{ "id": 1410998, "name": "Rankin v. Morgan", "name_abbreviation": "Rankin v. Morgan", "decision_date": "1937-03-08", "docket_number": "4-4554", "first_page": "751", "last_page": "754", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "193 Ark. 751" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ark.", "id": 8808, "name": "Arkansas Supreme Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 34, "name_long": "Arkansas", "name": "Ark." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "79 S. W. (2d) 995", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.W.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "190 Ark. 579", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1421830 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/190/0579-01" ] }, { "cite": "218 S. W. 835", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.W.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "142 Ark. 308", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1590548 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/142/0308-01" ] }, { "cite": "200 S. W. 1029", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.W.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "132 Ark. 402", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1576781 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "410" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/132/0402-01" ] }, { "cite": "95 S. W. 455", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.W.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "78 Ark. 209", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1497312 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/78/0209-01" ] }, { "cite": "55 S. W. 18", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.W.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "67 Ark. 318", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1152577 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "319" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/67/0318-01" ] }, { "cite": "100 S. W. 898", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.W.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "82 Ark. 136", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1529075 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/82/0136-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 379, "char_count": 4992, "ocr_confidence": 0.509, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.6929403032688794e-07, "percentile": 0.6995264974907803 }, "sha256": "6cad089fc6c41a7197e6d5534c3c29044edb4f71fc7240e117aef5d46997d90b", "simhash": "1:9e65877095db914c", "word_count": 813 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T16:27:08.157459+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "Rankin v. Morgan." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "Baker, J.\nJ. E. Morgan sued the estate of L. H. Rankin and recovered a judgment for personal injuries suffered in an automobile collision in which Rankin was killed.\nFrom a judgment recovered against the estate of L. H. Rankin this appeal has been taken to test the correctness of a ruling of the trial court in permitting the plaintiff, appellee here, to testify as to the collision and incidents in relation thereto. It is urged that a recovery Avas necessarily based upon this alleged incompetent testimony, and that a reversal must folloAv should it be held that the testimony Avas improperly admitted over \u2022 objections.\nThe parties have favored us only to the extent that they have stated the issue without furnishing citations to authorities supporting their respective contentions. The reason for this is suggested by the almost unfruitful independent search AAre have made.\nSection 2 of the Schedule of the Constitution of Arkansas provides:\n\u201cInterest no disqualification. In civil action, no witness shall be excluded because he is a party to the suit or interested in the issue to be tried. Provided, in actions by or against executors, administrators or guardians, in which judgment may be- rendered for or against them, neither party shall be allowed to testify against the other as to any transactions with or statements of the testator, intestate or ward, unless called to testify thereto by the opposite party. Provided further, this section may be amended or repealed by the General Assembly.\u201d \u00a7 4144, Crawford & Moses\u2019 Digest.\nMorgan, a Avitness in his own behalf was permitted over objections of the administratrix, to relate the details of the accident. No statements of Rankin Avere involved. The objection was that this testimony was as \u2022 to \u201ctransactions with\u201d Rankin, now deceased, and therefore within the inhibition.\nSpecifically, it is, in this case, urged that-a head-on collision of a truck driven by Morgan and a passenger car driven by Rankin constitutes \u201ctransactions-with\u201d each other, and that Morgan, the survivor, may not testify in regard thereto over , the objection of the administrator.\nWe do not agree with this interpretation. Such is not the usual, common or ordinarily accepted meaning of the word \u201ctransaction.\u201d -\nThe word is defined: \u201cA business deal; ah act involving buying and selling; as, the transactions on the exchange.\u201d Its synonym is negotiation. Webster\u2019s New International Dictionary, Second Edition.\nThe placing of these terms \u201ctransaction with\u201d and \u201cstatements of\u201d in juxtaposition within the inhibitory clause indicates a certain affinity between .the two, ejusdem generis, the general or m\u00f3fe comprehensive is the first and the specific is the second.\nWe have not been favored with any citation of authority covering directly or by analogy the exact point under consideration. But there are decisions of this court illustrative of the conditions wherein the protection of this bit of the organic law may be invoked. Williams v. Walden, 82 Ark. 136, 100 S. W. 898. This case deals with transactions as distinguished from statements. The same condition prevails- in the case of Cash v. Kirkham, 67 Ark. 318, 319, 55 S. W. 18. See, also, Strayhorn v. McCall, 78 Ark. 209, 95 S. W. 455, 8 Ann. Cas. 377. In another case we said: \u201d\n\u201cIt is finally insisted that much of the testimony of Sol Bans is incompetent, because it involved transactions with the deceased Heiseman in a suit against his administrator, and thereby offends against the inhibition of \u00a7 2 of the Schedule of the Constitution prohibiting such evidence. The testimony that the relation between witness and Heiseman was one of unreserved and unlimited trust and confidence related to \u00e1 relationship, rather than to a transaction, and is not, therefore, incompetent. The testimony of Cans, that Heiseman suggested to him, at a meeting of the stockholders of the Co-Operative Real Estate Company, that they purchase the assets of that corporation, was incompetent, because it does relate to a transaction between the witness and the administrator\u2019s intestate.\u201d Lasker-Morris Banh & Trust Co. v. Gans, 132 Ark. 402, 410, 200 S. W. 1029. See, also, Zimmerman v. Hermann, 142 Ark. 308, 218 S. W. 835; Graves v. Bowles, 190 Ark. 579, 79 S. W. (2d) 995.\nIt may, therefore, be said that a party may not, over objection of the administrator, undertake to interpret or express what was in the mind of one whose estate he sues, by giving details of dealings, negotiations or transactions or by quoting statements made in relation to such matters. Since the disqualification of witnesses is not favored, we make the observation that we will not extend or expand by interpretation the limited compass of the terms discussed.\nA collision and incidents connected therewith are not transactions with the testator or intestate as the case may be.\nAffirmed.", "type": "majority", "author": "Baker, J." } ], "attorneys": [ "Sam Robinson and G. R. Colvin, for appellant.", "Tom F. Digby, for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "Rankin v. Morgan.\n4-4554\nOpinion delivered March 8, 1937.\nSam Robinson and G. R. Colvin, for appellant.\nTom F. Digby, for appellee." }, "file_name": "0751-01", "first_page_order": 769, "last_page_order": 772 }