#### Barnes v. Jeffus.

Opinion delivered March 14, 1927.

*102 G. W. Smith and B. II. Little, for appellant.

B. K. Mason, for appellee.

Kirby, J.,

(after stating the facts). The undisputed testimony shows that the small dwellings were of temporary construction, the kind necessarily and usually built on such mill-sites for the use of the employees in the operation of -the mills, and that the appellants intended, at the time of their construction, to remove them with the mill when the timber had been manufactured.

These small dwelling-houses were put upon blocks that were sitting on boards on the ground, and could be removed- without reducing them to raw material, and without injury to the land. Since they were also such houses as could be used and of the kind in general use for tenants on farms in that particular community, it could have been urged with more reason that they were fixtures and not removable had the contracts for sale of the timber not restricted the use of the lands for mill-site and lumber yard to those outside of inclosed and cultivated fields.

These houses were necessary for use of the employees in the construction and operation of the mill for the manufacture of the timber, and constructed with the consent of the owner of the land, and the intention on the part of the mill owner to remove them, with the machinery, when the timber had been manufactured, and fall within the classification of trade fixtures,'which the lessee or tenant had the right to remove. Field v. Morris, 95 Ark. 268, 129 S. W. 543, 11 R. C. L. 1082, §§ 25-26; 26 G: J. 701, § 87; 2 Underhill, Landlord & Tenant, 1247, § 736.

In said ^ 26, R. C. L., it is -stated: ‘‘G-enerallv it. is considered that, where the landowner consents to the placing of a building on his land by another, without an express agreement as to whether it shall become a part of *103tlie realty or remain personalty, an agreement will be implied that it is to continue personal property.”

There was no intention on the part of the mill owner in constructing' the houses, and nothing in the method of construction and materials used indicated an intention, to make a permanent accession to the land or irremovable fixtures, and they did not become such, but remained personal property.

The court erred in holding otherwise, and its judgment permanently enjoining and prohibiting appellant from removal of the said buildings is reversed, and the cause dismissed.