{ "id": 1407925, "name": "Clark v. State", "name_abbreviation": "Clark v. State", "decision_date": "1926-11-01", "docket_number": "", "first_page": "23", "last_page": "27", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "172 Ark. 23" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ark.", "id": 8808, "name": "Arkansas Supreme Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 34, "name_long": "Arkansas", "name": "Ark." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "258 S. W. 401", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.W.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "162 Ark. 584", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1385546 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/162/0584-01" ] }, { "cite": "260 S. W. 41", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.W.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "163 Ark. 396", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1383869 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/163/0396-01" ] }, { "cite": "282 S. W. 684", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.W.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "170 Ark. 1061", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1371758 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/170/1061-01" ] }, { "cite": "239 S. W. 27", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.W.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "152 Ark. 553", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1364104 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/152/0553-01" ] }, { "cite": "207 S. W. 55", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.W.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "136 Ark. 473", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1570036 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/136/0473-01" ] }, { "cite": "197 S. W. 684", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.W.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "130 Ark. 322", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 8719942 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/130/0322-01" ] }, { "cite": "281 S. W. 17", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.W.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "170 Ark. 765", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1371650 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/170/0765-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 443, "char_count": 9139, "ocr_confidence": 0.528, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.03580807328026e-08, "percentile": 0.05288493653490995 }, "sha256": "b3474ac930894ce67b4fb44a673aedf907ff36681e5d25ec4cd4e9032c102708", "simhash": "1:96d5438d1e1c869b", "word_count": 1541 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T19:50:04.452939+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "Clark v. State." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "Wood, ,J.\nGeorge W. Clark was indicted by the grand jury of Pulaski County for the crime of assault with intent to kill one Vernith Tucker. He was eonvict\u00e9d of the crime of aggravated assault, and his punishment fixed by the jury at a fine of $250 and imprisonment in the county jail for six months. Judgment was pronounced in accordance with the verdict, from which this appeal is duly prosecuted.\nI. Witness J. L. McKahn was introduced on behalf of the State, and he gave testimony which the appellant deemed material and prejudicial to the appellant. The appellant sought to impeach the testimony by E. H. Hendricks. Appellant\u2019s counsel asked Hendricks the following question: \u201cDo you know his general reputation for morality?\u201d Objection was made by the State, and the court remarked, \u201cThis is not a morality case.\u201d Appellant saved his exceptions to the remarks of the coui:t. Counsel then asked, \u201cDo you know his general reputation for truth and morality?\u201d and witness answered, \u201cYes,\u201d and stated, \u201cAs.far as the truth is concerned, I never knew anything against him. We have arrested him for dealing in whiskey. Q. His reputation for morality is bad? A. In that line \u2014 yes.\u201d The State moved to exclude the testimony of the witness as to the morality of McKahn. The court sustained the motion, to which ruling the appellant excepted.\nOn cross-examination the witness stated that he had no reason to doubt McKahn where his oath was concerned ; that all he knew was that he had arrested McKahn on a whiskey charge.\nIn the recent case of Blevins v. State, 170 Ark. 765, 281 S. W. 17, we ruled that, under our statute, \u00a7 4187, C. & M. Digest, a witness may be impeached by evidence that his general reputation for truth or morality renders him unworthy of belief. Under this statute, testimony is admissible as to general reputation either for truth or morality. But an examination of the testimony shows that there was no prejudicial error to the appellant in the court\u2019s ruling, for the reason that the witness,'in answer to questions, stated that he knew the general reputation of the witness McKahn for truth and morality, and that he knew nothing against his reputation for truth, and that he had no reason to doubt him where his oath was concerned. The witness further stated that McKahn\u2019s reputation for morality was bad, but all he knew about that was that he had arrested McKahn on a whiskey charge. Thus, the examination as to morality w\u00e1s narrowed to the specific offense of selling whiskey. A witness cannot he impeached by direct evidence showing that he had been guilty of specific acts of immorality. Dean v. State, 130 Ark. 322, 197 S. W. 684. Evidence introduced primarily for the purpose of impeachment must be confined to the general reputation of the witness for truth or morality. But the credibility of a witness, on cross-examination of such witness, may be tested by showing specific instances of immorality. Lockhart v. State, 136 Ark. 473, 207 S. W. 55. Moreover, the ruling of the court was not prejudicial, because other witnesses had testified that McKahn\u2019s general reputation for morality was bad, and the testimony therefore of witness Hendricks would have been but cumulative.