{ "id": 1459833, "name": "Johnson v. State", "name_abbreviation": "Johnson v. State", "decision_date": "1939-10-02", "docket_number": "4130", "first_page": "871", "last_page": "874", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "198 Ark. 871" }, { "type": "parallel", "cite": "131 S.W.2d 934" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ark.", "id": 8808, "name": "Arkansas Supreme Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 34, "name_long": "Arkansas", "name": "Ark." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "166 S. W. 540", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.W.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "112 Ark. 282", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1538777 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/112/0282-01" ] }, { "cite": "127 S. W. 745", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.W.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "94 Ark. 343", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1545350 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/94/0343-01" ] }, { "cite": "197 Ark. 1016", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 8725197 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/197/1016-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 422, "char_count": 6089, "ocr_confidence": 0.507, "pagerank": { "raw": 5.286425800437643e-07, "percentile": 0.9420763527139999 }, "sha256": "972e520f089b6b57a7144f639b39905db06c9d9804447039557019b0769c3953", "simhash": "1:76523d73445bf092", "word_count": 1040 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T20:30:03.341287+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "Johnson v. State." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "Griefin Smith, C. J.\nThe defendant was convicted of arson and sentenced to ten years of penal servitude. It was alleged that he feloniously set fire to cotton contained in an automobile trailer..\nTwo errors assigned are (1) that the corpus delicti was not established by evidence independent of a confession, and (2) that the confession was not voluntary, and therefore it was inadmissible.\nSince the judgment must be reversed on the first ground, the second point will not be discussed.\nThe prosecuting witness Branch testified that the cotton in question was brought from one of his fields on the afternoon of October 24; that during the same day the defendant Johnson had been released from jail, where he had been held in connection with night-riding charges against other negroes; that the cotton was absolutely dry; that the trailer was placed in the barn or under a shed about 90 feet long; that exhaust from the tractor connected with the trailer was directed upward through a four-foot pipe; that the fire was discovered about daylight the morning\u2019 of October 25th; that physical facts indicated the cotton ignited at a point near the end of the -trailer and \u201cpractically on top of the load\u201d; that a levee is approximately fifty yards from the barn, with a road leading to it; that the destroyed cotton was worth $60, and the trailer was damaged to the extent of $10.\nThe defendant\u2019s wife and father were in jail at Osceola, held in connection with the night-riding charges heretofore referred to. Although the defendant in the instant case was kept in jail for some time, he was never formally accused of night-riding.\nAfter the fire had been extinguished Branch went to Joiner. He had no information with respect to origin of the fire, other than suspicion.\nA' deputy sheriff, testifying for the state, said that-he went to the Branch plantation the day of the fire \u201cand checked up very carefully as to the time.\u201d He ascertained that the defendant had spent the previous night with his mother, and that he left for Joiner early in the morning. Another witness saw appellant at Pecan Point between daylight and sun-up. At that time appellant was walking the gravel road rapidly, going in a direction away from the house\u2014a direction which would lead past the Branch plantation and the load of cotton.\nThis was the principal testimony tending to show that the fire was of incendiary origin.\nA special investigator, who had spent 18 years in the employ of the Frisco Railroad Company, took the defendant in an automobile and questioned him for several hours. A statement was made denying knowledge of the alleged crime. Later, in the sheriff\u2019s office, a confession was signed, and at the trial it was admitted in evidence.\nSection 4018 of Pope\u2019s Digest is: \u201cA confession of a defendant, unless made in open court, will not warrant a conviction unless accompanied with other proof that such offense was committed.\u201d\nWas there \u201cother proof\u201d that the offense was committed? We do not think so. It is possible\u2014perhaps probable\u2014that the defendant\u2019s confession was true. However, it is more important that the law\u2019s symmetry be preserved than it is that a criminal be punished in a particular case.\nThere is no presumption that an unexplained fire is of incendiary origin. Oh the contrary, the presumption is that such fire was caused by an accident, or, at least, that it was not of criminal design. In a prosecution for arson, as in other criminal cases, it is incumbent on the state to prove the corpus delicti, and it is now recognized as the universal rule in the law of arson that in order to establish the corpus delicti it is not only necessary that the state prove the burning of the building [or property] in question, but the evidence must also disclose that it was burned by the wilful act of some person criminally responsible for his acts, and not by natural or accidental causes.\nIn Alabama, California, Mississippi, Ohio, South Carolina, Tennessee, and some other states, the rule is that a predicate must be laid for the admission of a confession by introducing\" independent evidence of the corpus delicti. Our own cases do not seem to sharply draw this distinction. In Harshaw v. State it was said that \u201cIt is not essential that the corpus delicti be established by evidence entirely independent of the confession before the confession can be admitted and given probative force. The confession may be considered with other evidence tending to establish the guilt of the defendant. But, if there is no other evidence of the corpus delicti than the confession of the accused, then he shall not be convicted alone on his confession.\u201d\nIn discussing an instruction in Russell v. State we said: \u201cThe latter part of the instruction correctly tells the jury that the defendant\u2019s statement alone will not be sufficient to justify the finding that the appellant committed the crime charged against him, but that such statements could be considered by the jury along with other circumstances, if there are such circumstances, tending to show that the crime was, in fact, committed. \u2019 \u2019\nThe \u201cother evidence,\u201d and the \u201ccircumstances\u201d mentioned in these cases, and the requirements of the statute, must be of that substantial character which, independent of a confession, and considered without reference to what the accused is alleged to have said or \u25a0written, would suffice to overcome the legal presumption that the casualty was an accident, or that it resulted from natural events.\nIn the instant case the independent evidence was not of the character to meet the law\u2019s requirement. The judgment is therefore reversed, and the cause is remanded for a new trial.\nJohnson v. State, 197 Ark. 1016, 126 S. W. 2d 289.\n6 Corpus Juris Secundum, \u00a7 29, p. 746. See, also, 16 Corpus Juris, \u00a7 1514, pp. 735, 736, and 737.\n94 Ark. 343, 127 S. W. 745.\n112 Ark. 282, 166 S. W. 540.", "type": "majority", "author": "Griefin Smith, C. J." } ], "attorneys": [ "Claude F. Cooper and T. J. Croiuder, for appellant.", "Jack Holt, Attorney General, and Jno. P. Streepey, Asst. Atty. General, for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "Johnson v. State.\n4130\n131 S. W. 2d 934\nOpinion delivered October 2, 1939.\nClaude F. Cooper and T. J. Croiuder, for appellant.\nJack Holt, Attorney General, and Jno. P. Streepey, Asst. Atty. General, for appellee." }, "file_name": "0871-01", "first_page_order": 887, "last_page_order": 890 }