{
  "id": 1377052,
  "name": "Floyd Stroud v. State",
  "name_abbreviation": "Stroud v. State",
  "decision_date": "1925-02-16",
  "docket_number": "",
  "first_page": "505",
  "last_page": "507",
  "citations": [
    {
      "type": "official",
      "cite": "167 Ark. 505"
    }
  ],
  "court": {
    "name_abbreviation": "Ark.",
    "id": 8808,
    "name": "Arkansas Supreme Court"
  },
  "jurisdiction": {
    "id": 34,
    "name_long": "Arkansas",
    "name": "Ark."
  },
  "cites_to": [],
  "analysis": {
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    "simhash": "1:b2972a3b0cb71003",
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  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:22:17.434704+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
    "batch": "2018"
  },
  "casebody": {
    "judges": [
      "McCulloch, C. J., and Smith, J., dissent."
    ],
    "parties": [
      "Floyd Stroud v. State."
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "Humphreys, J.\nWhat we have said in the case of W. D. Stroud v. State, No. 3029, is decisive of the case of Floyd Stroud v. State. These are companion cases. The appellants are brothers, and, while they were separately tried, they were each tried upon the theory that they had conspired together to cause the storehouse of R. A. Harkins & Company to be burned, and that, pursuant to this conspiracy first formed between themselves, they had employed T. B. Wackerly to burn the building, or to procure some one to do so. Much of the testimony in the two cases is identical, and no useful purpose would be served in repeating it here or in restating the theory on which the State asked and secured a conviction.\nThe admission of the testimony in regard to the telephone conversation between Floyd McCuen and Floyd Stroud was condemned as erroneous and prejudicial in the case of W. D. Stroud, because it occurred after the consummation of the conspiracy and in the absence of W. D. Stroud.\nBut this testimony was admissible against Floyd Stroud, because it involved proof of something which he himself did, and proof of any act or declaration of the party on trial having probative value is admissible against him, even after the completion of the conspiracy.\nThe case against Floyd Stroud must, on the authority of what we have said in the W. D. Stroud case, be reversed, however, on account of the admission of the testimony of Roscoe Perkins. This witness testified that he knew both W. D. Stroud and Floyd Stroud, and remembered the occasion of the burning of the Harkins & Company building at Ratcliff. That W. D. Stroud had given him $100 in bills to deliver to the attorney who was representing Wackerly, and that he delivered this money to the attorney in Floyd Stroud\u2019s store. The witness was asked: \u201cWas it given to him (the attorney) in his (Floyd Stroud\u2019s) presence?\u201d and he answered, \u201cYes sir, but I could not say whether Floyd saw it or not.\u201d He was also asked, \u201cWhere was Floyd Stroud?\u201d and he answered, \u201cTalking with the attorney when I gave him the money.\u201d The witness had previously testified that Floyd Stroud did not know anything about the matter unless he had seen the witness give the attorney the money.\nWe do not think it sufficiently appears from this testimony that Floyd Stroud was a party to the payment of this fee, or that he knew what it was. No explanation of it was made at the time by the witness to the attorney, nor did the witness state that he told Floyd Stroud what he intended to do or had done. So far as the testimony shows, this may have been, and was, a transaction without significance to Floyd Stroud, and, in the absence of some showing charging him with knowledge of the transaction, it would be like any other act of an alleged co-conspirator after tbe end of the conspiracy, and would be inadmissible, under the rule announced in the W. D. Stroud case, and, on account of the admission of this incompetent testimony, which was necessarily prejudicial, the judgment in the Floyd Stroud case will also be reversed.\nMcCulloch, C. J., and Smith, J., dissent.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "Humphreys, J."
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "J. E. Chambers, Benson <& Benson, June P. Clayton, Linas A. Williams and Hays, Priddy $ Hays, for appellant.",
      "J. 8. Utley, Attorney General, und Darden Moose, Assistant, for appellee."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "Floyd Stroud v. State.\nOpinion delivered February 16, 1925.\n1. Criminal law \u2014 conversation of defendant and accomplice.\u2014 In a prosecution for being accessory beforei the fact to the crime of arson, testimony as to- a telephone conversation between defendant and a co-oconspirator, though had after consummation of the conspiracy, is admissible where it involved proof of something which defendant himiself did and which had a probative value in the case.\n2. Criminal law \u2014 acts of co-conspirator after commission of offense. \u2014 'Where defendant and another were charged with inducing a third person to commit arson, testimony that defendant\u2019s co-conspirator after its commission gave to witness money for defense of such third person was incompetent against defendant, though witness delivered the money to the attorney in. defendant\u2019s presence where it does not appear that defendant understood or was party to the transaction.\nAppeal from Franklin Circuit Court; James Cochran, Judge;\nreversed.\nJ. E. Chambers, Benson <& Benson, June P. Clayton, Linas A. Williams and Hays, Priddy $ Hays, for appellant.\nJ. 8. Utley, Attorney General, und Darden Moose, Assistant, for appellee."
  },
  "file_name": "0505-01",
  "first_page_order": 517,
  "last_page_order": 519
}