{ "id": 1374061, "name": "State v. Harvey", "name_abbreviation": "State v. Harvey", "decision_date": "1925-12-14", "docket_number": "", "first_page": "1074", "last_page": "1076", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "169 Ark. 1074" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ark.", "id": 8808, "name": "Arkansas Supreme Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 34, "name_long": "Arkansas", "name": "Ark." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "59 Ark. 413", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1327663 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/59/0413-01" ] }, { "cite": "110 Ark. 170", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1337118 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/110/0170-01" ] }, { "cite": "45 Ark. 333", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1892006 ], "weight": 3, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/45/0333-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 270, "char_count": 5411, "ocr_confidence": 0.476, "pagerank": { "raw": 7.317852702137001e-08, "percentile": 0.4359406668110766 }, "sha256": "235581ac25119a6a904b10e9614c032c747f8e0e9146be7d5135dfecfbb10ad9", "simhash": "1:9a45b1264b1125d1", "word_count": 911 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T23:00:38.667503+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "State v. Harvey." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "McCulloch, C. J.\nThe grand jury of Lonoke County, on September 5,1924, returned an indictment against appellee for the statutory offense of malicious mischief (Crawford & Moses\u2019 Digest, \u00a7 2511), alleged to have been committed on May 1, 1923, by wilfully and maliciously shooting and killing a dog, the property of William Beggs, of the value of fifty dollars. The court sustained a demurrer to the indictment on the ground that it was apparently barred by the statute of limitation.\n. In the case of State v. Reed, 45 Ark. 333, this court said: \u201cBut it is no ground for demurrer that a prosecution is apparently barred by limitation. On the trial, the State must prove that the offense was committed within the period of the statute bar, or else that the running of the statute has been suspended, as by a fleeing from justice, or the pendency of another indictment for the same crime.\u201d In the more recent case of James v. State, 110 Ark. 170, we declared the same rule and made the above quotation .from State v. Reed, supra, but in the opinion it was inadvertently said that \u201cthe State must allege and prove the commission\u2019 of the offense within the statutory period of limitation.\u201d In that case the indictment did not show on its face that the prosecution was apparently barred, and the question arose, on the trial of the case, in regard to the burden of proof. The language just referred to wias an inadvertence and must be disregarded, for the rule as announced in State v Reed, supra, is the settled rule in this State.\nThere has been brought into the present record another indictment against the appellee, returned by the grand jury on February 8, 1924, charging the same offense of malicious mischief by wilfully and maliciously killing a dog, the property of William Weggs, of the value of fifty dollars, on May 1, 1923. The record in regard to the disposal of this indictment is also brought into the present transcript, and shows that the former indictment was not dismissed until September 7, 1925, the same day on which the demurrer to the second indictment was sustained by the court. Counsel debate the question whether or not the pendency of the former indictment arrested the statute of limitation so as to prevent a bar of the prosecution under the second indictment. The statutes of this State (Crawford & Moses\u2019 Digest, \u00a7 3037) provide that if there shall be pending against the same defendant \u201ctwo indictments for the same offense, or two indictments for the same matter, # # * \u00a3ke indictment first found shall be deemed to be suspended by such indictment, and shall be quashed.\u201d The statute also \u00abprovides that, when an indictment shall be quashed, set aside or reversed, \u201cthe time during which the same was pending shall not be computed as part of the time of the limitation prescribed for the offense.\u201d Crawford & Moses\u2019Digest, \u00a7 2889. In the trial of this case it will devolve upon the 'State, in order to show a suspension of the running of the statute of limitation, to prove that the former indictment was for the same offense, but the fact that the former indictment was not dismissed until after the second indictment was returned, or until the court \u00bfsustained a demurrer to the second indictment, is not important. The two indictments appear to charge the same offense, and the difference in the names of the alleged owners may be supplied by proof that it was a clerical error, and the fact that the same offenses were intended to be charged. Stafford v. State, 59 Ark. 413.\nIt follows that the court erred in sustaining the demurrer, and the judgment is therefore reversed, and the cause remanded with directions to the court to overrule the demurrer to the indictment, and for further proceedings.", "type": "majority", "author": "McCulloch, C. J." } ], "attorneys": [ "H. W. Applegate, Attorney General, John L. Garter, Assistant, and. W. J. Waggoner, Prosecuting Attorney, for appellant.", "Williams & Holloway and Guy E. Williams, for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "State v. Harvey.\nOpinion delivered December 14, 1925.\nL Indictment and information \u2014 ground of demurrer. \u2014 That an indictment apparently is barred by limitation is not ground for demurrer, as the State may prove that the offense was committed \u25a0 within the period of the statute bar, or else that the running of the statute has been suspended by accused fleeing from justice or by the pendency of another indictment for the same offense.\n2. Criminal law \u2014 limitation of prosecution \u2014 suspension.\u2014 Under Crawford & Moses\u2019 Dig., \u00a7 3037, providing that, if there are two indictments pending against defendant for the same \u25a0 offense, the indictment first - found shall toe deemed suspended and shall be quashed, and \u00a7 2889, providing that when an indictment is quashed the .time during which it was pending shall not be computed as part of the time of limitation prescribed for the offense,- held that the fact that the former indictment was not dismissed until after the second one was returned, or until the court sustained a demurrer to the second indictment, was immaterial.\n3. - Indictment and information \u2014 designation of person. \u2014 Where, in 'a prosecution for malicious mischief, two- indictments appear to charge the same offense, a difference in the names of alleged owners of the property may be- explained by parol proof that the ' difference was due to a clerical error, and that the -same offense was intended to be charged.\nAppeal from Lonoke Circuit Court; George W, Clark, Judge;\nreversed.\nH. W. Applegate, Attorney General, John L. Garter, Assistant, and. W. J. Waggoner, Prosecuting Attorney, for appellant.\nWilliams & Holloway and Guy E. Williams, for appellee." }, "file_name": "1074-01", "first_page_order": 1094, "last_page_order": 1096 }