#### Jones v. Adkins.

Opinion delivered February 6, 1928.

*169 Arthur J. Jones, for appellant. .

Emerson, Donham & Fulk, for appellee.

Hart, C. J.,

(after stating the facts). The sole ground relied upon by the plaintiff for a reversal of the judgment is that, because he was a member of the Legislature, no order of dismissal could have been -made by the chancery court in the case.

Section 429 of Crawford & Moses’ Digest provides that the members of the Senate and House of Representatives shall be. privileged from arrest during the session of the General Assembly and .for fifteen days before the commencement and after the termination of each session. Section 430 provides that all proceedings in suits pendr ing in any of the courts of this State, in which any of the persons named in the preceding section are parties, shall be stayed during the time aforesaid. It is the contention of counsel for plaintiff that the dismissal of the action for the failure to give the bond for costs or to deposit one thousand dollars with the clerk of the court for the payment of the fees of the master, was a proceeding which should have been stayed under the provisions of the statute. We do not think so.

Proceedings, both in common parlance and in legal acceptance, imply action, procedure, and prosecution. Hence it indicates some steps taken or adopted in the prosecution or defense of an action. Beers v. Haughton, 9 Pet. (U. S.) 329, 9 L. ed. 145.

It is questionable, upon the facts appearing in the record before us, whether there was any proceeding before the court for trial. The court had already made an order that the action should be dismissed if the plaintiff did not make the deposit or give the bond required *170by tbe court within ten days. This the plaintiff not only failed,, bnt refused, to do. At the time the order now complained of was made, he was still refusing to comply with the former order of the court, and did not ask for time in which to comply with it. There was nothing to be done in the case except to enter of record a final order dismissing the case. No step requiring the presence of the plaintiff was necessary. No proceeding was to be taken in the case which required any action on his part or his presence in court. The simple entry of dismissal was not a proceeding in the ease which it was the intention of the framers of the statute to stay during the session of the General Assembly and for fifteen days before the commencement of and after the end of it.

Therefore the decree of the chancery court will be affirmed.