{
  "id": 1407832,
  "name": "Robinson v. St. Louis-San Francisco Railway Company",
  "name_abbreviation": "Robinson v. St. Louis-San Francisco Railway Co.",
  "decision_date": "1926-12-20",
  "docket_number": "",
  "first_page": "494",
  "last_page": "496",
  "citations": [
    {
      "type": "official",
      "cite": "172 Ark. 494"
    }
  ],
  "court": {
    "name_abbreviation": "Ark.",
    "id": 8808,
    "name": "Arkansas Supreme Court"
  },
  "jurisdiction": {
    "id": 34,
    "name_long": "Arkansas",
    "name": "Ark."
  },
  "cites_to": [
    {
      "cite": "57 L. R. A. 724",
      "category": "reporters:federal",
      "reporter": "L.R.A.",
      "opinion_index": 0
    },
    {
      "cite": "67 S. W. 752",
      "category": "reporters:state_regional",
      "reporter": "S.W.",
      "opinion_index": 0
    },
    {
      "cite": "70 Ark. 331",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Ark.",
      "case_ids": [
        1509505
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/ark/70/0331-01"
      ]
    },
    {
      "cite": "254 S. W. 1057",
      "category": "reporters:state_regional",
      "reporter": "S.W.",
      "opinion_index": 0
    },
    {
      "cite": "160 Ark. 560",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Ark.",
      "case_ids": [
        8724158
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/ark/160/0560-01"
      ]
    },
    {
      "cite": "147 S. W. 93",
      "category": "reporters:state_regional",
      "reporter": "S.W.",
      "opinion_index": 0
    },
    {
      "cite": "103 Ark. 401",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Ark.",
      "case_ids": [
        1351964
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/ark/103/0401-01"
      ]
    }
  ],
  "analysis": {
    "cardinality": 325,
    "char_count": 4811,
    "ocr_confidence": 0.494,
    "pagerank": {
      "raw": 7.40576461183852e-08,
      "percentile": 0.442956326797431
    },
    "sha256": "424d4e64e65f4036bd9cd026975020487ba0a7f648047e9e79e22ee364eb5ed0",
    "simhash": "1:ae61041ce42e1576",
    "word_count": 839
  },
  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T19:50:04.452939+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
    "batch": "2018"
  },
  "casebody": {
    "judges": [],
    "parties": [
      "Robinson v. St. Louis-San Francisco Railway Company."
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "Humphreys, J.\nThis is an appeal from an instructed verdict against appellant, and a consequent judgment dismissing her complaint.\nThe suit was instituted by her father, as next friend, in the circuit court of Little River County, against appellee, to recover damages for burns received .by her while walking over a pile of slack coal and cinders on its right-of-way near a pathway used by the public in crossing its railroad tracks. The gist of the complaint is that appellee\u2019s employees negligently set fire to the interior of the pile of slack coal, which continued to burn and create a cavity therein, leaving a crust on the outside so thin that the appellant, an eight-year-old child, stepped through it into the fire, and burned her right foot and leg, resulting in temporary injuries and considerable pain and suffering.\nIn reviewing the testimony in this case to ascertain whether the trial court erred in peremptorily instructing a verdict in favor of appellee and dismissing appellant\u2019s complaint, the governing rule-is to view it in the most favorable light to appellant, and, when viewed in that light, if appellant was entitled to recover, upon any theory under the law, the judgment should be reversed, and the cause remanded for a new trial. Williams v. St. Louis & S. F. Rd. Co., 103 Ark. 401, 147 S. W. 93; Brown v. Holliday, 160 Ark. 560, 254 S. W. 1057.\nThe undisputed testimony shows that there was a pile of slack coal on the right-of-way near a pathway used by the public in crossing the railroad track in going from one part of Ashdown to another; that the employees of appellee wrecked some old buildings, and piled the unusable lumber therefrom on the coal pile and set fire to it; that it burned for several days, and, during that time, entered the interior of said bed or deposit of coal and continued to burn within, creating a cavity, and leaving a crust on the outside thereof so thin that it was unsafe to walk upon; that appellant, who was eight years old, left the pathway, and, in walking over the pile of slack coal fell through the crust or hull into the burning cavity and burned her foot and leg; that, on account of the burn, she was confined to her bed for about two weeks, and suffered considerable pain.\nThere is evidence in the record tending to show that, although the pathway across the railroad right-of-way was not intended for the use of the public, the public had used it for many years with the knowledge of appellee, and without any objection on its part other than the posting of two signs, one about 90 feet east and one about 90 feet west of a bridge over a pond in the line of the pathway. The signs read, \u201cPrivate Property, Keep off.\u201d There is also testimony in the record tending to show that children had been playing in the vicinity of the bridge, pathway and slack-coal pile for a long time.\n\u00a5e think the testimony showing that the public had been passing at this place and that children had been playing in this vicinity for years was sufficient to warrant the submission of the issue to the jury of whether appellant was a licensee at the time she received the injury, and, if a licensee, whether the coal pile was a dangerous object, so attractive to children that one of ordinary prudence might expect that a child of the intelligence of appellant might be attracted thereto and injured. In other words, that there is sufficient substantial evidence in the record to support the verdict under the attractive nuisance doctrine, and that the evidence in the case'brings it within the rule announced in Brinkley Car Co. v. Cooper, 70 Ark. 331, 67 S. W. 752, 57 L. R. A. 724. This is the only theory upon which a verdict mig\u2019ht be sustained, so the judgment is reversed, and the cause is remanded for a new trial upon this theory and no other.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "Humphreys, J."
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Shaver, Shaver & Williams, for appellant. '",
      "A. P. Steele and A. D. DuLaney and King, Mahaffey (& Wheeler, for appellee."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "Robinson v. St. Louis-San Francisco Railway Company.\nOpinion delivered December 20, 1926.\n1. Appeal and error \u2014 review of directed verdict. \u2014 In reviewing an order directing a verdict for defendant, the evidence is to be viewed most favorably for plaintiff.\n2. Trial \u2014 direction of verdict. \u2014 Where, in viewing the evidence most favorably for the plaintiff, he is entitled on any theory to recover, it is error to direct a verdict for defendant.\n3. Negligence \u2014 attractive nuisance doctrine.- \u2014 Evidence in an action by an eight-year-old child for injuries from falling in a pile of burning coal, that the -coal was crusted over, and was situated near a path which the public had used for years, and where children had been accustomed to play, held to make a case for the jury under the attractive nuisance doctrine.\nAppeal from Little River Circuit Court; B. E. Isbell, Judge;\nreversed.\nShaver, Shaver & Williams, for appellant. '\nA. P. Steele and A. D. DuLaney and King, Mahaffey (& Wheeler, for appellee."
  },
  "file_name": "0494-01",
  "first_page_order": 512,
  "last_page_order": 514
}