{ "id": 1456583, "name": "Missouri Pacific Transportation Company v. Porter", "name_abbreviation": "Missouri Pacific Transportation Co. v. Porter", "decision_date": "1939-11-20", "docket_number": "4-5654", "first_page": "225", "last_page": "229", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "199 Ark. 225" }, { "type": "parallel", "cite": "134 S.W.2d 513" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ark.", "id": 8808, "name": "Arkansas Supreme Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 34, "name_long": "Arkansas", "name": "Ark." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "48 S. W. 2d 548", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.W.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "185 Ark. 598", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1435276 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/185/0598-01" ] }, { "cite": "39 Ark. 387", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1898705 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/39/0387-01" ] }, { "cite": "42 Ark. 527", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 8724993 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/42/0527-01" ] }, { "cite": "76 S. W. 2d 307", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.W.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "189 Ark. 1132", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1425541 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/189/1132-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 473, "char_count": 7489, "ocr_confidence": 0.538, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.03580807328026e-08, "percentile": 0.054649325115093586 }, "sha256": "5dfd6a57adab954b012870a4eb4104f41aced4c8cb03d474c0ae1939ac63f252", "simhash": "1:04efc57278186dbe", "word_count": 1322 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T16:09:45.659289+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "Missouri Pacific Transportation Company v. Porter." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "Holt, J.\nAppellee brought suit against appellants in the Randolph circuit court to recover damages for injuries which she alleged she received while a passenger on a bus belonging to appellant, Missouri Pacific Transportation Company, and operated and driven by appellant, Clyde Fiveash, its employee.\nShe sets out in her complaint a general allegation that appellants (defendants below) were negligent in furnishing, maintaining and operating the bus in question at the time of her alleged injuries, and that without such negligence on the part of defendants the bus would not have been wrecked, and she would not have been injured.\nDefendants set up a general denial, and in addition pleaded contributory negligence and assumption of risk on the part of appellee.\nThe record reflects that appellee, Alma Porter, a colored woman, twenty-two years of ag\u2019e, boarded appellants\u2019 bus at Newport, Arkansas, at about 10:15 on the night of February 26,1938, and took her seat in the rear. In one hand she carried a suitcase and in the other an eighteen-months-old baby. She had been married, but was divorced.\nAfter the bus had been driven by appellant, Fiveash, about thirty-five miles, or within about five miles of Hoxie, on the eighteen-foot concrete highway between the two cities, the wheels on the left side of the bus left the pavement and traveled on the dirt shoulder some two hundred and forty feet when the bus struck some posts supporting mail boxes, swerved quickly to the right across the pavement, turned off of the highway dump, which was about four feet high, to the right, and overturned two or three times.\nAs a result, appellee received a.n injury to her head, many bruises and abrasions, and, according to the testimony of one of the doctors, her left leg was fractured between the linee and hip. This limb was in a cast for approximately one month and appellee was confined to her bed for three months following her injuries. There is evidence that her injuries are of a permanent nature.\nThe doctor, who testified on behalf of appellee, stated that while he made no X-ray of appellee\u2019s limb, yet that she was very thin and he could feel the bone fracture, and that upon an examination a short time before the trial he could feel a knot on the bone where the fracture had healed.\nThere is evidence that appellee suffered intense pain and still suffers to a certain extent. Before her injuries she was a strong and healthy woman and the only times that she had ever been sick were the occasions on the births of her two children. Sh\u00e9 had a position that would pay her $5 a week.\nThe only evidence, on the part of appellants, as to the cause for the overturning of the bus is that of appellant, Fiveash, and is very meager.\nThere were only five people on the bus at the time, the bus driver, Clyde Fiveash, appellee, her baby, and two others.