#### Miller and Gregson v. State.

Opinion delivered September 27, 1926.

1. Intoxicating liquors — possession op still. — Evidence’ held sufficient to sustain a conviction for possessing an unregistered still, contrary tó Acts 1921, p. 372.

2. Intoxicating liquors — possessing still — evidence.—In a prosecution for possessing an unregistered still, .where defendant; arrested at the still, denied-ownership or possession thereof, evidence that defendant’s son was seen on the same morning in the vicinity of the still with sacks of sugar, “shorts”, and fruit jar lids, was competent in considering whether defendant was at the still by accident or for the purpose of operating it.

*7573. Criminal law — competency op evidence.op another crime.— In a prosecution for possessing a still, testimony that a witness.- . bought whiskey from one defendant, being taken to his house by • his codefendarit, held competent.

4. Witnesses — impeachment on cross-examination. — In a prosecution for possessing a still, it was competent, as affecting his , credibility, to cross-examine defendant- as to his having heen caught at another still after his arrest: '

Appeal from Craighead Circuit Court, Jonesboro District; G. E. Keck, Judge;

affirmed.

Hawthorne, Hawthorne S Wheatley, for appellant,

H. W. Applegate, Attorney General, and John L. Carter, Assistant, for appellee.

McCulloch, C. J.

Appellants were separately indicted for the statutory offense of keeping in possesr sion an unregistered still (Acts 1921, p. 372), and on the trial of the two cases together, by consent of parties, both of the appellants were convicted and sentenced to the penitentiary.

The first and principal contention, is that the evidence'is not sufficient to sustain the verdict of conviction.

The sheriff of the county and two citizens who accompanied him on a raid testified that, early one morning, they found a distillery out in the woods, at which- there were ten or twelve barrels of mash ready for use in the , distillation of alcoholic spirits. They testified that they waited*, at the still, in hiding, for several hours, and that, about eight o’clock in the morning, the two appellants, George Miller and BillGrégson, came up and walked in among the barrels of mash near the distillery. The oificers commanded them to hold up their hands, which they did, and they were placed under arrest. - Miller cláimed, according to the testimony of the witnesses, that he had come there to make a run of the- distillery -for a man-named Gaither, who, with others, was operating the still, and that it was Gaither’s day to make a run. Gregsonwas standing a few feet away, and made no response to this statement of Miller, but Gregson, according to the testimony of the witnesses, made the statement that he *758was not worried, as it did not mean “but a year anyway, and maybe six months.”

The sheriff' testified that, shortly afterwards that morning, he arrested Miller’s son and another yonng man in:a car about half a mile from the distillery, and that the-boys had two sacks of sugar and a sack of “shorts,” or bran meal, some fruit-jar lids and rubbers.

Miller denied that he made the statement to the officers to the effect that he was there for the purpose of operating- the still. He. testified that he had arranged with a man by the name of Breeze, who owned land there,' to cut cordwood, and that, when arrested by the officers, he was merely walking down into the woods to find the boundary line of the land on which he was to-cut the wood. He testified that he did not know that the distillery was there until the officers called out to him to hold up his hands. Gregson testified to the same effect, saying that he accompanied Miller into the woods to see about the timber, as he expected to haul it when cut by Miller.

• We are of the opinion that the evidence was legally sufficient to sustain the verdict.- The presence of the accused at the distillery, which was ready for operation, together with the statements made to the officers, constituted sufficient evidence that appellants had appeared there for the purpose of taking possession of the still and operating -it.' '

Assignments of error are also made with respect to the court’s ruling in admitting testimony. It is insisted that the court erred in permitting the sheriff to testify concerning Miller’s son having the sacks of sugar and “shorts” and the fruit-jar lids in the vicinity of the distillery. The articles in possession of Miller ’s.son were such as are customarily used in the manufacture and distribution of alcoholic liquors, and the fact that those things were in the possession of Miller’s son-was competent in considering whether or not Miller was at the distillery by accident or for the purpose of operating the distillery. Appellant contended that the boy had been *759sent to purchase those articles for use in preserving and canning fruit, hut it was a question for the jury to determine whether the hoy, as a member of Miller’s family and under his control, had procured, the things at Miller’s request for use at the distillery.

Again, it is insisted that the court erred in permitting, witnesses Moore and Lyttel to' testify that they bought whiskey from Miller and that they had beéri carried to. Miller’s house by Gfregson to procure the liquor. This was competent for the purpose of showing that both of the appellants were engaged in the liquor traffic and as corroborative of the proof that they were interested in the operation of the distillery at which they were found by the officers.

Error is assigned in the ruling of the court permitting the prosecuting attorney to interrogate Milíer, on cross-examination, as to his being caught at ánother distillery in the neighbbrhood since he was arrested. This was competent for the purpose óf Misc.editing Millet as a'witness. The fact that he was asked'about ah occurrence’since he was arrestedMoes not lessen its competency fot the purpose of testing the credibility of 'the witness.

There are other assignments, which are not of sufficient importance to discuss.

We find no erior in the recoiM, and'the judgment is therefore affirmed.