\n2. The appellant complains of the ruling of the court in permitting the State to introduce the shirt, overcoat and other articles of wearing apparel worn b!y Vernith Tucker, the prosecuting witness, at the time of the alleged assault upon him by the appellant. In the case of Pate v. State, 152 Ark. 553-557, 239 S. W. 27, we ruled that the garments worn by the deceased at the time she was shot were admissible to show the location of the wounds. See.also Stepp v. State, 170 Ark. 1061, 282 S. W. 684; Hornsby v. State, 163 Ark. 396, 260 S. W. 41, and cases there cited.\nThe exhibition of the clothing* worn by the prosecuting witness on the night he is alleged to have been assaulted, by placing the same upon his body as it was at the time of the alleged assault, might have assisted the jury in more thoroughly understanding the nature and character of the assault, notwithstanding the assault was admitted by the appellant, and the nature of the wounds was explained by the physician who'attended the prosecuting* witness on the night he was assaulted.\n3. The appellant assigns as error in his motion for a new trial the ruling of the court in refusing to allow the appellant to ask witness for the State, Mrs. Maude Clark, if McKahn had not made a statement that he would get even with the defendant, and if McKahn had not made threats against the defendant. The appellant does not show that the witness, if permitted to do so by the court, would have answered the above questions in the affirmative. The appellant therefore does not show any prejudicial error in this ruling of the court. See Dixon v. State, 162 Ark. 584-587, 258 S. W. 401.\n4. The appellant prayed .the court to instruct the jury as follows: \u201cThe court instructs you that, if you find from the evidence that the prosecuting witness, Tucker, struck the defendant, and that the prosecuting witness at the time was attempting to do him injury, or, if it reasonably appeared to the defendant, viewed from his standpoint alone, by words or acts, that Tucker was making an unlawful attack upon him, then and in that event the defendant had a right to use whatever means was necessary to protect himself from serious bodily injury, and although it subsequently appeared that the defendant used more force than was actually necessary to protect himself from serious bodily injury.\u201d\nThe court, on its own motion, gave the following instruction: \u201cIf you believe from the evidence that the defendant, without any fault or negligence on his part, was 'himself assaulted by the prosecuting witness, Tucker, with such violence so as to make it appear to the defendant at the time, while he was acting without fault or carelessness on his part in coming to such a conclusion, that Tucker manifestly intended and endeavored to kill him or to do him some great bodily harm, and that the danger was imminent and impending, then, and in that case, you are instructed that the defendant was not bound to retreat, but had the right to stand his ground under such circumstances and to repel force, and, if need be, to kill his adversary to save his own life or prevent his receiving great bodily injury.\u201d\nThe instruction given by the court fully covered the subject-matter of appellant\u2019s prayer for instruction. The court therefore did not err in refusing to grant appellant\u2019s prayer. Furthermore, the appellant\u2019s prayer was not an accurate statement of the law on his plea of self-defense, while the instruction given - correctly declared the law on that subject.\nThere is no error, and the judgment is therefore affirmed.", "type": "majority", "author": "Wood, ,J." } ], "attorneys": [ "John B. 'Gulley and Arthur J. Jones, for appellant.", "H. W. Applegate, Attorney General, and Darden Moose, Assistant, for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "Clark v. State.\nOpinion delivered November 1, 1926.\n1. Witnesses \u2014 impeachment\u2014general refutation. \u2014 Under Crawford & Moses\u2019 Dig., \u00a7 4187, testimony as to the general reputation of a witness, either for truth or morality, is admissible to impeach him.\n2. Witnesses \u2014 impeachment-\u2014proof of specific offense. \u2014 Where a witness was asked if he knew the general reputation of another witness for truth and morality, his answer that, as far as the truth was concerned, witness knew nothing against him, but that he had been arrested for dealing in whiskey, his answer was properly excluded, as amounting only to proof of a specific offense of immorality.\n3. Witnesses \u2014 test of credibility on cross-examination. \u2014 The credibility of a witness may be tested on his cross-examination by showing specific instances of immorality.\n4. Criminal law \u2014 exclusion of testimony- \u2014 harmless error.\u2014 The exclusion of testimony as to a witness\u2019 reputation for morality held not prejudicial error where it was merely cumulative of other testimony that witness\u2019 general reputation for morality was bad,\n5., Criminal law \u2014 -demonstrative evidence. \u2014 In a prosecution for assault with intent to kill, permitting the State to introduce wearing apparel of the prosecuting witness at the time of assault, by placing same on the body of such witness to assist the jury in understanding the nature and character of the assault, held not error, though the assault was admitted, and the nature of the wounds explained by a physician.\n6. Criminal law \u2014 exclusion of testimony \u2014 prejudice.\u2014An assignment of error in a prosecution for assault with intent to kill for refusing permission to question a witness as to 'threats alleged to -have been made by the prosecuting witness against defendant without showing what the answer would have been, shows no prejudicial error.\n\u25a0 7. Criminal law- \u2014 repetition of instructions. \u2014 Where, in a prose- . cution for assault with intent to kill, the court gave a correct instruction on self-defense, it was not error to refuse a requested instruction on the same subject, especially where it was not an accurate statement of the law.\nAppeal from Pulaski Circuit Court,'First Division; John W. Wade, Judge;\naffirmed.\nJohn B. 'Gulley and Arthur J. Jones, for appellant.\nH. W. Applegate, Attorney General, and Darden Moose, Assistant, for appellee." }, "file_name": "0023-01", "first_page_order": 41, "last_page_order": 45 }