\nMr. Fiveash testified: \u201c. . . and about four miles out of Iioxie, the bus started across the road and hit the shoulder- \u2014 it was soft dirt, and struck a mail box and I tried to straighten it back up and it seems as though I went down the road apiece, and it took out again, and went a little further and then it turned over. . . . Q. What- was it that caused this bus to start going across the road? A. That, I don\u2019t know. There was a catch or something in the front end. Q. Was the bus in good condition at Newport? A. Yes, sir. Q. Did it run all right up to that point? A. Yes, sir.\u201d\nOn a trial to a jury, appellee was awarded damages in the sum of $2,500.\nAppellants urge here that there is no substantial evidence of negligence presented to take the case to the . jury, and that the verdict is excessive.\nWe are unable to agree with either contention.\nIt is our view that the evidence presented in this record, some of which we have set out above, when considered in its strongest light in favor of appellee, is substantial, and fully warranted the jury in returning a verdict in favor of appellee. When we determine here that there is substantial evidence to support the jury\u2019s verdict, we do not disturb it.\nThere is no evidence in this record that would indicate that appellee was guilty of any kind of negligence on her part contributing to her injuries. In fact, appellants do not so contend.\nThe bus driver\u2019s only explanation of what might have caused the bus to overturn was, \u201cI don\u2019t know. There was a catch- or\"something in the front end.\u201d\nWe think that the jury would have been justified from the testimony in concluding that Fiveash negligently lost control of the bus, thereby causing it to overturn and injure appellee.\nAppellants earnestly insist that the verdict is excessive. The evidence shows that appellee, at the time of her injuries, was a young negro woman, twenty-two years of age, and the mother.of two. children, one of which is now dead. Her injuries caused much pain, severe shock, fracture of the femur bone of the left leg, and injury to her head, shoulder, hip, and right arm. There was also evidence that her back was injured in the sacro-iliac region. She was in bed for approximately three months, and it was necessary to place the fractured limb in a cast for a month or more. Her physician testified that her injuries would be permanent.\nAs this court said in Coca-Cola Bottling Company of Arkansas v. Cordell, 189 Ark. 1132, 76 S. W. 2d 307:\n.\u201cVerdicts are set aside for this cause (excessiveness) only when they are not supported by proof, or when they ale so excessive as to indicate passion, prejudice, or an incorrect appreciation of the law applicable to the case. Texas & St. L. Ry. Co. v. Eddy, 42 Ark. 527; Kelly v. McDonald, 39 Ark. 387.\n\u201cWhile the discretion of the jury is very wide, it is not an arbitrary or unlimited discretion, but it must be exercised reasonably, intelligently, and in harmony with the testimony before them. The amount of damages to be awarded for breach of contract, or in actions for tort, is ordinarily a question for the jury; and this is particularly true in actions for personal injuries and other personal torts, especially where a recovery is sought for mental suffering. 8 R. C. L. 657, \u00a7 199.\n\u201cThe amount of recovery in a case of this sort should be such, as nearly as can be, to compensate the injured party for his injury. The suit is for compensation, and compensation means that which constituted or is regarded as an equivalent or recompense; that which compensates for loss or privation, remuneration. M. P. Ry. Co. v. Remel, 185 Ark. 598, 48 S. W. 2d 548.\n\u201cThe extent of the injury and the amount of recovery were questions of fact for the jury, and there is nothing in this case to indicate passion, prejudice, or an incorrect appreciation of the law applicable to the case. This court, as was said in Texas & St. L. Ry. Co. v. Eddy, supra, cannot set aside a verdict if it is supported by proof, and when there is nothing to indicate passion, prejudice, or an, incorrect appreciation of the law applicable to the case. \u2019 \u2019\nWe do not think the size of the verdict in the instant case evidences passion or prejudice on the part ,of the jury, or misapplication of the law as announced by the trial court, and, therefore, we do not feel warranted in reducing the amount.\nOn the whole case, we find no errors, and the judgment is accordingly affirmed.", "type": "majority", "author": "Holt, J." } ], "attorneys": [ "Westbroohe & Westbroohe, for appellant.", "Richardson & Richardson, for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "Missouri Pacific Transportation Company v. Porter.\n4-5654\n134 S. W. 2d 513\nOpinion delivered November 20, 1939.\nWestbroohe & Westbroohe, for appellant.\nRichardson & Richardson, for appellee." }, "file_name": "0225-01", "first_page_order": 243, "last_page_order": 247 }