#### Security Mortgage Company v. Herron.

Opinion delivered July 4, 1927.

*700 Gustavus G. Pope, for appellant.

McMillan & McMillan, for appellee.

Kirby, J.,

(after stating the facts). The act under which the drainage district was organized, special act No. 93 of 1917, provides how the delinquent assessment shall be collected by suit brought for the purpose, and that “proceedings and decrees shall be in the nature of proceedings in rem,” provides for the giving of notice of the pendency of the suit and the form of it, directs how the proceedings shall be conducted, about the decree and the sale and the making of the deed by the commissioner, and provides that “all deeds made by the commissioner, after the report of sale made bv him, shall have been duly approved as required for judicial sales, shall have the effect of vesting the title of owners of said lands or said property in the purchaser, in fee simple.”

*701Section 7 provides tire manner of redemption of the lands from such sale hy the owner or any person interested therein within one year after the date of said sale.

Section 8 provides that the lien for the assessments upon the lands shall he paramount to the rights- of persons owning or having an interest therein; while section 21 gives such lien priority oyer the lien of the State, county, road and school district taxes,

There is.no complaint of any defect in the organization of the district or irregularity in the levy of taxes or the sale of the lands for the payment thereof. Plaintiff only contends that the lands were sold for taxes upon constructive service only, in a proceeding in which it was not a party, and insists that it is entitled to redeem from such sale within the time allowed hy act 43 of 1915, five years from the date of the sale, and also that the Saunders Mercantile Company should have redeemed the lands from the tax sale, and cannot take advantage of the purchase thereof hy the McMillans for its benefit, not having done so.

The lands having been sold in accordance with the provisions of the special act creating the district, upon the .kind of notice therein required given, there appears to he no reason why the sale, should not be held valid. In the publication of the notice Herron, who was the owner and in possession thereof, was put into the notice, as the “supposed owner,” in accordance with the provisions of. the act, and certainly it was not necessary to include the name of the first mortgagee, under the circumstances, as the “supposed owner” of the lands.

The sale of the lands appears to have been made in conformance with the provisions of the law as to the notice required given, and the Legislature had the power to make such a law, as has been frequently held. Vietz v. Road Imp. Dist., 139 Ark. 572, 214 S. W. 50.

The holding in Simpson v. Reinman, 146 Ark. 417, 227 S. W. 15, upon which the 'appellant appears to rely,-in no wise affects the authority of the above case. In the Rein-man case a person was named as the “supposed owner” *702who had-no claim or interest in the land, while the'true owner was in the actual possession thereof, a condition altogether different from that obtaining here, where the true owner wias in possession and named, as the “supposed owner.”

Neither do we think there is any merit in appellant’s contention that special act number 92 of 1917, under which the drainage district was created, the terms of which were complete, providing for its organization, operation and maintenance, did not affect or change the time provided in the general act No. 43 of 1915 for the redemption of lands sold for such delinquent taxes, since there is no express repealing clause. It is true that, under that act, the period for redemption from sales of delinquent lands in improvement districts is five years, and any person is allowed to redeem who would have been permitted to redeem if the sale had been made by the collector for State and county taxes. The provisions of this special act complete in itself, covering the whole subject-matter, later passed 'by the Legislature and in direct conflict with the terms of the general act mentioned relative to the time allowed for redemption and the. persons permitted to redeem, and being the last expression of the legislative will, having a particular purpose, is exclusive and necessarily repeals by implication, those prior statutes, general or special, in conflict with its provisions. Boaz v. Coates, 114 Ark. 23, 169 S. W. 312; DeQueen v. Fenton, 100 Ark. 507, 140 S. W. 716; Hampton v. Hickey, 88 Ark. 327, 114 S. W. 707.

The holder of the second mortgage was under no obligation to the holder of the first mortgage to redeem the lands in possession of the mortgagor from their sale for delinquent taxes, notwithstanding the owner was bound to the payment of such taxes by the terms of the first mórtgage. The appellant, under his mortgage, could have paid the taxes before the lands were sold as delinquent, and charged them against the mortgagor, and it could have redeemed the lands in the manner provided *703by the act from the tax sale within the time allowed therefor after such sale.

Appellant makes no showing of having’ been prevented from either paying the taxes or redeeming the lands by any conduct of the holder of the second mortgage calculated to lull him into- security in the belief that such taxes would be paid or redemption would be made for his benefit.

We find no error in the record, and the decree is affirmed.