{
  "id": 1456529,
  "name": "Jones v. Garratt, Chancellor",
  "name_abbreviation": "Jones v. Garratt",
  "decision_date": "1940-01-22",
  "docket_number": "4-5922",
  "first_page": "737",
  "last_page": "740",
  "citations": [
    {
      "type": "official",
      "cite": "199 Ark. 737"
    },
    {
      "type": "parallel",
      "cite": "135 S.W.2d 859"
    }
  ],
  "court": {
    "name_abbreviation": "Ark.",
    "id": 8808,
    "name": "Arkansas Supreme Court"
  },
  "jurisdiction": {
    "id": 34,
    "name_long": "Arkansas",
    "name": "Ark."
  },
  "cites_to": [
    {
      "cite": "135 S. W. 2d 857",
      "category": "reporters:state_regional",
      "reporter": "S.W.2d",
      "case_ids": [
        1456586
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/ark/199/0750-01"
      ]
    },
    {
      "cite": "198 Ark. 756",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Ark.",
      "case_ids": [
        1459730
      ],
      "weight": 2,
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/ark/198/0756-01"
      ]
    },
    {
      "cite": "100 S. W. 2d 249",
      "category": "reporters:state_regional",
      "reporter": "S.W.2d",
      "opinion_index": 0
    },
    {
      "cite": "193 Ark. 391",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Ark.",
      "case_ids": [
        1410967
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/ark/193/0391-01"
      ]
    }
  ],
  "analysis": {
    "cardinality": 319,
    "char_count": 4451,
    "ocr_confidence": 0.544,
    "pagerank": {
      "raw": 1.231408380556586e-07,
      "percentile": 0.6057580963214457
    },
    "sha256": "0776bace3d261640be9f872fc648e10dc543edf3cfa370f43ced8dd3ee83a5d7",
    "simhash": "1:e39d9c06202c34c3",
    "word_count": 718
  },
  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T16:09:45.659289+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
    "batch": "2018"
  },
  "casebody": {
    "judges": [],
    "parties": [
      "Jones v. Garratt, Chancellor."
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "Per Curiam.\nPetitioner alleges that, unless the chancery court is restrained, it will unlawfully proceed with trial in a cause wherein petitioner is defendant; also, that the court will permit execution to issue on a judgment for $7,132.19 rendered against petitioner in such court.\nTransactions prompting the petition are these: John E. Jones has for many years been circuit clerk of Garland county. It. was claimed on behalf of the county that certain fees and commissions collected by Jones in 1931, 1932, 1933, 1934 and 1935, had not been fully accounted for. Suit to surcharge the clerk\u2019s settlements was, in 1936, dismissed on demurrer. On appeal the order was reversed, and the cause remanded with directions. State, Use and Benefit of Garland County v. Jones, 193 Ark. 391, 100 S. W. 2d 249.\nOn remand the defenses interposed were sustained, with dismissal of the complaint. This court sustained the chancellor\u2019s finding that settlements of 1931 and 1932 were barred by limitation. In other respects, the decree was reversed, and the cause remanded with directions to ascertain whether any sums were due for 1933, 1934, and 1935. State, Use and Benefit of Garland County, et al. v. Jones, 198 Ark. 756, 131 S. W. 2d 612.\nThe petition for prohibition alleges that this court\u2019s mandate on the second remand was filed in Garland county October 25, 1939. Thereafter supplemental complaint was filed alleging the clerk\u2019s failure to account for certain excess fees and commissions collected in 1936, 1937,1938 and 1939.\nIn compliance with this court\u2019s directions the chancellor ascertained what sums were due for the accountable years, and gave judgment December 18, 1939. The order recites submission of the cause December 13, and judgment nunc pro tunc.\nOctober 18,1939, the prosecuting attorney filed complaint in circuit court \u201c. . . for the purpose of recovering excess salaries and fees for the years 1933,1934, 1935, 1936, 1937, 1938 and 1939.\u201d The indebtedness was alleged in blank. By amendment December 15 overcharges for 1933, 1934 and 1935 were stated as $3,858.50. For 1936 and 1937 the demand was $3,873.55. It was then alieged that \u201cthe defendant is also indebted to the plaintiff for excess salary and fees collected during the years 193.8 and 1939, but at the time of the filing of this amendment the comptroller\u2019s office has not filed its report of audit for the years 1938 and 1939, but as soon as said reports are filed the complaint will be amended to show said amounts.\u201d\nThree days after the amended complaint was filed the court gave .judgment for $816.90, \u201c. . . this being the aggregate amount due for all of the years\u201d enumerated.\nThe judgment recites that \u201c. . . by agreement of the parties the cause is submitted to the court upon the plaintiff\u2019s complaint and amendment to the complaint, the defendant\u2019s answer, oral testimony, and statement of counsel, from all of which the court finds that the indebtedness [for the seven-year period] is $816.90.\u201d\n\"What the so-called \u201coral testimony\u201d was is not disclosed.\nBy statute the state comptroller is required to determine facts necessary to an adjudication of that character of claims alleged in the prosecuting attorney\u2019s complaint. Neither the prosecuting attorney nor the court had all of the information contemplated by law when the judgment was rendered. A valid chancery court judgment of more than seven thousand dollars was \u201cabsorbed\u201d and in effect set aside by the circuit court, while at the same time claims aggregating $3,873.55 for 1936 and 1937, together with alleged, but unstated items for 1938 and unknown and unknowable demands for 1939, were reduced to $816.\nThis arbitrary conduct is shocking to public sensibilities, and if unrestrained would paralyze justice.\nIn the face of such a record this court is now asked to participate in the transaction by prohibiting the chancery court from continuing to perform its duties.\nThe chancellor rightly rendered judgment and has properly declined to relinquish jurisdiction in respect of the amended complaint. Having acquired jurisdiction, such jurisdiction was exclusive. [See cases cited in Cause No. 5885 this day decided \u2014 Butt, Prosecuting Attorney, et al. v. Southwestern Distilled Products, Inc., post p. 750, 135 S. W. 2d 857.]\nThe writ is denied.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "Per Curiam."
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Jay M. Rowland, for petitioner.",
      "G. A. Stanfield, for respondent."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "Jones v. Garratt, Chancellor.\n4-5922\n135 S. W. 2d 859\nOpinion delivered January 22, 1940.\nJay M. Rowland, for petitioner.\nG. A. Stanfield, for respondent."
  },
  "file_name": "0737-01",
  "first_page_order": 755,
  "last_page_order": 758
}