{
  "id": 1418442,
  "name": "Hurley v. Gus Blass Company",
  "name_abbreviation": "Hurley v. Gus Blass Co.",
  "decision_date": "1935-12-02",
  "docket_number": "4-4038",
  "first_page": "917",
  "last_page": "920",
  "citations": [
    {
      "type": "official",
      "cite": "191 Ark. 917"
    }
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  "court": {
    "name_abbreviation": "Ark.",
    "id": 8808,
    "name": "Arkansas Supreme Court"
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    "name": "Ark."
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        1897121
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    {
      "cite": "138 S. W. 1181",
      "category": "reporters:state_regional",
      "reporter": "S.W.",
      "case_ids": [
        8293203
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      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
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          "page": "9"
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    {
      "cite": "191 N. C. 127",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "N.C.",
      "opinion_index": 0
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  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T14:58:19.493067+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
    "batch": "2018"
  },
  "casebody": {
    "judges": [],
    "parties": [
      "Hurley v. Gus Blass Company."
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "Humphreys, J.\nThis suit was brought by appellants against appellee in the circuit: court of Pulaski County to recover damages for an injury received by one of appellants, Mrs. Blanche B. Hurley, in a fall when about to enter one of the elevators in the business house of appellee, on account of the. alleged defective condition of the floor in front of the elevator which she was about to enter. . The specific allegation as to the condition of the floor and the manner in which it caused her to fall is as follows:\n\u201cSaid floor, at the time plaintiff fell and received her injuries, was sloping* in places. Some of the floor boards were cracked, and there were raised joints in the floor, the ends of some of the boards being raised higher than the boards adjoining them. Because of said defects, the sole and heel of plaintiff\u2019s shoe caught upon the floor, and she was thereby violently thrown and caused to fall, which fall resulted in her injuries.\u201d\nAppellee filed an answer to the complaint denying each and every material allegation therein, and also pleaded contributory negligence on the part of appellants as a bar to recovery, even if injured in the manner alleged.\nThe testimony introduced by the respective parties upon the questions of negligence and contributory negligence was conflicting, and the issues of fact relative to both questions were submitted to the jury under instructions of the court, resulting in a verdict for appellee and a consequent judgment dismissing appellant\u2019s complaint, from which is this appeal.\nAppellants first contend for a reversal of the judgment because the court gave appellee\u2019s requested instruction No. 2, which is as follows:\n\u201cReasonable or ordinary care as used in these instructions means that degree of care which a careful and prudent person would exercise under like or similar circumstances. \u2019 \u2019\nIt is argued by the use of the word \u201ccareful\u201d in the instruction, a higher degree of care was required on the part of Mrs. Blanche B. Hurley than the law requires. It perhaps may have been more accurate to have omitted the word \u201ccareful.\u201d The words \u201ccareful\u201d and \u201cprudent,\u201d in referring to the conduct of an ordinary person, are commonly used in the same sense and could not have misled the jury. \u201c \u2018Prudent\u2019 and \u2018cautious\u2019 are used interchangeably in defining negligence; the difference, if any, between the two being infinitesimal. \u201d Malcolm v. Morresville Cotton Mills, 191 N. C. 127, 133 S. E. 7, 9; Southwest T. T. v. Sanders, Tex. Civ. App., 138 S. W. 1181-1184. Appellee\u2019s requested instruction No. 2 was not inherently erroneous.\nAppellants also contend for a reversal of the judgment because the court gave appellee\u2019s requested instruction. No. 5, which is as follows:\n\u201cYou are instructed that you are not to indulge in the presumption that the defendant was guilty of negligence simply because the plaintiff, Mrs. Hurley, sustained a fall and injury in defendant\u2019s store, but the burden of proof is upon the plaintiff to show by a preponderance of the evidence that her fall was occasioned solely through a defective condition of the floor of defendant\u2019s store, and that the condition of defendant\u2019s floor was such that a person of ordinary prudence would not have allowed it to exist.\u201d\nIt is argued that this instruction is erroneous because, by using the word \u201csolely,\u201d the right of appellants to recover is restricted to the defective condition of appellee\u2019s floor. The restriction was proper because this was the only allegation of negligence set up in the complaint against appellee, and the only thing which Mrs. Blanche B. Hurley testified caused her to fall. Appellee\u2019s requested instruction No. 5 Avas a correct declaration of law applicable to the facts.\nAppellant\u2019s next and last contention for a reversal of the judgment is that the court erred in giving appellee\u2019s requested instruction No. 10, which is as folloAvs: \u201cYou are instructed that it was the duty of Mrs. Hurley to exercise ordinary and reasonable care for her own safety while in defendant\u2019s store, and if you find that she negligently failed to use reasonable care for her own safety and her failure to use such care, if any, contributed in any degree, however slight, to her injury, then she cannot recover damages from the defendant.\u201d\nAppellants argue that the instruction is inherently erroneous because it contains the words \u201cany degree, however slight.\u201d The words were correctly inserted in the instruction. This court said in the case of Little Rock & Fort Smith Ry. Co. v. Miles, 40 Ark. 298-332, that:\n\u201cThe test of contributory negligence is, did the negligence contribute in any degree to produce the injury complained of1?\u201d\nAppellee\u2019s requested instruction No. 10 was a correct declaration of the law applicable to the facts.\nNo error appearing, the judgment is affirmed.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "Humphreys, J."
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "W. R. Donham, for appellants.",
      "Isgrig & Robinson, for appellee."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "Hurley v. Gus Blass Company.\n4-4038\nOpinion delivered December 2, 1935.\nW. R. Donham, for appellants.\nIsgrig & Robinson, for appellee."
  },
  "file_name": "0917-01",
  "first_page_order": 935,
  "last_page_order": 938
}