public protection from possible imposition by such a course of business, and we think it is no injustice to a corporation, within the meaning of \u00a7 6 of article 12 of the Constitution, quoted above, to prohibit a corporation from doing business under a corporate name which might be misleading to the investing public as to its corporate character.\nIt 'is also insisted in the answer that the act of the General Assembly in question is violative of the due process of law clause of the Federal Constitution, which provides that no State shall deprive any person of life, libertv, or property, without due process of law, nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. \u2018Section 1 of Amendment 14, Federal Constitution.\nOf this defense but little need be said. In 6 R. C. L., title \u201cConstitutional Law,\u201d beginning with \u00a7 198, the scope and objects of enactments under the State\u2019s police power are dealt with, and this section and those following cite annotated cases which collect an almost limitless number of cases on the subject. It will suffice to quote what Mr. Justice Harlan said, in speaking for the Supreme Court of the United States, in the case of Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U. S. 623, 31 L. ed. 205. This was the case in which the validity of the prohibition law of the State 'Of Kansas was involved, and, in upholding that statute, Justice Harlan said: \u201cUnder our system that power is lodged with the legislative branch of the \u25a0 government. It belongs to that department to exert what are known as the police powers of the State, and to determine, primarily, what measures are appropriate or needful for the protection of the public morals, the public health, or the public safety.\u201d\nAs to the contention that act 627 is void as an ex post facto law, it may be said that the act is not subject to this objection. It does not make any action taken before its passage unlawful.\nThe other defenses raised in the answer require but little discussion.\nAppellee was not entitled to a trial by jury, as this was not a suit to enforce the criminal features of the act, but was one to enjoin its continued violation. Hickey v. State, 123 Ark. 180; Marvel v. State, 127 Ark. 595; Adams v. State, 153 Ark. 202.\nThe Bank Commissioner has authority to maintain this suit. The act imposed upon him the duty of enforcing its provisions, and expressly authorizes him to bring an injunction suit when necessary.\nAppellee\u2019s violation of the act is obvious. Its present corporate name indicates that it is a trust company, possessing the powers conferred by law on such corporations, and its answer admits that its charter confers no such power.\nWe conclude therefore that the court below erred in dismissing the Bank Commissioner\u2019s complaint as being without equity, and that decree is reversed, and the cause will be remanded with directions to enter a decree in accordance with this opinion.", "type": "majority", "author": "Smith, J." } ], "attorneys": [ "John M. Bose,, for appellant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "McKee v. American Trust Company.\nOpinion delivered December 1, 1924.\n1. Statutes \u2014 enacting clause. \u2014 Where an act contains the enacting clause .prescribed by Const. 1874, art. 5, \u00a7 19, it is not necessary that the separate sections of the act should likewise contain such enacting clause.\n2. Statutes \u2014 amendment of act by reference to title. \u2014 Acts 1923, No. 627, \u00a7 6, amending Acts 1913, No. 113, relative to hanks, by' adding an additional complete section thereto, is not void as amending the latter act by reference to its title.\n3. Banks and banking \u2014 deprivation op property without due process. \u2014 Acts 1923, No. 627, \u00a7 6, which prohibits unauthorized corporations from doing business under the name of a \u201ctrust company,\u201d is not void, as a deprivation of property without due process, within Const. 1874, art. 2, \u00a7 8, or of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, in view of art. 12, \u00a7 6, authorizing the General Assembly to alter or repeal the general laws under which corporations may :be organized.\n4. Constitutional law \u2014 ex post facto law. \u2014 Acts 1923, No. 627, \u00a7 6, which prohibits unauthorized corporations from using the words \u201ctrust company\u201d as part of- their names, is not an ex post facto law. as it has no retroactive effect.\n5. Jury \u2014 injunction suit.. \u2014 In a suit to restrain an unauthorized corporation from using the words \u201ctrust company\u201d as part of its name, in violation of Acts 1923, No. 627, \u00a7 6, the defendant . is not entitled to a trial by jury.\n6. Banks and banking \u2014 authority of bank commissioner.\u2014 Under Acts 1923, No. 627, \u00a7 6, the Bank Commissioner is expresly authorized to bring suits to restrain corporations from doing business under a name prohibited by that act.\nAppeal -from Union Chancery Court, First Division; J. Y. Stevens, Chancellor;\nreversed.'\nJohn M. Bose,, for appellant.\n1. The use of the words \u201ctrust company\u201d by appellees is a -clear violation of the statute, \u00a7 6, art. 627, Acts 1923. No other construction can be placed on the clear and explicit language of the statute.\n2. Before there can be a violation of the due process clause of the Constitution, there must be some \u201cproperty\u201d sought to be taken. Appellee has no property right in a trade name which is in fact a misrepresentation to the public. R. C. L., \u00a7-14, \u2018 \u2018 Trade Marks, Trade Names,\u201d etc. In determining in this case whether there has been a violation of art. 2, \u00a7 8, Constitution, it must be considered in connection with art. 12, \u00a7 6, from which it appears that the due process clause does not apply in the case of corporations, unless injustice is done to the corporators. As to what constitutes an injustice, see 130 Ark. 128; 54 Ark. 101; 58 Ark. 407; 64 Ark. 83; 69 Ark. 521; 87 Ark. 587 ; 94 Ark. 27; 148 Ark. 504. It was within the rights of the Legislature to enact this bill, as being within the police powers of the State. R. C. L., \u00a7 182,190, 192, 193, 194; 123 U. S. 623; 31 U. S. (L. ed.) 205; 85 Ark. 464; 6 R. C. L. 208-210; Id. 219; Id. 222.\n3. The act is not an ex post facto law. The acts prohibited by the statute are such only as may be committed after its passage. The objection that it is ex post facto is particularly inapplicable in this case, since it is an injunction suit, and not in any sense a criminal prosecution. 23 Ark. 587; 1 Ark. 21.\n4. The act 627 of 1923 is not within the inhibition of the Constitution, art. 5, \u2022\u00a7 '23, with respect to amendment by reference only, either as to \u00a7 1700 of Crawford & Moses\u2019 Digest, relating to the formation of corporations, or as to the general banking act of 1913. 29 Ark. 252; 31 Ark. 236; 49 Ark. 131; 52 Ark. 290; 120 Ark. 165; 52 Ark. 326; 64 Ark. 83; 133 Ark. 380 ; 103 Ark. 298; 133 Ark. 157.\n5. This case is an injunction proceeding, purely equitable, and the remedy prescribed by the statute. The right of trial by jury therefore does not exist. Art.'2, \u00a7 7, Constitution; 32 Ark. 553.\n6. That the State Bank Commissioner, and not the Attorney General, is the proper party to maintain this action is clearly shown by the language of the act 627 of 1923, \u00a7 6." }, "file_name": "0480-01", "first_page_order": 506, "last_page_order": 515 }