{
  "id": 1399978,
  "name": "Allison v. Cooper",
  "name_abbreviation": "Allison v. Cooper",
  "decision_date": "1928-04-02",
  "docket_number": "",
  "first_page": "826",
  "last_page": "829",
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      "type": "official",
      "cite": "176 Ark. 826"
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    "name_abbreviation": "Ark.",
    "id": 8808,
    "name": "Arkansas Supreme Court"
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      "cite": "221 S. W. 477",
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  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T17:05:04.337082+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
    "batch": "2018"
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  "casebody": {
    "judges": [],
    "parties": [
      "Allison v. Cooper."
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "Hart, C. J.,\n(after stating the facts). Under the Federal Bankruptcy Act, certain debts that are provable are nevertheless excepted from the operation of the discharge decree. Remington on Bankruptcy, 3d ed., vol. 7, \u00a7 3533. Under \u00a7 3537 it is said that liabilities for obtaining property by false pretenses or false representations are excepted from the operation of discharge. The author adds that this exception was added by the amendment of 1903, and took the place of the former provision that read: \u201cJudgments for fraud or for obtaining property by false pretenses or false representations.\u201d\nUpon the same subject we quote from Collier on Bankruptcy, 13 ed., vol. 1, page 613, the following:\n\u201cLiabilities for fraud, false pretenses and false representation. Before the amendment of 1903, a bankrupt might have been released from a debt contracted in' fraud, unless the fraud had been determined and ia judgment therefor had been rendered. As the law now stands, the frauds which will bar discharge are those connected with the obtaining of property by \u2018false pretenses or false representations.\u2019 \u2018Property\u2019 as here used has the meaning usually accorded to the word in similar statutes; it means something of substance; it includes money, but does not include services.\u201d\nIn Forsythe v. Vehmeyer, 177 U. S. 177, 20 S. Ct. 623, 44 L. ed. 723, it was held that a representation as to a fact, made knowingly, falsely and fraudulently, for the purpose of obtaining money from another, and by means of which such money is obtained, creates a debt by means of a fraud involving moral turpitude and intentional wrong, and such debt is not discharged by a discharge in bankruptcy.\nIn Bullis v. O\u2019Beirne, 195 U. S. 606, 25 S. Ct. 118, 49 L. ed. 340, it was held that on writ of\" error to a State court, reviewing its refusal to cancel a judgment after discharge of the debtor in bankruptcy, on the ground that the judgment was in action for fraud, the Federal question is not whether the complaint sufficiently charged fraud to warrant the judgment, but whether the action was for fraud; and if there are facts charged and found to the effect that false and fraudulent representations were made and relied on which, in the State court, were sufficient to warrant relief on the ground of fraud, the judgment comes within the exception of \u00a7 17 of the bankrupt act, and will not be canceled, although the suit may originally have been brought in equity for specific performance instead of for money judgment. A statement made fraudulently with knowledge of its falsity must necessarily be intended to deceive.\nIn the same case it was said that, whether the complaint specifically charged fraud to warrant the judgment given, was not a Federal question. The court further said that the question for it was whether the judgment rendered by the said court was in an action for fraud, and.that, if so, it was excepted from the effect of a discharge in bankruptcy.\nThe question therefore presented in this case is, was the judgment in favor of Allison in Allison v. Cooper, in the circuit court, as finally decided in this court, one within the meaning of the second exception to the bankruptcy act above referred.to? We think an examination of the record in that case, as well as the interpretation, of the pleadings and judgment by the opinion of this court in the case referred to, in 144 Ark. 82, 221 S. W. 477, shows that the relief was granted on the ground of false representations by Cooper which induced Allison to make the exchange of lands. Under the principles of law above decided, in order to bring the case within the operation of the bankruptcy statute and prevent the discharge of the bankrupt, it should be made to appear that the money or property was obtained by fraudulent representations, and that it was not therefore released by the discharge in bankruptcy.\nThe object of the statute is to prevent the bankrupt from retaining the benefits of property acquired or money secured by fraudulent representations. In Cooper v. Allison, 144 Ark. 82, 221 S. W. 477, the court said:\n\u201cThere is enough evidence, we think, to warrant the conclusion that the purchase by Parnell, and appellant\u2019s (appellee here) representations as to the opportunity to resell the property to Parnell, were not made in good faith, but were collusive between appellant and Parnell, and that those facts constituted \u00a1actionable deceit practiced by appellant upon appellee, which induced the latter to enter into a contract for exchange of properties.\u201d\nAs thus interpreted, we are of the opinion that the judgment in question was'based upon the fraudulent representations of Cooper, and the judgment sought to be revived in this case is, in our opinion, in \u00a1an action for fraud within the meaning of subdivision 2 of provable claims excepted from a discharge in bankruptcy in the Federal court.\nIt follows that the judgment will be reversed, and the cause will be remanded with directions to the circuit court.to issue the writ of scire facias and revive the judgment in accordance with the petition of S. Gr. Allison, and for further proceedings according to law and not inconsistent with this opinion.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "Hart, C. J.,"
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "O. H. Sumpter and Berry E. Randolph, for appellant."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "Allison v. Cooper.\nOpinion delivered April 2, 1928.\nO. H. Sumpter and Berry E. Randolph, for appellant."
  },
  "file_name": "0826-01",
  "first_page_order": 844,
  "last_page_order": 847
}