{ "id": 1408002, "name": "Wrenn v. Manufacturers' Furniture Company", "name_abbreviation": "Wrenn v. Manufacturers' Furniture Co.", "decision_date": "1927-01-17", "docket_number": "", "first_page": "599", "last_page": "601", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "172 Ark. 599" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ark.", "id": 8808, "name": "Arkansas Supreme Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 34, "name_long": "Arkansas", "name": "Ark." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "281 S. W. 368", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.W.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "170 Ark. 794", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1371622 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/170/0794-01" ] }, { "cite": "26 S. W. 820", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.W.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "59 Ark. 162", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1327731 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/59/0162-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 245, "char_count": 4005, "ocr_confidence": 0.462, "pagerank": { "raw": 2.728362419434884e-07, "percentile": 0.8309011452019017 }, "sha256": "94b2daf14c954937145e3800a8ab93a16030aca7c99541221518b626f35e8fc7", "simhash": "1:114738d0805a84db", "word_count": 681 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T19:50:04.452939+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "Wrenn v. Manufacturers\u2019 Furniture Company." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "Mehaeey, J.\nThe facts, as they appear from the pleadings, are substantially as follows: The appellant, the plaintiff below, filed suit in the Pulaski Circuit Court against the defendant; the defendant filed answer, and depositions were taken by both parties. The attorney for defendant and a member of the firm of the attorneys for the plaintiff agreed that the case should be continued from time to time, and that the case would be set down subject to the convenience and approval of the attorney for the defendant. The attorney for defendant was absent from Little Bock from December 15 until after the 8th of January, except one day. Attorney for defendant received no notice of the setting of the case. The attorney for the plaintiff who had been handling the case, and the one with whom the agreement was made, was absent from the city the latter part of the year, and another member of the firm took charge of the case. It does not appear that this attorney had any knowledge of the agreement. The case had been set by the court for the 8th of January. Judgment by default was taken on said day. Attorney knew nothing of the judgment having been taken until some time in May, after the term of court at which the judgment was taken had adjourned. On June 1, defendant filed its petition to vacate and set aside the .judgment, and on June 4 plaintiff filed his response. Defendant\u2019s petition states the facts, and that it had a good defense.\nThere does not seem to be any controversy about the facts, but, as stated in appellant\u2019s brief, the appeal is here on the simple proposition that the trial court had no right to set aside the judgment after the term. It does not appear that attorney for defendant was guilty of any negligence, and the fact that the judgment by default was taken by a member of the firm other than the one with whom the agreement was had is immaterial.\nThis court has held that, where the sickness of the wife of an attorney is the cause of his failure to appear at court and give his attention to the case, this is not such neglect as should operate to the prejudice of his client. It was stated that the sickness of the attorney\u2019s wife was an unavoidable casualty excusing his nonattendance at the court. Learning v. McMillan. 59 Ark. 162, 26 S. W. 820.\nIn a recent case, where a defendant relied on conversations and statements of attorney for plaintiff, this court said: \u201cThere was such a misunderstanding as constituted unavoidable casualty or misfortune which prevented, the defendant from appearing and defending. There is no room to suspect \u2014 and the lower court did not find \u2014 that plaintiff\u2019s attorney had intentionally misled the defendant, but the defendant and her husband, who was her representative in the matter, did testify that they were misled, and, because of that fact, had not arranged with the attorney they intended to employ to file an answer presenting a defense which, if true, would defeat a recovery, and had not furnished the attorney the information needed to prepare the answer.\u201d McElroy v. Underwood, 170 Ark. 794, 281 S. W. 368.\nWe think that, while the attorney who took the default judgment knew nothing of the agreement, yet that the attorney for the defendant was misled, and the judgment of the circuit court is affirmed.", "type": "majority", "author": "Mehaeey, J." } ], "attorneys": [ "Rogers, Barber & Henry, for appellant.", "Abner McGehee, for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "Wrenn v. Manufacturers\u2019 Furniture Company.\nOpinion delivered January 17, 1927.\nJudgment \u2014 vacating -default judgment after term. \u2014 Where one of plaintiff\u2019s attorneys agreed with defendant\u2019s attorney that the case should he continued and set down for a date to be approved by defendant\u2019s attorney, but subsequently another of plaintiff\u2019s attorneys, having no knowledge of this agreement, took judgment by default in the absence of defendant\u2019s attorney, who learned this fact after the term had expired, the judgment was properly-vacated at the next term of court.\nAppeal from Pulaski Circuit Court, Third Division; Marvin Harris, Judge;\naffirmed.\nRogers, Barber & Henry, for appellant.\nAbner McGehee, for appellee." }, "file_name": "0599-01", "first_page_order": 617, "last_page_order": 619 }