#### Lesser-Goldman Cotton Company v. Cache River Drainage District.

Opinion delivered May 23, 1927.

*165 Basil Baker and H. L. Ponder, for appellant.

Horace Sloan, for appellee.

Kirby, J.,

(after stating the facts). Appellants only insist here that no authority is granted by % 3630 of C. & M. Digest to extend the ditches or improvement, the same having been completed, and that the court could not authorize it done under the provisions of § 3625 of the statutes, which only permit alteration of ’the plans for the ditches or drains before the completion of the project; and that no authority is given by law for an issuance of bonds or levying taxes upon assessment of benefits already made, the law not authorizing the further issuance of bonds to make new or additional improvements.

Section 3630 of C. & M. Digest provides as follows:

> “The district shall not cease to exist upon the completion of its drainage system, but shall continue to exist for the purpose of preserving the same, of keeping the ditches clear from obstructions, and of extending, widening or deepening the ditches from time to time as it may be found advantageous to the district; to this end the commissioners may, from time to time, apply to the county court for the levying of additional taxes. Upon the filing of such petitions notices shall be published by the clerk for two weeks in a newspaper published in each of the counties in which the "district embraces lands, and any property owner seeking to resist such additional levy may appear at the next regular term of the county court and urge his objections thereto, and either such property owners or the commissioners may appeal from the finding of the county court. ’ ’

This section declares that the district shall not cease to exist upon completion of its drainage system, “but shall continue to exist for the purpose of preserving the same, of keeping the ditches clear from obstructions and of extending, widening or deepening the ditches from time to time as it may be found advantageous to the district.” * * *

*166This does not preserve the district for any purpose other than expressly declared, and does not authorize the district to make a new or different improvement therein not in the nature of extending, widening or deepening the ditches already constructed, after the completion of the first one, as held in Indian Bayou Drainage District v. Walt, 154 Ark. 335, 243 S. W. 575.

In Bayou Meto Drainage District v. Ingram, 165 Ark. 318, 264 S. W. 947, the court held that the plans of the improvement could he altered before the project had been completed, as originally planned, allowing the extension of the boundaries of the district to include 'additional lands, which would necessarily be benefited by the extension of the main ditch, saying, relative to the completion thereof:

> “The statute clearly takes cognizance that a drainage scheme is ineffectual and incomplete unless the water is completely gathered up and an outlet provided for carrying it entirely away. In other words, the statute contemplates that a drainage ditch does not drain unless the water is taken care of and entirely carried away. So there is a clearly expressed purpose on the part of the lawmakers to authorize everything that is necessary to get the water off the land and into an outlet which will carrry it somewhere into the open channel of a stream. ” * * #

Appellants contend that-the case of Clay v. England, 172 Ark. 373, 288 S. W. 895, is in point, and holds conclusively that § 3630, C. & M. Digest, does not authorize the extension of the ditches herein. It was only held there, however, that the new canal, proposed to be constructed to furnish an adequate outlet, being no part of the original plans of the district, as approved or revised, could not be authorized constructed under the statute, the plans having been fully completed.

Authority is expressly given by said section of the statutes for the purpose of preserving the drainage system, keeping the ditches clear from obstructions and “of extending, widening or deepening the ditches from time *167to time as it may be found advantageous to the district.” Giving these words of the statute tbeir plain^and obvious meaning, it is manifest that the Legislature intended that the district should have the authority for extending, widening or deepening the ditches £ ‘ as it may be found advantageous to the district” to do. Extending can mean nothing else, in the connection used, but lengthening, since-authority is also given for widening and deepening the ditches already made.

It is not contemplated here that a new or different canal or ditch shall be constructed, but only that the main ditches shall be extended or lengthened to reach or terminate in an adequate outlet which was in contemplation at the time of the adoption of the original plans as suggested in the engineer’s report. In fact, the project has never been more than substantially completed, since the one ditch lacks about 50 feet and the other about 100 feet of being carried into the small channel of the river. It was substantially completed, however, since the construction was stopped at this point and the water carried by wearing its way into the channel of the river.

When the construction was stopped, the necessity for an adequate outlet was more apparent, and it was contemplated that another district might be formed, joining the one in operation, for extending the improvement on to an adequate outlet in the open lake. This was hot accomplished, and, even though the original plans may be regarded completed and the improvement constructed, preventing the change or alteration of the plans, nevertheless, under the provisions of the statute authorizing the “extending, widening or deepening the ditches,” power is given and authority conferred to lengthen or extend the ditches into an adequate outlet, as held by the lower court.

There is no conflict between this holding and any heretofore made in the construction of these statutes.

The court below found that the lands through which the extension would be constructed would not be benefited, and they could not, of course, be required to be *168included in the district. Tlie statute expressly authorizes the district, where necessity requires it, to obtain a proper outlet 'for the drainage system, to construct ditches on lands beyond the limits of the district and outside the jurisdiction of the county court. Section 3629, C. & M. Digest.

The lands of the district being in more than one county, the proceeding must necessarily be before the circuit court, as the statute provides, which procedure was followed in this cause.

The judgment and orders of the lower court authorizing the procuring of the right-of-way for the extension of the improvement or outlet and the assessment of benefits and issuance of bonds for the completion thereof are correct and in all things affirmed.