#### State v. Haynes, Shick and Austeel.

Opinion delivered December 5, 1927.

*647 H. W. Applegate, Attorney General, and Hal L. Nor-wood, Assistant, for appellant.

A. T. Davies, for appellee.

Hart, C. J.,

(after stating the facts). The three cases have been consolidated for the purposes of appeal, and involve the construction of act 99, approved March 4,1927. Acts of 1927, p. 257. Under § 1 of the act there is a proviso that the term “motor vehicles” or “motor-propelled vehicles” as used in the act shall only include a motor vehicle operating a service between cities or towns. The section also provides that the term “improved public highway,” wherever used in the act, means every improved public highway in the State which is or may hereafter be declared to be a part of the State highway system, or a county highway system, or the streets of any city or town. The act contains fourteen sections, and provides that every corporation or person operating motor vehicles within the terms of the act shall *648procure a license therefor from the Arkansas Railroad Commission, and comply with the reasonable rules and regulations prescribed by said commission. Section 8 makes it a misdemeanor to operate a motor vehicle as provided in the act without first securing a permit from said commission. Section 10 provides that no city or town shall impose any tax or license, upon a motor-vehicle carrier licensed under the provisions of the act. Other provisions of the act show that it was the intention'of the framers of it to apply it to motor vehicles being operated over fixed routes and as a common carrier of passengers or of freight.

It will be noted-that subdivision D of § 1 contains the'following: “Provided, the terms ‘motor vehicles’ or ‘motor-propelled vehicles’ as used in this act shall only include a motor vehicle operating a service between cities or towns.”

Other provisions of the act show that the motor vehicles coming within its terms are common carriers which operate over a fixed route.

We are of the opinion that the term “between cities or towns” is used to designate the termini of the line or -route, and it would not make any -difference whether the station at which passengers or freight are loaded and unloaded were within' the corporate limits or just outside the corporate limits of the cities or towns which are the termini of the route.

In Murray v. Menefee, 20 Ark. 561, the court had under consideration a statute relative to locating ferries in or near cities or towns where the public convenience may require it. The court said that in this country there seems to be no precise legal definition of the term town, and that it was used in the statute in its popular sense. In that ease the place claimed to be a town had a business house, dwelling houses for two families, and the population of the two families embraced six persons. The court said to call the place a town in any sense would be an obvious misapplication of the term. Again, in Clements v. Crawford County Bank, 64 Ark. 7, 40 S. W. 132, 62 Am. *649 St. Rep. 149, the court had under consideration what constituted a town or village within the meaning of our Constitution relating to homesteads, and again approved the definition of the word as used in its popular sense in the first case cited. Hence it may be said that the word “town,” as used in the statute, is to-be considered in its popular sense as an aggregation of houses so near one another that the inhabitants may fairly be said to dwell together. 38 Cyc. 596.

The word “city” in the United States denotes a large town, and is a municipal corporation charged with certain specified- duties of government within its territorial limits. 11 C. J. 787, and Ford v. Delta & Pine Land Co., 164 U. S. 662, 17 S. Ct. 230, 41 L. ed. 590.

We think that the framers of the statute in question used the words “city” and “town” in the popular sense, as above stated, and only meant to place within the jurisdiction of the Arkansas Railroad Commission common carriers operating motor vehicles over a fixed route between cities and towns. The cities or towns are required to be the termini of the route. Stations might be established within, or reasonable distances without, the limits of said cities or towns for the purpose of receiving and discharging passengers or loading and unloading freight.

Under the agreed statement of facts, none of the defendants came under the provisions. of the act.

Haynes was operating a taxicab in the city of Hot Springs, and the mere fact that he went outside of the city on certain occasions to deliver passengers did not bring him within the provisions of the act in question.

The agreed statement of facts shows that Shick operated a sight-seeing bus, commencing its journey in the city -of Hot Springs and going to Re-mmel Dam and certain springs near, and returning to the city of Hot . Springs. In making the sight-seeing trip the bus did not go through any city or town. Consequently the operator did not come within the provisions of the statute.

*650Under the agreed statement of facts, Austeel operated a taxicab service from the hotels in the city of Hot Springs to the Hot Springs Country Club, or golf course, which was about three miles from the city limits. In going to and from the city to the golf 'course he did not go through any city or town. He only went to and from the hotels in the city to the golf course, when passengers desired such service.

The defendants all complied with the ordinance of the city of Hot Springs regulating the operation of taxicabs, and we are of the opinion- that, under the. facts stated, the defendants were not operating motor vehicles as prescribed in the act, and that the circuit court properly held that the Arkansas Railroad Commission had no jurisdiction over* them. It follows that the judgment in each case will be affirmed.